233.8 F811
Class Book
General Theological Seminary Library
CHELSEA SQUARE, NEW YORK

Purchased from the fund bequeathed to the Seminary by
EUGENE AUGUSTUS HOFFMAN, D. D.
DEAN 1879-1902

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/manimageofgod0000hube_i3g1

MAN AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
OF CANADA, LIMITED
TORONTO

MAN AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

BY

HUBERT M. FOSTON

D.Lit. (Lond.)

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1930

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

LIBRARY

NEW YORK

2338
F811
89296

COPYRIGHT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

Loved One, whose limpid Thought refreshes mine,
Whose Feeling blends my reverent awes with thine,
Whose steadfast Will shines in thy dear frank eyes,
Thou dost *adorn* what I *psychologize!*

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	Introduction	1
II.	Some History of Psychology	8
III.	Intellect and the Trinity	27
IV.	Willing and the Trinity	38
V.	Feeling and the Trinity	53
VI.	Critical Review	72
VII.	Intellect and the Creation	85
VIII.	Self-Consciousness and the Incarnation	122
IX.	Estimates	137
X.	Expository Applications	161
XI.	The Likeness of Love in the Universe	170
XII.	Summary and Conclusion	208

MAN AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 1895 British psychologists and philosophers saw a page of their profound organ, *Mind*, decorated with an unusual diagram. The subjects which it took up were familiar enough in current scientific discussion, but it brought them together in an unfamiliar way. Seventeen pages of argument accompanied it,[1] and apparently tried to commend themselves by an occasional note of hilarity in that serious journal. They seemed to point to some sort of relation, not thought of before, between the human mind and the varied life springing up in the surrounding world. It was a relation which, if it subsisted, would be decidedly curious. The particulars of the argument must have appeared either more or less weighty, or oddly interesting, in the eyes of

1 "Organic Evolution and Mental Elaboration," *Mind*, Vol. IV, N.S., No. 16.

eminent authority, or they would never have found a place in *Mind*.

But not even eminent authority could have penetrated to the fact that at the back of an article so entirely without explicit reference to religion lay a thought of the belief which finds assertion week by week throughout the land in the recital of the well-worn words, " I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth: And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord. . . . I believe in the Holy Ghost . . ." The article contained purely scientific arguments about subjects on which scientific men were busy, and relied for its acceptance upon its purely intellectual soundness. Yet it was in its real essence part of a range of deductions arrived at by viewing this ' Christian doctrine of the Trinity '—for it seems we have to use labels even where we most shrink from them—in connection with something much more modern. This something more modern was the present psychological doctrine of the nature of man, which declares the constancy of a threefold character in all our experience. We shall see [1] this threefold view developing very late in the history of psychology, but it is quite popularly reflected in the cardinal statement that we *think*, and *feel*, and *will*.

The article was written in the impulsive haste of three-and-twenty to be making a start; the larger thought behind it was not one to be set out publicly without more preparation. Mean-

[1] Chapter II.

while it probably seemed significant to the writer that his deductions should have been found to have sufficient directly scientific weight to be set forward for the consideration of contemporary thinkers in so authoritative a journal. Other articles appeared in *Mind*, after an interval of years, from the same hand, still with some bearing on the subject, and still with the bearing undisclosed. After a third of a century it may not be premature to acknowledge the underlying thought in the form which it has at last assumed.

The argument putting forth leaf of some kind from roots thus invisible was partly historical.

Long ago God, beyond the scientific scope, was declared to be 'tri-une'; and the 'Trinity in Unity' was a problem of endless difficulty to old ecclesiastical thought. How should the 'threeness' be conceived without injury to the 'oneness,' and belief in the oneness be accompanied by due recognition of the threeness? Stated abstractly, does it sound like an unreal problem? Was all the difficulty due to the logic which tried to devise gratuitous harmony for the hopeless inconsistencies of theological imaginings? If that were all, it might be just a little curious to bring what psychologists were doing in a much later day into comparison with it. We might, we shall see, find the psychologists, as they developed their account of the invisible life which we speak of as going on 'within us,' protecting the idea of an essential oneness in our experience while they insisted on its fundamental 'three-

ness ' (' knowing,' ' feeling,' ' willing ')—and we might notice that they were keeping the intimate balance with a delicacy and an insistence not altogether dissimilar to that of the old theologians.

But those who were shaping modern psychology were not as a rule very greatly interested in ancient (or modern) discussions about the Trinity; those who were expert in ecclesiastical history did not always cherish a devotion which amounted to passion for a newly developing psychology. Suppose, however, that someone had been deeply interested in both sides of the study,—and had held them both in view without quite losing the springtide freshness of the New Testament intuitions of God through over-immersion in old-time conflict, and in the special logic by which ecclesiastical councils tried to meet the emergencies of their days. Suppose he had compared the triple outlining of his own mind now being delivered to him by psychology with the threefold vision of God dawning at the beginning of the Christian era. He might have been struck by something more than the fact of a threeness-in-oneness being present in both. When he considered the *special* character of each of the ' phases ' of mind, and the special sphere of being or activity ascribed to each of the three memberships of the Trinity, he might have been arrested by a very notable likeness between what had been said of God and what was being said of mind. The more special resemblances, the more deeply

he pondered them, might become the more difficult to dismiss as accidental.

But now, to explain why anyone *should* ponder them, and even burden himself to write a book for others upon them. Suppose investigation convinced our enquirer that the resemblance between the *early* implications about God and the *later* crystallizing discovery about man could not be set down to chance. What might he begin to think? He knows of a teaching in the psychological world that man has made God in his own image; he knows of a teaching in the religious world that God has made man in His own image. If the religious teaching had fact behind it, it would be quite natural that something fundamental should first be made known about God, and that something comparable, but immeasurably different in scale and in personal distinctness, should later on be discovered about man. If it be the other way, if man made God in his own image, how did man at the beginning of the Christian era begin to achieve a complicated thought of God after an image in himself which he would not discover for centuries after? Assume that the parallel between the psychological and the theological doctrines can ultimately be made out. That may seem a very large assumption: I do not say it is not—but anyone who is going to dismiss the whole forthwith as a fancy beneath his intelligence may perhaps reasonably remember that papers containing deductions from it, and reflections bearing upon it, have appeared both

in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in *Mind*, which was also receiving the communications of the highest philosophical intellect in the country. Now if it *were* made out, would it begin to seem as if Christian doctrine, instead of being a matter of purely human opinion—a mere development of human *cultus* and thought—was based on some knowledge which at the beginning of the Christian era was not available to the general human intellect? The gravity of such an issue will surely be at once in some measure evident.

Perhaps the first non-Christian answer might be that although men did not *explicitly recognize* the three characters in their own experience, they might (to use the modern psychological phrase) be *subconsciously aware* of them. Then, half-knowing without knowing that they knew, might they not (the psychologist may ask) 'refer' them to an imagined Divine Being before they outright distinguished them in their own obscure inner life? More practically, it might be suggested that men were under the pressure of *needs* arising from their threefold nature, without distinguishing the threefold nature itself, and supposed for themselves forms of Divine manifestation to meet such needs. I think it can be shown that theories on these lines would have much ado before they could cover the facts, and would have to be shaped into very gratuitous appropriateness. And there would still be a question why this apparently crowning accomplishment in concealed 'anthro-

pomorphism '—*i.e.*, the envisagement of God after human form—should have been performed just when and where it was. But I shall have to show reason, scientifically based, why this theory of merely subconscious development quite *definitely* would not work here.

The contents of the first article in *Mind*—contents which I shall reorganize and amplify—form part of the material for a stubborn breakwater against the inflow of this kind of explanation upon the strange resemblances. And they will have a further use in showing that the truth of the analogy with which we are concerned would *not* imply that the three ' persons ' of the Trinity are distinct merely as thinking, feeling, and willing are distinct in us. We shall see where ' personality ' falls into the scheme.

But our first business will be to trace the history of the modern crystallization of the threefold conception of human experience. Grip upon the past will be necessary, I think, for any due appreciation of the more recent situation in psychology, developing since the article to which I have referred was written. We shall need some critical knowledge, in particular, of the different attitudes taken in pre-Christian days, in more modern times, and again quite recently, to the fact—if we take it for a fact—that man not only thinks and wills, but *feels*.

CHAPTER II

SOME HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

PLAIN John Locke more than two centuries ago found himself surrounded by learned humbug. It was not deliberate humbug; but men of learned tradition were led astray by assuming that their ancestral teachers, and they after them, could think in a refined way in which no man really *did* think; and consequently plumed themselves on being familiar with things about which no one knew anything at all—so in general Locke felt. They were impeding the progress of science by a tangle of unreal notions; and Locke set himself to go to the root of the matter, and clear the ground, by showing how the mind actually worked, and what it could do and could not do. He did not originate the study of the intellect; but he might almost be said to have given the study a new function. It has been said of him that "he was the first to watch patiently the operations of his mind, that, watching, he might surprise the evanescent thoughts, and steal from them the secret of their combinations."[1]

In his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*

[1] Lewes: *History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, ch. iv.

Locke found place to distinguish 'powers' called the Understanding and the Will. In this he followed the tradition founded by Aristotle, who philosophized in Greece two thousand years before. But earlier than Aristotle there was a symptom (if it could have been interpreted) of something more than these characters waiting to be reckoned with in any full account of experience. Thinkers interested in *conduct* had debated whether the proper end of all human activity was pleasure, with the avoidance of pain. And such discussion was still vigorous in nineteenth-century England. But it does not seem to have occurred to anyone in Locke's day that feeling—the experience of pleasure and pain—was worthy of a cardinal place together with the understanding and the will in a more fully organized study of mind.

Feeling, however, was to assert itself before the beginning of the nineteenth century in the wider world of daily life. A tide of human pity had broken through the artificialities of the periwigged and pretentiously classical eighteenth century; and it seems natural to suppose that it was by a current, or combination of currents, of the same movement that a great effect was ultimately produced upon the outward shape even of psychology. This was the century, not only of the ungenially brilliant Pope, but also of the still beloved (if 'celebrated') Dr. Johnson, so memorably compassionate, though so privileged in bearishness—and likewise of his cat 'Hodge.'

There was, indeed, in eighteenth-century England a new 'humanism,' finding expression, not as the humanism of the Renaissance, in the labours of poets and painters for princes, but rather, say, in a dauntless University man's[1] solicitude for the inner life of the poor and neglected and the ignorantly violent; in the unrestrainable enterprise of an English country magistrate,[2] whose sense of the wretchedness of the prisoners whom he had to sentence led him into toils which ended only with his dying of camp-fever as far away as Russia; in the sincerity of the sore-wounded poet of the freshly seen English countryside,[3] thrilling with compassion for the manhood *he* could discern in the far-off slave, and even introducing into English poetry the note of familiar tenderness for animals; and there was, besides, a literature of more theatrical tenderness, varying from the masterly to the mawkish. On the speculative side it is notable that early in the century the third Earl of Shaftesbury had put forth a novel theory of morals which turned attention from abstract reason to men's social affections, as the centre of interest (and the seventh Earl, whose lowly labours for unhappy children helped to carry on the deeper movement through the nineteenth century, no doubt abominated the theory).

Shaftesbury's writing seems to have attracted and sustained special interest in Germany, where there was later on an almost fantastic devotion to

[1] John Wesley. [2] Howard. [3] Cowper.

imaginative English literature. Prominent among the exemplars of that turn of speculation in Germany upon which the force of new sentiment bore so energetically was Mendelssohn, silk-merchant and thinker—grandfather of the Mendelssohn who translated the spirit of consolation into music as it spread more widely through the following century. From the group with which the elder Mendelssohn is bound up in the history of thought arose the demand that the impressible feeling side of mental life should be recognized as well as the contemplative intellectual and the energetic active sides. Kant took it up—a philosophical giant under the figure of a dry little clockwork man. So it came about that the capacity for *Feeling*, with its unmeasured intensities, the side of us on which we are open to be touched or exhilarated, became established as one of the three cardinal topics in the study of our own life through the authority of the thinker who in his old age turned away in boredom at the charm of the springtime that was only ' the same all the years.' [1] About the reflection of this more deeply hidden and sensitive aspect of life on the surface of psychology there has all along been something paradoxical.

[1] Kant died at eighty. I cannot resist Mrs. Ann Gilbert (the Ann Taylor of the crisp old poetry for children), who writes in a letter at eighty-two : " Everything around is so beautiful—trees, flowers, haymaking in perfection, and every day a drive through the beautiful wriggles of the tree'd-up lanes. I do not know when I have enjoyed a country holiday so much " (Harpenden, 1862—*Autobiography*, Vol. II, p. 293).

As not only the threefold distinction itself, but also its late emergence, enters into the underlying thought which we have to define, we shall glance for a moment at Sir William Hamilton lecturing in Edinburgh to the youth of Scotland and other countries from 1836 to 1856. He effectually introduced the threefold base for the study of mind into this country, where, as we have seen, the vital impulse which probably led to its shaping was early at work. Recording that the words *psychology* and *psychological* have lately and belatedly 'come into common use'[1] in our insular English—the use is much more common to-day, though it does not seem long since it was an unenvied distinction to be able to spell them—he remarks that the threefold statement "was first promulgated by Kant; and the felicity of the distribution was so apparent that it has now been long all but universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of every school."[2] "To the psychologists of this country," he adds, "it is apparently wholly[3] unknown. They still adhere

[1] *Metaphysics*, Vol. I, p. 130.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[3] Apparently not wholly. Dugald Stewart, his predecessor at the University, in his *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, speaks of the mind as "something which feels, thinks, and wills," on the second page; repeats it in a footnote on the next; and does nothing more with it in the nearly 600 which follow. Hamilton, too, in his edition of the *Works* of Reid, who is still earlier (1710–96), incidentally cites at the close of Chapter vi of the third of the *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* the following words of Reid himself in a communication to Lord Kames: "I am not thought; I am not action; I am not

to the old scholastic division into powers of the Understanding and powers of the Will; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into Intellectual and Active powers."

We may start a closer examination of the whole subject from the dignified professor's own summary, which is open to exception for something more than the 'Unconditioned' state of its grammar. "Taking," he says, ". . . a survey of the mental modifications, or phenomena, of which we are conscious,—these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great classes. *In the first place, there are the phenomena of Knowledge; in the second place, there are the phenomena of Feeling, or the phenomena of Pleasure and Pain; and, in the third place, there are the phenomena of Will and Desire.*" [1]

That, in the main, is what is still held to-day. But if there is anything which the three distinguishable characters in our experience do *not* do, it is to 'divide' themselves.

If, for example, you are reading this book, and understanding and it may be criticizing it, you are 'knowing'—there is a process of 'intellection' going on; if you are irritated by it, or if,

---

feeling; but I think, and act, and feel. Thoughts, actions, feelings, change every moment, but *self*, to which they belong, is permanent." For working purposes, however, Reid follows "that general division which is the most common, into the powers of *understanding*, and those of *will*." (*Essay* I, ch. vii, *init.*).

[1] *Metaphysics*, Vol. I, p. 183 (*italics mine*).

on the other hand, you should happen to be 'uncommon suited wi' it,' as we say in Leicestershire, you are 'feeling' (though 'irritation' or the opposite does not describe *your feeling itself*, which is always a more mysterious experience than you may yet realize); and if you are deliberately determined to keep on with the book, you are 'willing.' Sometimes the intellection may be absorbing; sometimes the feeling may be more excited; and if you are 'musical,' and someone begins to sing, and you are determined to read on, the willing might become more prominent than the knowing, and the sentences might be blank while you struggled for your grip.

So it is all through life. Substituting 'striving' for 'willing,' as covering the dim impulses still present when we scarcely 'will,' we may say that in every moment and in all circumstances we are knowing-*cum*-feeling-*cum*-striving in one commingled current of living, rather than separately knowing, and separately feeling, and separately striving. Although to express the changing complexion of your life during some seconds of a minute, or through some whole minute of an hour, you might sometimes print one of the three words in very large capitals, and sometimes another, yet in giving a balanced account of your experience at any moment you would never leave one of them out.

Such in general, and in very wide admission, was the situation which opened up before the professedly scientific student of human experience as

the nineteenth century grew into that peculiar sense of being the century of the centuries which distinguished its later years. And by now the distinction has passed beyond the treatises and the manuals and, in such forms as 'all I think, all I feel, all I do,' has become a commonplace of the literature of reflection and exhortation. For a specially interesting illustration of its usefulness in promoting balance in social aim we might turn to the opening chapter of Professor J. A. Thomson's little *Introduction to Science*, where, with characteristic catholicity, he begins by finding room in the world for the practical man, the sympathetic man, and the scientific man, and acknowledges the contributions and the dangers of their prevailing moods (all more or less represented in all of us); and the eminent biologist sums up with words in the light of which even eminent psychologists might reconsider their scientific and practical aims: "*The scientific mood is especially marked by a passion for facts . . . and by a sense of the inter-relatedness of things. It is contrasted with the emotional . . . mood and with the practical mood, but the three form a trinity (of knowing, feeling and doing), which should be unified in every normal life.*" [1]

Amid the changed, multiform, and internally

[1] P. 34. It is interesting to find in a sermon (otherwise little to our purpose), by Prof. Robert Flint on "The Image of God," the statement: "A spirit has intellect, affection, and will; and if it bear the image of God at all it must bear it in and on these."—*The Pulpit Analyst*, Vol. III. (1868), pp. 481–499.

unsettled psychologizing of the present day the fundamental distinctions still find a plain acceptance: the consequence of the acceptance is not perhaps so plain.

In typical recent text-books you will find such statements as these: "It is generally admitted that all mental activity has these three aspects, cognitive, conative, affective;"[1] "the mind or the subject has three fundamental faculties—the cognitive, the conative, and the affective—the faculties of knowing, of striving, of feeling."[2] Or again: "The psychologist speaks of three ultimate modes of being conscious, knowing, feeling, and striving or willing. To speak in such a way is somewhat misleading, for no experience is pure knowing, or pure feeling, or pure willing; every experience is all three. . . . In their most elementary and undeveloped forms the three elements may be said to be sensation, interest, and instinct. . . . Every development of human knowledge, human character, and human conduct may be traced ultimately back to these three elements."[3]

Such being the recognition, is it adequately followed up? Given that these three aspects are really 'fundamental,' so that no one of them can be shown to be a mere phase of either of the others, and given that they are each of them

[1] M'Dougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 266 (Great Britain, 1923).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

[3] Drever, *Psychology of Everyday Life*, Third Edition, 1922, p. 14.

apparently omnipresent in experience, it might seem to be of first importance to contemplate our experience as definitely as possible from the point of view of *each* aspect, and to be *fundamentally* careful to saturate ourselves in the results. It might seem desirable to do this as steadily as we could, to help to ensure that we were holding our experience in a balanced view.

But psychology, in a present phase of its development, seems (whether through oversight or conviction, or both) to be leaving this way of impartially contemplative enquiry very much aside. It may be admitted that the psychology of yesterday showed a tendency to be predominantly intellectual, but the psychology of to-day is much more predominantly, even absorbedly, a psychology of active impulse: indeed, it proceeds very much as if it could be definitely known that the other phases existed only for the purpose of subserving the phase of striving, as supreme in importance. But can this subordination be a matter of scientific knowledge? To discern the whole purpose, or to determine the ultimate significance and value, of anything that we do not ourselves construct is not the business of scientific method, and is recognized to be beyond its scope. It seems difficult to be sure that the prevailing assumption of present psychology has really been scientifically ascertained, or is permanently settled.

It may be true that our reflections upon striving have naturally a wider scope than our reflections

upon knowing or feeling. Where we have living things to which we should hesitate to attribute either intelligence or the capacity for enjoyment or suffering—beets and onions, for example—their growth and self-preservation may yet strongly appeal to us under the aspect of a striving. And in concentrating upon that one aspect the science of psychology assimilates itself more closely to the science of biology, which studies the structures and activities of living things in general. But that seems to be no sufficient reason why psychology should compromise its own larger distinctness of base, and no sufficient ground for surrendering its own unique possibilities of originality as a science.

In common affairs we know that the life which is full of avid movement, and is called 'practical' by those who live it, will often seem to itself to be the one obvious kind of life. Yet in its very preoccupation with its own form of success it may so narrow its vision, so lose respect for all but one kind of interest, that it may tend to dry up its capacity for appreciating the import of any object other than a now fundamentally objectless pursuit. This barren directness of mental life has a way of supporting its self-sufficiency by the very blankness of its limitation. I do not rid myself of the misgiving that a triumphantly modern one-sided psychology of 'urge,' with all its new-found effectiveness and prosperity, may not be wholly free from the bias, nor wholly unaffected by that partial blindness, which we

know to be so characteristic of the too exclusively practical way of life in the everyday world. Nor can I be sure that its methods will not subtly foster in human society both the development and the approval of something too like this insufficiently rooted and typically restless manner of living.

Our specific bias in psychology is perhaps being favoured by a social addiction to which a more balanced psychology ought to be indirectly supplying a corrective. In the eighteenth century feeling gained recognition, we estimated, as a result of Europe's emotional self-surprise. That our consciousness of striving, on the other hand, should by now have become disproportionately and even irritably enhanced through a more recent self-surprise both of Europe and America is hardly a topic for simple wonder. Knowledge has yielded to us a practical and mechanical control of nature with which we overwhelm ourselves. And modern life is turned outward: much opportunity for *doing*, on narrow reserves of life, rushes us out into haste for bigness, accompanied by a taste for unrestrained publicity. But it is not amid clatter in which we cannot hear ourselves speak, nor while we eagerly scan the quickly staling novelties of 'records' surpassing 'records,' nor even while we discuss with one another our own modest feats in motor-driving, that a stillness will come upon us in which the stirred depths of feeling within us will reach after like possibilities in others. We have raised about us an artificial

world to which not all our lately alarmed study for beauty will restore the sequestered loveliness of the countryside which it has over-built. And in such a world a psychology that teaches us with least fuss how to ' size things up ' intellectually, so as to ' hustle ' energetically and unconfusedly, may be felt to be in place to produce a smoothly efficient cosmos in the mind of man, wherein all the springs of spontaneous action will be duly numbered: but what if from that inner world, as well as from our mechanized outer world, the charm of artless spontaneity should have fled? Are we sufficiently considering whether the promise of a gain in efficiency would humanly compensate us for the prospect? An *activist* type of psychology, in which the energetic phase tends to swallow up all the others, may seem to *explain*, and yet may never *interpret*, a restless age to its own self.

In our one-time rather more evenly balanced view of Intellect as knowing with a widening grasp and ever-enriched complexity, Feeling as varying from the glow of pleasure to the desolateness of pain and forming the base of sympathy, Will as developing more and more highly organized control of action, there was, I believe, an unfulfilled promise. It may be that the ever-present three were spoken of incautiously too much as if philosophers could discern their Shapes in the smoke they made as they sat and thought together—in other words, the language used tended to make them into abstract Some-

things in a manner which savoured less of the simplicity of science than of metaphysical imagination; but the three elementary characteristics of our experience did impress one, and so they ought. The beginner in psychology found himself confronted by a most wonderful triple fact, dominating his entire life, and entering intimately into the constitution of anything he could get hold of to call himself. Meanwhile, it might almost begin to seem to his imagination, from what he now learnt more or less scientifically, as if his own finite nature were too narrow to contain, too weak to bear, the united fulness of the three. For if feeling dominated to the full, pain, in its mastery, would almost drown thought and paralyze action; or in an access of joy thought might break up into fragments of quick beginnings and endings, and action might cease in expectancy. Or if one were, as they say, 'all out' in activity, effort to full strain might stun intelligence, and postpone for a moment almost mechanically the inevitable presence of feeling. Much observation and abstract thinking, again, may make action characteristically slow; and for a vivid example of its possible effect on feeling we can picture Darwin walking repeatedly in his Cambridge days to King's College Chapel to hear the anthem with such 'intense pleasure' that his 'backbone would sometimes shiver,' [1] and then, after many years of 'grinding general laws out of large collections of facts,' [2] regretting a lost taste, with

[1] *Life and Letters*, Vol. I, p. 49. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

the confession that 'music generally sets me thinking too energetically on what I have been at work on, instead of giving me pleasure.' [1]

Such are the mutual limitations of the different types of experience in the finite mind. On the other hand, to prove that any one of the three indefeasibly united living characters, abiding in and pervading one's invisible life, could actually exist as we now know it if the other characters were not present with it, would be an impossible task.

There is no other fact like this within the range of nature, no other situation like this within the scope of science. Attempt to illustrate it confessedly breaks down.

FOR THE MORE STERNLY PHILOSOPHICAL: AN APOLOGY FOR CHAPTER II

In a chapter meant not to offer needless perplexities to readers who might be making their first acquaintance with the topics, I have not referred to the illusion, as it seems to me, that the modern psychological trichotomy was anticipated by Plato or by St. Augustine. But as more than one of the more philosophical readers of my manuscript have brought the matter up, it appears to call for separate remark.

I find it particularly evident that both Plato in the *Republic* (Bk. IV) and St. Augustine in the *De Civitate* (Bk. VIII, iv; XI, xxv) really confine their division fundamentally to the old dichotomy of the intellectual and the conative.

Plato has one supreme factor, the rational, and two lower factors, one below the other, which he manifestly treats as conative—the 'spirited' and the appetitive. There is in effect a second dichotomy *on the conative side:* hence his three

[1] *Life and Letters*, Vol. I, p. 101.

factors. (On the small significance of mere coincidence of trichotomies, see Chapter VI *infra*.)

Such division gives no place of its own to the affective aspect of mind: it is only, I think, by unhistorical oversight that it could be supposed to do so.

Though in dealing with the 'spirited' factor Plato mentions 'anger,' which *as a matter of fact* is an emotion with a marked affective tone, he never discusses or distinguishes *its affective aspect.* The fact of the existence of such an aspect does not appear to have any bearing whatever on his triple division or on his treatment.

The fact, again, that, like other ethical writers, Plato naturally refers to pleasure and pain when he is dealing with the appetitive factor, does not alter his division, which has no place at all for these affective conditions *as distinguished* from conative impulse.

To pretend that Plato's division affords a distinguishing place to feeling is to confuse the aspects of fact on which he founds his division with another recognizable aspect of fact on which, for his purposes in the *Republic*, he has founded no division. To furnish as his own the mark which he has left out may be to contribute to present intellectual entertainment, but hardly to any history of actual psychology.

St. Augustine, in his *De Civitate*, has a division of philosophy into 'the natural'—connected with 'contemplation'—'the rational' and the 'moral,' which he traces back to Plato (VIII, iv). Here again is the old dichotomy—since the first two terms, in St. Augustine's use, point to the intellect first in its more matter-of-fact and second in its more intuitional aspect; while the third is active, as related to 'practice' and 'use.'

'Trichotomy' is thus arrived at through a second dichotomy on the intellectual side. (See his own remark on the agreement of the 'trichotomy' with the 'dichotomy,' *De Civ.*, VIII, iv).

The affective aspect is here subsumed under the moral or active, through such terms as 'fruition' and 'beatitude.'

St. Augustine's triad expressions, in different places in the *De Civitate*, and in connections human and Divine, seem remarkably consistent in principle (VIII, iv, *fin.*, ix, *init.*; XI, xxiv, *init.*). We have steadily the matter-of-fact, the intuitional, and the active, *with its affective issue included and not divisionally distinguished.*

And if anyone will study these triads as a whole he may realize distinctly that such a triad as (XI, xxvii) " we not only *have being*, but *know* that we have being, and also *love* (*diligimus*) that knowing and being " (where ' being ' is the matter-of-fact, ' knowing ' the intuition, and ' love,' with its specially affective interest, takes the third place), means *not* that St. Augustine is giving a separate division to the affective, but that in his third place the moral (or active) *and* the affective are taken together without divisional distinction, thus appearing indifferently in the third places of his characteristically systematic triads.

Thus, again, in the *De Trinitate*, where he has another trichotomy, of memory, understanding, and will (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*—X, x (13), *fin.*, xi, *init.*), he speaks of ' loving by will ' (XIV, iii (5), *init.*), of ' love . . . which is none other than will seeking or holding something to be enjoyed ' (XIV, vi (8), *fin.*), of ' our will, or love or affection (*vel amorem seu dilectionem*) which is a stronger will ' (XV, xxi (41), *init.*, cf. ' *voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem*,' XIV, vii (10)); and in XV, xxii, *init.*, the trichotomy is ' memory, understanding and love ' (*memoria, intellectus, et amor*).[1]

Reconciliation of the trichotomy of the natural, the rational, and the moral with that of memory, understanding, and will may be sought in the connection of the natural with what *is*, and is therefore latently knowable, and in the conception of *memoria* as being mind latently recognizable by the understanding. Both trichotomies contain an intellectual dichotomy.

If St. Augustine's trichotomy provides as it were two pigeonholes into which different kinds of intellectual considerations are separated, and one in which conative and affective considerations are left together, it seems a strange misreading of the significance of the history of psychology to represent him as anticipating an organization in which all intellectual considerations are unified, while the affective and conative interests are definitely distinguished.

It would perhaps be true to say that St. Augustine's sensitive-

---

[1] In the *De Doctrina* St. Augustine has a chapter (I, iv) on the difference of use and enjoyment (cp. I, iii, v, xxii, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii).

ness brought affective facts into a more or less confused prominence, which, *had it been so maintained as to overcome the influence of the prevailing dichotomy*, might have led to an earlier recognition of the schematic rights of the affective aspect of mind, but as a matter of history did not.

The ecclesiastical distinction of 'power, wisdom, and goodness' (cf. the First Article of the Church of England, where 'goodness' may naturally be interpreted to mean a disposition to give happiness), while conceived from the ethical side, comes very close to the modern psychological distinction, and suggests clear and comprehensive insight into the constitution of a fully satisfactory activity. It progresses synthetically to moral climax: the more usual 'wisdom, love, and power' moves consistently towards the executive climax.

I have selected Mendelssohn as an illustration of the pre-Kantian movement towards a genuine psychological trichotomy because circumstances allow him, more easily than Tetens, say, or Baumgarten, to be taken home by the ordinarily imaginative reader through a word or two. I daresay I have done several such things. There are methodical histories written for those who will develop their way into the subject, but I have not regarded this chapter as the place for a deliberate attempt to add one more to their number.

With the powerful influences, practical and literary, already at work, is it clear that the psychological result would ultimately have been at all inferior to what it was in balance if Rousseau had held his plausible tongue?

While I am engaged upon these adjustments I will add that it may be objected to some of my expressions that they savour of the discredited faculty-theory in psychology. If, however, the ultimate suggestion of this book were made good, it might point in the direction of justification for regarding the three phases of mind as at least reflections of what philosophers call substance; and I do not think the same kind of disproof by analysis which has been applied to the faculty-theory of intellectual developments like memory or reasoning can be

made effective against such a view. Granting that it is extra-psychological, with the hurriedly preoccupied sort of handling that a book on a new subject may expect to-day I have thought it desirable to use the language which will bring my particular meanings home with least initial trouble to the reader.

CHAPTER III

INTELLECT AND THE TRINITY

OBSERVATION, together with reflection on what you observe—that is the sum of your intellectual business.

It is by no means limited to subjects liable to be known as 'highbrow.' If, as I pass through the village, I hear from over a wall the casual statement, 'These 'ere is like them there,' I know, even by that, that an intellective process has been carried out. Some things have been observed; some things have been compared—which is a step in reflection.

Observation and reflection of a much more complex kind would be involved in the intellectual act of listening to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. And here there is the further complication that unless the observation and reflection are kept in undercurrent, while the mind is stilled for the play of feeling, the hearer will follow only the composer's artifice, and miss the appeal of his art. But, in some form, they constitute the properly intellectual contribution to the listening.

And the intellectual reflection all through life seems to be based in some way upon the observa-

tion. You observe something, and then you reflect upon it.

Observation carried out directly by means of the senses is specially called *perception*. It is the observation of perceptible objects, like our visible, tangible bread and cheese (which presently prove to be smellable and tasteable too), like fossils or gems, or like glister of stars, or sound of falling waters, or 'scent of beanfields far away.'

We may, of course, reflect upon any of these. Then we may also reflect upon such *imperceptible* objects as atoms or electrons, or such imperceptible conditions as the fine fraction of a degree of heat acquired by a needle whenever you push it through cloth. But it is plain that when we reflect on such objects and conditions, *accredited* as facts, we are reflecting on what men have come to believe through first reflecting closely on what they observe in things which *can* be perceived. First, for example, you perceive a big change of heat in something as plain as a poker; you might measure this by a thermometer. Then you could pass to a change of heat too small for you to perceive like the first, but not so small as that in the needle. This smaller change might still be made manifest to you by reflection on the change in the column of the thermometer, which may also in a manner of speech be said to be as plain as a poker. And as a result of orderly reflection on a vast range of such larger and smaller changes, you may argue to the certainty of the presence of such a change in the needle.

All through, so far, reflective intellection, with its various branchings, has an ultimate rooting in the ground of things which are *perceptible*. Things which are too minute or elusive for perception may become sufficiently *manifest* for us to reflect upon them, because we can argue to them from perceptible signs.

It must further be noticed that without some degree of *definiteness* in what is observed, or what becomes manifest, reflection cannot get a start. Even the foggiest thinker must have *some* partly defined shapes before him. He may misapply his thinking by confusing the shapes one with another, as a lady I know misapplied hers in proffering 'twopence change' to a stranger on the pavement instead of to the husband she had just left outside the shop. But if he fails like that in the recognition of his objects he will not, in attempting to reflect, get on very well with his reflection; if he has before him no object of thought sufficiently definite for him to *fancy* he recognizes it, he will not even seem to himself to be getting on.

Now when you perceive or recognize an object you are so far *knowing*. Feeling and willing (to speak of them abstractly) are not in themselves thus directly concerned with objects as perceptible or recognizable. If I perceive a broken window in my house I may be affected pleasurably or otherwise, or I may strive to do something about it; but to be thus *affected* or thus *striving* is not at all the same thing as to be perceiving and

knowing. If I give the shape of the hole and the cracks my energetic attention, I may, indeed, know more about what has happened; but the clearness of the knowing is quite different from the energy of the attention. When we feel we may feel *poignantly*. When we strive we may strive *energetically*. But the *clearness and distinctness* which belong to perceiving, to knowing, to intellection are quite *peculiarly an intellectual interest*.

We cannot, as they say, 'get away from it': we must either involve ourselves in contradiction of ideas, or realize that intellect has to do with the perceptible and the definite—which is only to say it has to do with the *intelligible*. That is its sphere, possessed in widening range—its peculiar realm.

Now take up the vision of the Trinity, dawning in a certainly unforgettable period of spiritual realization, discussed if not dissected in ecclesiastical councils, and to-day being much discussed again: for it is recognized to-day, if I mistake not, as a critical point of departure between those who are all for simplification in religious thought, and those who boldly believe that spiritual intuitions may be both valid in significance and rich in content. Those who, on the one hand, wish to get to business as economically as possible, and those who, on the other, hope to gain from fulness what they cannot hope to gain from a principle of parsimony, may naturally see such a conception in different aspects. Begin to consider it first

just from the point of view of that very obvious philosophy of the intellectual sphere which we have based upon our ordinary psychology of intellection.

Suppose we wished even to look out into the world of perceptible things, and see God, as nearly as might be, visible—to find him, at any rate, *definitely manifest*. Should we think first of the Father? Should we think first of the Spirit? The Father, whose is the 'abyss of being' in the Godhead, may be hid in his own ineffable majesty; the Spirit may be indistinguishably active, save as we can trace the effects of his presence; but is there one in whom we say that God was made *manifest?* Is there not one of whom we love to say again and again that through him God was made intelligible? What is this we hear of an 'Incarnate Son'—'Deity only-begotten,'[1] that is in the bosom of the Father, by whom, though no one has seen God at any time, God is 'made explicit'?[2] Jesus, at any rate, however we construe him, was quite definite for apprehension: he looked about him with our eyes, and could be seen looking; his own lips spoke a national language into ears which heard like ours; we can judge how he seemed as he walked or discoursed—joyous, tender, grieved, or here passionately disgusted as sensitive men are when they move amongst us. It is partly by his very familiarity of intercourse that his majesty awes

[1] μονογενὴς θεός, John i. 18.
[2] ἐξηγήσατο, *ibid.*

us, unless we dare to cheapen the familiarity by offering our own in return.

If thinking of the character of intellect in the inter-involved 'trinity' of our own life brings before us such conceptions as 'manifestation,' 'definiteness,' and even position in the world of things perceptible, we surely do not need to hesitate very long to say which membership in the Divine Triunity brings before us, and most importantly, the same conceptions. Christ presents the Divine character under the conditions of the perceptible world, through perceptible acts and directly intelligible words. According to psychologists, 'presentation' is the basis of our intellection. Here, if anywhere, God is *presented* to us.

Observe, I am not saying any such absurd thing as that the Son of God is represented to us as purely intellectual *in his own nature*, or that he *appeals* exclusively to the intellect. Feeling and striving are present enough in the life of Jesus: in none of us have they ever been what they were in him when he was come to Gethsemane. A purely intellectual view of Gethsemane would be like the stare of dead eyes. I am not even saying that a study of our own thinking, feeling, and willing would exhaust what he is. Let me try to illustrate the kind of comparison which the subject prompts.

With a vital similitude that might be incredible to one who had not seen it, the features of a human face, for example, may be represented by three tiny dots of ink skilfully disposed. It

is then perfectly evident that *one* of these three dots, seen in the midst of the whole pictured face, and *relatively to the other dots*, represents the right eye, *relatively to the other features*. The dot can be so deftly touched into the tiny picture that one may even see by its shape, taken in its place and surroundings, that it represents an eye overhung by a projecting brow. But now try an *isolated* comparison. Let the one dot, which so plainly represented the eye, be taken *alone*, and on the other side let the actual eye be viewed *alone*, out of relation to the other features. Between the speck of ink, with its minute unbroken black surface, and the deep-arched eye, thousands of times larger, multi-coloured, changeful, living, there may be little enough resemblance traceable. Apply this to the work in hand. I am beginning an *essentially threefold* comparison, which will come to very little unless the same method of comparison can be carried through in relation to all the three phases of mind and all the three memberships of the Trinity. And when I say that the intellectual phase, *among the three phases of mind*, may be in some sort compared with what the Son, in the Trinity, is to us in having to do with the perceptible or otherwise definite, I am not involved in saying that the intellect itself can *absolutely suggest* what the Son is like, any more than a slight monotint black spot could by itself suggest the living fulness of the eye. There may be very distinct *relative analogy* independently of any considerable *absolute resemblance*.

According to the Christian revelation the essentials of *knowing, feeling, and willing all* belong to *each* of the Divine Trinity. But when we think of what is specially distinctive of the intelligence among the phases of mind, and what is specially distinctive of the relation to us of the Son among the members of the Trinity, we find a special bond of comparison. When we take up another phase of mind, and consider what is specially distinctive of it among the three phases, we shall find a special bond of comparison between it and what we are told of another member of the Trinity; and so with the third. At present we are trying to distinguish the special bond of comparison between the intellect and the Son. Both are concerned with manifestation, presentation, definite intelligibility.

If we test this view by the direct characterizations of the Son in those great passages of the first Christian writings which dwell upon his relation to the Godhead and the universe, we shall find it quite precisely borne out.

In that passage setting forth the transcendent and universal sway of the Son which stands near the beginning of the letter addressed 'to the Colossians' (about thirty years, it is supposed, after the crucifixion), we find the direct characterization beginning: "who is the Image of the invisible God" (i. 15). Now the *image* of the invisible is naturally its visible 'representation'; [1] and if the image be a true one it is thus the

[1] Cp. Lightfoot, *The Epistle to the Colossians, in loc.*

means of the 'manifestation'[1] of what is not otherwise open to contemplation. The term is used, we are told, 'for the description of individuals in official documents'[2]—and there it is something to be *read*, a means of recognition: we are obviously dealing, here and all through, with the means of knowing, of intelligent grasp and apprehension. And a little later (ii. 3) it is into the secret nature of Christ that we are led to look for 'all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.'

The letter 'to the Hebrews,' written perhaps about the same time or twenty years later, opens with a powerfully sweeping passage about God speaking through 'a Son' (i. 1). The most directly descriptive part of the passage declares the Son, in relation to God, as "being the shining forth of his glory, and the betokening of his inner being" (i. 3). Christ is the glory of God brought within the range of visibility for us, and so becoming capable of arresting us. But Christ, who is the means of arresting us by this manifestation, is also a 'betokening,' and thus interpretable; and the true interpretation of him will bring us into the secret of the being of God. Westcott,[3] who does not take quite the view of the passage which I have here suggested, nevertheless remarks upon the two successive parts of

[1] Cp. Lightfoot, *The Epistle to the Colossians, in loc.*

[2] Cp. Moulton and Milligan, *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament.*

[3] *Epistle to the Hebrews, in loc.*

the description, first, " it is in Christ that the Revelation is seen," and second, " it is in Christ that the Essence [of God] is made intelligibly distinct for man." It will be observed that the ideas of visibility and intelligible distinctness are evoked by the New Testament description of the Son quite independently of our interest in analogy.

The descriptive words translated ' image,' ' shining forth,' ' betokening,' are all used here in the New Testament in such a way as to recall their use in a contemporary movement of thought. This movement of thought was the result of the blending of the almost exhausted philosophical development of the Greeks, who were the intellect of the ancient Western world, with selected conceptions of the Jews—a process centring notably in Alexandria. Their very ring thus carries us into a markedly intellectual relation, though the vital force of the words is greatly changed in these passages from what it had ever been before.

The same is true of the dominant name used in characterization of the Son in the vast, still dawn at the opening of the Fourth Gospel —which an early dating would place perhaps within one decade of the late date for the letter ' to the Hebrews.' Here the Son is ' the Logos,' *the Word*. In Greek *logos* means a word as an expression of *inward thought*, or even the inward thought itself. There has been much discussion as to whether or how far we should interpret it here on Greek lines and in connection with Greek philosophy, or whether we should see

in it a continuation of a Hebrew way of speaking. But there may often be an advantage in investigating this Gospel by its own clues; and if we take 'the Word' to mean *the Word in which God interprets himself*, we may find the whole passage opening up as if we had found a key.

We thought first generally of the way in which, and the effect to which, Christ appeared in history. We have now compared together the specific terms used to characterize the Son in the New Testament passages which celebrate him in his relation to the Godhead and the universe. And we still find that the intelligibility, the definiteness of manifestation, the presence for interpretation, which we are specially moved to desire as being ourselves intellectual beings, appear as satisfactions characteristically conveyed to us in that member of the Trinity who is spoken of as 'the Son.'

CHAPTER IV

WILLING AND THE TRINITY

THE wearer of human nature who finds himself confronted by that mystery which he calls his 'mind' observes also in the background that other mystery which he calls his 'body.' He would be a very great philosopher who could give a clear account of the relation between the two, and we should have to be at least a little more than human to understand him. But psychology has to take *some* account of their relation, without quite seeing what it is doing—a predicament more customary, not to say universal, in science than the unreflective might suppose. It studies, for example, the *effort* involved when we 'make up our minds' to move some part of our bodies. That is one department of the analysis of willing or striving. But roughly speaking there are two departments—at any rate there is meaning in our popular distinction between 'bodily effort' and 'mental effort.'

Now we regard 'mind' as higher than 'body' (not without some justification from the scale of the sciences, which grow richer from physics to psychology). We need hardly be surprised if in

tracing an analogy between what we know of our own living being and what we have heard of supreme living Being we find ourselves led to think of willing in its more purely mental connection, rather than in its bodily connection.

Now what sort of mental effort (effort other than an effort to move or to ' tense ' some part of the body) do you find you can make ?

You will find you can make an effort of *attention*.

If you find you can make any other kind of mental effort, I think you had better report it. For if you do find this, either you are a unique person, or you have struck out a discovery in human experience which does not seem to have been made and certified before. All our earnest resolves seem to depend upon our attention.

This is true even of our resolves to attend—attention sustains even our *resolves* to attend !—so it is hard to see any bottom to what attention does. No one can say how far the study of attention, if we could pursue it, would take us into ' the abysmal deeps of personality.'

I do not mean that everything depends on what theologians call ' our own unaided efforts.' I am at this moment beginning a chapter which cannot complete its design without speaking explicitly of the Spirit of God. To live in a self-complete train of effort of one's own would, in my belief, be to shut out spring and summer and rich-handed autumn from one's living. But if we watch and try to discern what is our part in mak-

ing and sustaining resolves, I think we shall find it to consist, so far as we can trace it, in the directing and maintaining of attention. Let us conceive an instance.

Suppose I am reading something very fascinating, which bears upon my own work. Though I have no hope of finishing it at a sitting, and am going away to-day, and want to leave it behind me for home reading, I am eager to see a little more and a little more of how it leads on. At the same time I know that before I have read nearly all I am likely to wish to read I shall have run myself short of minutes for my preparation, and shall afterwards perhaps be observed a mile from the station positively trotting to it. I never like this when it happens—it becomes so difficult to philosophize—but my attention is fixed on my reading, and I will *not* attend to the idea of a perspiring philosopher vainly desiring a detestable motor-'bus. But I find myself, in snatches, attending to the large fact that it is a lucid sunny morning, and there are green hills about the road to the station and a willowy brook beside it. It will be a sore waste of time to be rushing through the delicate pageantry when I start. If I could but be wise, and let my attention *fix* on that, and *not* be so fixed on the particulars and immediate prospects of the reading—*then* I should resolve to stop in time.

And what is this 'being wise'? Is it not in effect itself a readiness to let my attention pass freely between one set of ideas and the other,

until one, with its array of consequences now clearly foreseen, becomes the settled attraction for my attention, and the other, with its array of consequences similarly foreseen, drops out of focus? There may be more in it:[1] there may be some deep action of the hidden self in my resolution which could not be sufficiently described as 'letting my attention' do anything. But if there is, it seems to express itself through attention, the ultimate deeps of which, I say, I cannot psychologically search. And in a 'difficult' resolve one finds one has constantly to renew one's effort of attention to the trend of thought to which one has *attentively resolved to attend*. It sounds complex, I know, but life is complex.

Now what is your attention? You may hardly, if at all, be able to detect its actual movement, and yet you may be aware of its vivifying power upon your impressions and ideas. You have been reading for some time and attending to ideas. Now, all of a sudden, *attend* to the look of this page. Was it not quickly vivid? Did not its lines stand out in a fret of black on white with a surprising change of clearness? Exactly what happened you cannot trace, and no one could; but you know that there was an act of attention, and thereupon a vivification in the way the page presented itself to you.

[1] Yes, indeed: I wrote this as psychology, and as such I leave it; but when I read it in print I cannot forbear remarking how much we lose by balancing prospects alone to ourselves without praying.

If we direct attention to more complex, impalpable, and recondite objects of thought, such as the trend of civilization or the nature of mathematics, the effect is evidently of a similar kind, though it may be more difficult to discern. Such objects of thought seem notably to depend upon a subtle action of attention for their very existence for us; attention maintains them in strength, enables us to discern their qualities and significance, and thus becomes the means of guiding us in what direction to think effectively about them.

This may serve us for a sketch of what attention does. Now where shall we place it among the 'phases of mind'?

We have been treating attention as *voluntary*; but even when it is unintended rather than voluntary it is still, I think, correctly described as *conative*—'conation' (from the Latin *conor*, 'I try') being a word much in modern use to express the 'striving' aspect of experience. Attention is a striving impulse in mind. Indeed, I take it to be *the* psychologically recognizable striving of the mind. I am not clear that *mental striving* can be shown to express itself in any other form.[1]

[1] On the voluntary aspect compare M'Dougall, *Social Psychology* (20th edition, 1926), p. 209: "We may therefore follow Prof. James when he asserts that 'the essential achievement of the will is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind,' and, again, that 'effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.' . . . Effort of attention is, then, the essential form of all volition" (the citations from James's *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 561, 562).

In attention, then, we recognize the mind as striving. If we try to describe attention itself, we have, of course, to use imagery. It may be agreed that its portraiture would be very recognizable, and not easily mistaken for anything else, if we said that it was present in mental affairs as an indiscernibly acting, vivifying influence, becoming apparent in a very evident illumination—with a resulting guidance into lines of intellectual progress.

Now we have said all this about what we distinguish as an aspect of mind. Consider carefully, then. I think it may be admitted that in reading the New Testament we are specially led to think of the Spirit as empowering,[1] which brings us into connection with the active phase, with the 'striving' or conative aspect generally. But if we should hear a Christian believer in God as triune speaking of God as an indiscernibly acting, vivifying influence present in Divine affairs, the vivifying becoming apparent in a very evident illumination—with a resulting guidance into progress in the ways of the Son of God, should we have a moment's question about what he meant? Should we *ask* whether he meant to speak of God as the Holy Spirit? Or should we expect, if we searched the whole content of mind, or even of nature, to discover a more immediately striking analogy for what we are told of the Spirit?

[1] Compare, in one relation, Luke iv. 14 and, in another, Acts i. 8.

One point, however, may require discriminating more definitely. Attention we hold to be conative, but the illumination which comes of its vivifying is intellectual, and so is the progress in perception and thought which is due to the illumination. If there be a parallel here, the illumination which comes of the quickening action of the Spirit should be illumination in the things of the Son, the things of Christ.[1] The resulting progress should be 'in Christ.' And what believer in the triune God would say that this was not precisely so?

Take another characteristic of attention. I have before me at the moment across the room a fine copy of one of Corot's tinted rather than coloured morning skies. If I fix attention on a patch of rose-grey in it, or on the slaty water, delicate as lavender, below, the tint seems to have grown brighter, more luminous. I absolutely cannot distinguish, in the total impression, between what is the effect of the original brightness—subdued brightness—of the colouring, and what is the effect of my attention.[2] Probably similar blendings of *conative attention* with *force of presentation* are going on throughout our intellectual develop-

[1] Cp., e.g., John xiv. 26; xvi. 14.

[2] Whether attention intensifies sensation as well as clarifying perception is a topic of debate. It at any rate intensifies the psychosis in which the sensation is concerned. If it intensifies our 'awareness' of intensity, we scarcely need, for our present purposes, to distinguish between that and intensifying the sensation. It may be allowed that attention and intensity of sensation combine into vivacity of effect.

ments. And if a man is manifesting Christ in daily life can we distinguish analytically where the effect of his own given constitution and his own character established in Christ ends, and the effect of the ever-fresh inspiration of the Spirit begins?[1] Does not the activity of the Spirit blend itself with individual life, much, to all appearance, as the energy of attention blends with the force of impression? Is there not on each side of the analogy an indistinguishable *unity* of the energizing and the energized?

The 'communion of the Holy Spirit' has another aspect. Such passages as 'we were all made to drink of one Spirit' (1 Cor. xii. 13), 'being zealous to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace' (Eph. iv. 3), will be recognized as characteristic. And attention not only seems to blend its energy into a unity with the

[1] Cp. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, p. 156. "Experience by itself could not have qualified the Eleven to bear their witness before the world, nor could the Spirit have supplied the lack of experience. The life in Galilee was crowned by the Gift of Pentecost, without which its lessons would have been barren of results, but on the other hand the Gift of Pentecost would have yielded widely different results if it had not fallen on men who *were with Jesus* and could testify to what they had seen and heard."

The precise analogy for human spiritual manifestation has to be sought, according to our whole comparison (as we shall see by Chapter VIII), in *self-conscious* thinking, regarded in its general scope (see p. 132). The bearings of attention here are extremely difficult to trace. We base the comparison on the principle of a relation between attention and presentation which is *most readily detected psychologically* in sense-perception.

force of what it vivifies, it seems, also, to work much as if it created impalpable constraints of unity *between* different currents of impression and ideation. Objects or aspects to which we have attended together tend thereafter to form one whole in perception or thought. You are intensely familiar with the sight of a beloved instrument, and have been engrossed in its floods of rich sound. The two have become so much one in your attention to them that the very sight of the instrument is redolent of harmony; its very wood is not as other wood, nor its whole bulk as other furniture or ornaments in the room. The different strains of impression seem to play upon one another, and reinforce one another (you could almost say, cherish one another) in the mind. In us this unifying capacity of attention is very limited, so far as direct perception is concerned. Five dots in a row, for instance ..... have, I believe, been found by experiment to be generally as many as we can organize by attention into one group; six ..... have to be taken in two groups—three and three, or four and two, or with more difficulty five and one—or we cannot see how many they are. Try the groups yourself. The unifying power gains a wider sweep in that thinking about large subjects which we carry on by aid of those wonderful constructions, the words constituting language. By means of words we hold firmly together before the mind much that our attention has already brought together in the past; and while we speak or reflect these words

are themselves being held together in attention to sustain new combinations of ideas in our minds. We cannot measure the unifying power of the Spirit among individuals and differing types of humanity, and among the differing institutions which have come into being through his unifying activity. But is there no sense of analogy?

In testing the analogy by reading the New Testament references to the Spirit, it may be well to bear in mind that it appears to be peculiarly through attention that our thoughts are kept together in unity *of interest*.[1]

Take up now some expressions, familiar in tone, transcendent in significance, which, when we compare them with what we know about the working of our own attention, may seem in almost startlingly close analogy (John xvi. 13, 14). Speaking figuratively rather than analytically, we may say that we trust attention as being transparently transmissive: if we knew that things were changed, or that some things apparently perceived were actually created, by the medium of our attention, we should tend to regard it as, so far, not an organ of objective truth. And we read, in more personal terms, of the Spirit: "He shall guide you into all the truth; for he shall not speak as of himself, but whatsoever he hears he shall speak." The Spirit, I should understand, does not create religious judgments in us independently of objective reality beyond them.

[1] The supreme psychological example would be in a self-conscious unity of thinking—compare Chapter VIII.

Again, a cardinal function of attention is its *selectiveness*. It 'seizes' on the data, or on aspects of the data; and this is essential to their presentation. And, more personally, the function of the Spirit is described by saying, "He shall *take of* (ἐκ, *out of*) mine, and declare (ἀναγγελεῖ, *presentatively announce*) it to you." Yet again, it is through attention that our remembrance of things past is brought under effective personal control: and not far away it is said of the Spirit that "he shall *bring to your remembrance* all things that I have spoken to you" (John xiv. 26).[1]

Through one of the first group of these sayings—"he shall show you things to come"—we may turn to consider attention in its important aspect of *expectant attention*. With my hand on the door of a little-known private picture gallery that I have been longing to enter, my attention is fixed upon nothing in the world so much as upon what is within, though it is not yet before me. In spirit it is before me, though not as it will be when I see the hitherto hidden spreads of colouring in the light of day. And often in lesser things our attention is *pre-adjusted* to what we may expect to perceive; and our thoughts thus take anticipative possession of it, and so are prepared for more swiftly rich possession of it when it comes. And the Spirit is particularly spoken of as the 'earnest' or 'foreholding'[2] of the

[1] On the parallel interpretation of "all things whatsoever the Father has are mine," (John xvi. 15), see Chapter VIII, p. 135.

[2] II Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Eph. i. 14.

inheritance upon which we have but anticipatively entered; he is the maintainer of the 'hope' for what is 'not yet seen.'[1]

Once more, we know how characteristically our attention is often thwarted and harassed. And we read of the Spirit being 'resisted,'[2] or 'grieved'[3]—the second term reminding us (as we have been reminded before)[4] that force of analogy does not imply fulness of resemblance. 'Grieving' has a deeply sensitive personal colour of which we find no reflection in the transparent activities of attention.

From a standpoint at which we shall arrive later it may appear that our most striking psychological analogy for the action of the Spirit upon those who belong to Christ is to be found in considering that thinking which is self-consciously controlled.[5] We may here notice how the language used of the Spirit in the primitive Christian writing suggests the analogy of self-conscious attention—of attention directed upon *search* into the things of the mind itself. "The Spirit searches into all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one has discerned the things of God except the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11).[6]

[1] Rom. viii. 23–26. As the 'Holy Spirit of promise,' he is associated with that 'sealing' which betokens our assignment to a destiny not yet perceptible (Eph. i. 13).

[2] Acts vii. 51. [3] Eph. iv. 30. [4] Pp. 33 ff.

[5] Chapter VIII, pp. 132, 133.

[6] On the attribution of 'knowing' to the Spirit, see p. 52.

Take a confirming comparison on broader conative grounds. Typically and fundamentally, in knowing, you have an object present to you, and you ' inwardly ' apprehend it. And the Son is presented to you that you may inwardly apprehend him. There is a characteristic phrase of ' preaching Christ.' [1]

In willing, in conation, on the other hand, there is first an inward impulse, the presence of which does not become discernible to observers except through its consequent outward manifestations. In the working of the Spirit also there is first in the believer an inward impulse, the presence of which does not become discernible to observers except through its consequent outward manifestations. (And there is no characteristic New Testament phrase of ' preaching the Spirit.')

Again, if there is no knowing without attention, there is no recognizing Jesus as ' Lord ' without the Spirit.[2]

Still following the broader conception of conation, we might notice such a forcible expression as " the Spirit *driveth* him (*ἐκβάλλει*) into the wilderness " (Mark i. 12), or—differently suggesting the control of conative impulse—the distinctive *inhibitory* implication in the Spirit's

[1] Acts viii. 5, ix. 20, xix. 13; I Cor. i. 23, xv. 12; II Cor. i. 19, iv. 5, xi. 4; Phil. i. 15 (κηρύσσω). Acts v. 42, viii. 35, xi. 20, xvii. 18; Gal. i. 16 (εὐαγγελίζω). Acts xvii. 3; Phil. i. 16, 18; Col. i. 28 (καταγγέλλω). Cf. Acts v. 42 (διδάσκω).

[2] I Cor. xii. 3.

'checking' action, and 'not allowing' movement (Acts xvi. 6, 7). The term 'rapt away' (ἥρπασεν) is used in Acts viii. 39 as of sudden decisive retraction. These expressions are like rising sparks that indicate the presence of a fire not always thus in sight—they suggest an energy still burning in conception even when it may not be made so distinctly visible in the language. The restraint of conative impulse is brought into more distinct psychological statement when we read even of *the mutual opposition of the craving* (ἐπιθυμεῖ) of the flesh and of the Spirit (Gal. v. 17); and conative tension finds expression to the limits of language when we are bidden to contemplate the Spirit as "making intercession for us *with groanings that cannot be uttered*" (Rom. viii. 26). We need hardly suffer our awe at the thought to repress our sense of the conative analogy.

No doubt we shall be unspeakably the losers if we let analogy dwarf or limit our views. Though attention in particular appear to us as an intensifying, vivifying application of the life of the mind itself, its working remains an inadequate—I do not say easily exhausted—figure of the vitally creative energies of the Spirit of the eternal God.

And I discern only a *central core* of analogy. I have said that I cannot regard intellect as generally comparable to the varied fulness of the being of the Son; I do not regard conative activity as generally comparable to the rich and awful vital being of the Spirit. Indeed, so far from the Son

being mentioned in intellectual terms alone, he is spoken of as possessing ' power ' (which implies activity); so far from the Spirit being mentioned in conative terms alone, he is directly spoken of as ' knowing.' And this would naturally be so, if they are each regarded as having fully personal being. But if on the strength of these particular attributions we were to try (instead of proceeding as we have proceeded) to compare *conative activity* in the mind with the Son in the Trinity, and *knowing* in the mind with the Spirit in the Trinity, or *feeling* with either, I do not think we should find any analogy breaking out upon us with such force of detail and appropriateness as we are experiencing; nor do I anticipate that the results would display such capacity for *working out*[1] as we may yet recognize while we regard the Son through the figure of intellect, and the Spirit through the figure of conative activity, slight and inadequate for all purposes but those of analogy as the figures may be.

[1] See Chapters VII and VIII.

CHAPTER V

FEELING AND THE TRINITY

THE Christian revelation contemplates not only Son and Spirit sent forth to develop immediate relations with the world, but also One whose being remains the hidden secret of the life of Deity. In that Christian view the relation between the world and the Father is a matter of supreme ultimate concern, but the attitude of the Father to the world constantly appears to be finding expression through the other beings of the triune Godhead.

And if we look within, intellect and will are both concerned in different ways in dealing with what we call the outward facts of life—with 'objects.' There is a third phase which we naturally regard as the mind's own inner secret. It has been called 'subjectively subjective.'[1] This is the life of feeling. It is concerned with objects only through the other two phases—knowing and doing.

We have to consider the place, if any, in psychology, of this retired fact of feeling.

If we only perceived and acted, thought and

[1] Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, p. 432.

strove, and did not happen to *feel*, in the way of pleasure and pain, it is conceivable that we could more completely assume the position that the psychologist prescribes as correct for his work. The psychologist is a scientific observer and reasoner, and the scientific observer and reasoner, it is held, has to find out what he can about facts which come before him, and about processes which are going on within his scope, without essentially considering them in any special bearing they may have upon himself. His is to be a plain 'there they are,' or 'there it goes,' sort of attitude. The questions, 'Do I like them?' 'Do I wish it wouldn't?' are questions which, as a scientific observer, he has no business to ask.

We may imagine that if we were purely intellectual beings—thinking, thinking, thinking, and never doing anything else—and somehow got our observation turned upon our own thinking and thinking and thinking, we might look at the succession of ideas simply as we looked at anything else that was going on in the world. We might merely say, in William James's phrase, 'It thinks' to-day, as we say 'It rains' to-day.

If to this we suppose distinct conative activity to be added, it seems still just possible that we might be able to regard *that* too as merely 'going on'—more or less as we fancy energetic exertion in the wind which presses against us or whirls about us.

But try to bring *feeling* into this play, and we shall find that, in so far as we have really brought

that in, it has carried us outside the theatre. You can no more *merely witness* your own enjoyment or suffering going on, as if you were its spectator, than you can press down water with your bare, dry finger. You cannot just *observe* it, or it would not be your genuinely felt pleasure and pain.

Even memory will probably assure you that if you are in *intense* pain the intensity will not let you assume any matter-of-fact 'Ah-yes-there-it-is, just-happening-as-I-notice' sort of attitude towards it. You cannot cope with it like that. And I believe that this ungraspableness is true also of lesser pain and of pleasure.

At first blush it might seem that we could not help observing severe pain, whether we chose or not. But if you set yourself to try closely to observe pleasure and pain as they are experienced within you, and accurately take account of what you do observe, I think you will always find that you have just missed them, and got fast hold of something else. When we have what we call 'bodily pain' we have intense sensations which we can describe as aching, burning, and so on—my fingers ache as I walk about the snowy garden with a writing-pad. And if you can summon resolution to fix your attention on these intense sensations you will naturally find that they grow more distinct: you will probably discover varieties among them of which you were quite unaware (just as I did not know, until I fixed my attention upon my wintry sensations, that my fingers—which are not very bad—felt

as if they would bleed as well as ache). The distinguishing of these different sensations is a matter of recognizing, that is of *knowing*; it is not in itself the experience of suffering. It is often extremely useful knowledge—useful, for example, if you communicate it in illness to your doctor, for him to interpret it for your help. That nearly everybody *confuses* the characteristic sensations *with the pain* suffered, and even calls *them* 'the pains,' does not matter for practical purposes. For the practical purposes of guidance to relief the distinguishable sensations, which seem to *give* us the pain, are the important things to study; while for the pain anyone has we are simply sorry.

In brief, we may distinctly observe the sensation, which is poignant; it would be another thing to observe the poignancy, which is pain. And when a psychologist in effect assumes, without careful examination, that the experience of pain itself is nothing else and nothing more than that which he can observe if he chooses, he is perhaps on his way to produce a shallow psychology of the subject, without having faced the mystery of the nature of that of which he is going to treat.

There is a further point. I have often tried to track down painful conditions as far as I could —with a gumboil, in dental extraction without anæsthetic, and in other thwartings of nature.[1]

[1] See Section III of my article on "Non-Phenomenality and Otherness," *Mind*, Vol. XVII, N.S., pp. 1–19 (January, 1908).

But my impression of the experience is that, so long as I can control my attention to make the sensations distinct, the suffering will be less: that is, the pain has temporarily decreased—(so far as my fingers are concerned, I almost lose the slight unpleasantness). But if, while the sensations become more distinct, the pain can slightly fade, it does not seem very probable that the sensations and the pain can be the same thing, does it? [1]

And to me it seems more difficult even to try to fix my attention on pleasure than to try to fix it on pain, perhaps because pleasure does not so assertively contradict my natural positive inclinations, but identifies itself with them. To make a metaphor out of its common sensational accompaniments, and describe it as a 'glow' or what not, does not help us to observe it; it may help us to suppose we are contemplating it when we are only looking at the bright veil cast before it by our imagination.

Perhaps the paradox about the unobservability of feeling would seem less contrary to belief if, instead of saying that you cannot observe your

[1] It was not until after this chapter (which closely follows the lines of the above-mentioned article) was written that I read in Professor Titchener's *Psychology of Feeling and Attention* (Macmillan, 1908) the statement of what is, so far, an identical position: "Attention to a sensation means always that the sensation becomes clear; attention to an affection is impossible. If it is attempted, the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us and disappears, and we find ourselves attending to some obtrusive sensation or idea that we had not the slightest desire to observe" (p. 69). My own view arose out of reflection on Ward's famous Encyclopædia article (cp. pp. 58, 59 *infra*).

own pleasure and pain, I said that you cannot deliberately make your own *liking* and *disliking* an object of observation. After search repeated in the course of many years, I simply conclude my real pleasure and pain to be indistinguishable from my own liking and disliking: my liking and disliking of the sensations, situations, prospects, which I describe as pleasurable or painful, grievous or exhilarating. And I am ready to conclude that I cannot observe my own liking and disliking because it is too intimately *me* [1] for me to distinguish it. I try to look it in the face, and it seems to have dazzled me by intimacy.

It is remarkable that, as we have noticed, men were discussing pleasure and pain in relation to the governing ends of life long before these experiences took their definite place in the enquiry about the constitution of the mind. And we are, I am sure, more in touch with the true nature of feeling when we are frankly going on living than when we are trying to observe ourselves live. We have here, I believe, a great deep.

Dr. James Ward's statement of the paradox seems more valuable for its suggestiveness than sufficient in its discrimination. He says: "If all knowledge is concerned with presentations, how, it will be asked, come we to know anything of feeling and attention, if they are not presented? We know of them mediately

[1] '*Me*,' not because I am oblivious of grammar, but because it is 'me,' not 'I,' from the point of view of my attempt to *objectify* it.

through their effects; we do not *know* them immediately in themselves."[1] That does not seem to tell us more in a positive way than that we know of them as the causes of certain effects. We have here, of course, but a very indirect characterization of one of the two—feeling: (to speak of attention as a *cause* seems to go much further towards covering what we realize of it than it would go in the case of feeling). But how can we distinguish between *two* such causes, when neither of them is known to us? Hegel, in another connection, pointed out that in the night all cows look black; it seems to me that causes which *we constitutionally do not know*, except through their effects, must be similarly indistinguishable. I do not know how we come to speak intelligibly of pleasure and pain, and I do not find that Dr. Ward's distinction has told me. I cannot fathom the depth from which this possibility arises in speech; but I am conscious of what appeals to me as a depth.

Take away this feeling, strangely hidden, yet spoken of—take this feeling away, and what happens to art will be but the token of what will happen to life as a whole. The great picture changes its aspect—the ingenious geometry of the composition of the Sistine Madonna (the composition that one cannot now induce oneself to study for long at a time amid the glory) will begin to stand out barely and plainly for examination (for the glory will be gone); while the skill

[1] *Psychological Principles*, p. 58.

in the music of the great masters will remain as a limited kind of mathematics. In daily life, where nothing is felt, sympathy will shrivel down to its base. As to love, it will have nothing but reflective observation, and the impulse to change things as a consequence of the reflective observation, out of which to constitute itself. All rapture, tragedy, impressiveness, in life will have ceased to disturb us; and an impassive psychology, with its purely scientific and practical aims, will perhaps have become at last more equal to its narrowed task.

Import, intimate beyond all expression as import, ever present in life, yet seeming veiled in its own intensity of being, and transcending all the immediate grasp of thought!—is there here anything which *begins* to remind us of the New Testament touch upon any one membership of the Trinity? Is it any way relevant if a thought springs up, awed and distant—ready to silence itself lest its intimacy be disallowed—a thought of One "dwelling in light unapproachable, whom no man hath seen nor can see,"[1] and by whom, yet, the very hairs of our heads are all numbered, without whom not one sparrow falls to the ground, and to whom we ourselves are of more value than many sparrows?

If we took a view of feeling which prevailed among nineteenth-century psychologists, we could quickly state an analogy. The view is simpler than the truth, and so regarded may be useful as an introduction.

[1] I Tim. vi. 16.

A typical nineteenth-century psychologist would tell you that when a man (or even an animal) acted with an end consciously before him, the end of his activity was always at bottom, if you looked to the bottom, the obtaining of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Constitutionally that was the only end for which a man was capable of acting. And if you thought otherwise the psychologist might be inclined to think meanly of an intelligence which could not see the obvious.

Now it is clear that, according to the Christian revelation, when we look towards the Father, hid as it were in his own being, we are looking towards the supreme end of all Divine contact with the world. The coming of the Son is to reveal him and to bring us into right relation with him; "no one comes *to the Father* but through me," (John xiv. 6), and through the Son we have "access by one Spirit to the Father" (Eph. ii. 18). At the end the Son is to "deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father" (I Cor xv. 24). It is hardly to be questioned that if we would set before us the end of all being and doing, as it is conceived in the doctrine of the Trinity, we must look ultimately not to the Son or to the Spirit, but to the Father.

But the problem of the relation of feeling to our end in living is, I believe, more profoundly complex than this type of nineteenth-century psychologist was realizing. It may reasonably be doubted whether any psychology can achieve

the feat of dealing with this problem and yet remaining within the limits of what is understood by science.

Science, it must be remembered, by its very conditions, is always more or less artificial. I believe there ought to be a very much more distinct idea of the limitation of the competence of a scientific psychology than appears to be abroad in this century of psychology. Artificiality in the study of human life means that you do not quite get the life as living. True, your account may seem to leave very little out: but you might have a razor with very little left out; there is not much of the metal in the edge: but so far as shaving is concerned, without that little you might just as well be without the whole razor. And there is a cutting edge of living that a deliberately scientific psychology, in its detached way of taking up human life, will always miss. When psychology was taught more academically as a support of a larger philosophical discipline there was at least the advantage that those who studied life through it were systematically taught to look beyond it. But, apart from philosophy and system, it will surely often happen that the things that one finds oneself saying or thinking or meaning in the midst of the struggle and vision that enter into earnest living will be nearer to the marrow of life than anything one would arrive at by set psychological methods. One may be sure, and others may realize, that these flashes of snatched and often hard-won Promethean fire

shine further into the heart of life than a formal psychology can come, and even that the same formal psychology is hardly the final instrument for testing whether they do.

It may be only by the light of one of those flashes that come from somewhere outside the psychological lantern that I can see, with conviction, something which I am going to state, and which you may be able to corroborate by a similar kind of lighting up. I do not, indeed, take feeling, as I shall show, to be either the only motive of action, or a sufficient motive for conduct; and yet it presents itself to me as a plain truth that no end in life, no end of action, can be in the true sense *a man's own* except as *he possesses it through his feeling*. That might be a meaningless statement from the point of view of anyone who thought (I do not say psychologists do) that we could be entirely accounted for as bundles of instinctive tendencies and accretions of 'complexes,' with hypnotism and psychoanalysis as our appropriately sufficient if not exactly glorious salvation. I may not be able to fathom what I say I realize, and treat it as a consequence of some other principle scientifically ascertained: I do not profess to be able to fathom the nature of feeling. I may not even be altogether talking psychology—the problem of personality extends beyond psychology—when I say that that surely cannot be any personal end of mine in which I myself *take no pleasure*. So long as we are psychologizing, our attitude to our own actions

and systematized impulses is perhaps inevitably rather curiously like that of the little girl pictured by a humorous artist as protesting that she did not sneeze, but was being sneezed. But a healthy delight, or honest loathing—not just as impulsively working out through us, but as having our inner subjective feeling at the root—appears to be essential to the constitution of a truly personal motive. They seem to remain as necessarily the animating intimacy entering into any action to make it 'ours,' as pleasure and pain appeared in the eyes of older psychologists to be the necessary motives of all voluntary action. If a man had no joy in suffering for a noble end, could we think the nobleness of the end had fully converted the man *himself* to its own quality?[1] Would he not be the bachelor of fate, lacking true marriage of spirit with the purposes which he followed?

But though our pleasure or pain is *necessary* to our personal motive, it yet cannot itself *satisfy* us as a motive, because we can never find any true nobleness in the mere enjoyment of pleasure or the successful avoidance of pain. And as moral beings we crave for nobleness. The noble-minded man would be miserable to think that his highest motive *must* be pleasure. To think

[1] When we duly distinguish pleasure from sensation we may reduce the apparent difference between pleasure and joy. But 'joy' should perhaps properly be reserved to mark an experience possible only to a self-conscious being—a being who will be able to appreciate his *situation* as a creature capable of pleasure, but without self-consciousness, would not.

that constitutionally it must, as they were assuring him in the nineteenth century, was to tell him he must live all his life in a cage, and be fed with bird-seed.

We are frankly passing over from psychology (which, as a conventionally conceived natural science, does not seem to be adequate or deeply suited to grapple with the problem of feeling) into ethics, the theory of conduct, in connection with which pleasure and pain came earlier into distinctive view. We are asking about our personal end in living. We see, on the one hand, that feeling is essential; for the end would not be ours if we could not rejoice in it—we should not be owning it in our hearts. We see, on the other hand, that the end cannot be *simply* pleasure; for pleasure would not satisfy us if we were really awake in life. Pleasure, strangely enough, could not satisfy our very desire to be pleased! The very idea of it as the one end to which we are confined gives us, if we are awake, even pain. It cannot fulfil itself. It looks as if there must be something related to it, yet beyond it, for life.

To begin to make our outlook more definite, let us notice a department in life *in which it becomes specially obvious that we cannot leave pleasure and pain out of account in considering the motives which we ought to cherish, the ends for which we ought to live.* This becomes instantly clear when we recognize *serious pain in other lives than our own.* Let us see.

If we find some who are hungry and faint by

day, and shivering at night, who cough in the smoke of their miserable dwellings, sick unto death, who are broken-hearted, should we be living from the noblest, the morally most satisfying of motives, if we left the pain of such as these *out of account*—their pain and their possible cheering, their mitigating pleasure? And if someone did take them into account, but only so far as pain depressed and pleasure enhanced 'efficiency,' and did not regard pain from his heart just *because* these people were suffering pain, would he not be rather a brute? Coleridge says:

> "And he, that works my good with unmov'd face,
> Does it but half: he chills me while he aids."

There are, besides, more positive possibilities of innocent pleasure, and there are possibilities of wrecking them. There are children, blessings on their little hearts! If we were unwilling to promote such pleasure of others when it did not prevent a greater good, should we be quite free from selfishness—from something ignoble? And if we could not ourselves take pleasure in doing so, even when in some pain, should we not be ungracious?

But if a man had *himself* no experience of pleasure or pain, how could he appreciate the pain, the gladness, the possibilities of relief, about him? If he had not felt, how would he know how to give feeling any value in the estimate of life generally? Without pleasure and pain, he would

not be merely less efficient, he would be wholly undesirable.

We may now begin to see more clearly in what direction lies a cardinal significance of the presence of pleasure and pain in our experience. We say we cannot be satisfied with them as a motive; we cannot morally *exclude* them—pity, we see, would forbid. But is a pity which regards only the pleasure and pain of others—only their comfort—enough? Pleasure and pain would not satisfy *us*, we say, as motives. Ought we to wish them to satisfy others? Is one to desire nobleness for oneself, and wish others no part in it? Does not a penetratingly kind man have sometimes to leave pains, which he could relieve, unrelieved (not without pity and regret), because he cannot see how to relieve them without interfering with the sufferer's training in nobleness, in the strength and dignity of living? Pity is akin to—something much more full in aim and insight. At its highest it merges into love, with its full cherishing of other lives, its passion for life in all men. Our effort to interpret the true place of feeling in life thus leads us at last to *love* (which, as we shall distinguish presently, is more than feeling, and not simply emotional). And having been led so far, we may begin to distinguish that *love is the one really satisfying motive of life for a personal being*.

Let a man look round within himself, and down to the bottom of himself, as far as he can. Let him find that he is moved by any motive which in its deepest significance is not one of love, and

surely he will not be *perfectly* satisfied with it—he cannot take pure pleasure in it: or let him learn what love is, and then he will not. We do not know to any depth of controlling insight *why* it is so, we can give no psychological reason for it, but we *know* that every other motive has some bareness about it, some lack of satisfying significance, and that we could not continuously and fundamentally look into what it is, if it be not love, and not be as if we were staring at the boards and mouldering bricks of a painfully bounded little yard, instead of standing, outside the paltry wall, where we could see the open sunshine on the living hills of summer, and look 'over the hills and far away.'

But given love, though one knows all too little of it in one's experience, one can almost *perceive*, with an anticipative glow at one's heart, that one *would* be satisfied in one's personal motive. We cannot fathom the satisfaction. But love, we feel, must delight in love.[1] It can find nothing more lovely in which to delight, and would be the less love, and the less lovely, if it did not delight in love itself. Love must *love* love, and find no shame in its self-delight: for love, to true insight, is so worthy of love. And as far as a man's life is identified with love, he must, he ought, fully to delight in his own being alive, for love's sake.

[1] I may observe that I am not here following St. Augustine (*De Civ.*, XI, xxviii). The intuition struck me as valid, and I had worked upon it as philosophically suggestive (cp. Chapter XI) years before I knew of its appearance in the fifth century.

This self-delighting of his, the only *self*-ishness of which he would be capable, will be a very energy of unselfishness—for he is really delighting in love. It is not altogether of *human* life that one begins to think such thoughts. Wait a little.

It would seem, then, that our capacity for pleasure and pain makes us seek a satisfaction which can be FULNESS of satisfaction only in LOVE. It should be observed that to say this is not to say that love is merely an emotion, or even that love is *like* feeling. We cannot refer love itself to any one phase of mind. It involves *intellect*: for there is no true love without recognition of an object of love, or without discernment of the qualities of the one whom we love. And only in the beneficent outgoing of love, again, will realization of the full privilege of having a *conative* nature come to us.[1] And yet the special relation of love to feeling seems peculiarly intimate. While thinking and acting come to nothing without love, feeling, in a way which we may perhaps better realize than describe (for I do not know that any exact comparative language in which to describe it exists), seems to have a lack in its own very nature apart from love—a lack such as we do not find correspondingly in clear thinking or energetic action. It is surely not

[1] That love is a 'sentiment'—involving a disposition of greater permanence than its manifestations—does not seem to call for special remark on our part, as we are dealing with capacities throughout.

when we think of ourselves as intellectual, making our observations and solving our problems, or when we think of ourselves as conative, ceaselessly pursuing our chains of nearer and remoter ends, that we come most immediately face to face with our inevitable dissatisfaction apart from love. This revelation seems rather to break upon us out of the allurement and limitation of our experience in the way of feeling.

Where, then, has our interpretation of the place of feeling in life brought us in relation to the Trinity? It has brought us to love. And what, in its ultimate nature, if we could find it, *is* this pure, self-delighting Love, which excludes all selfishness? When we hear of 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,' and of 'the fellowship of the Holy Spirit,' *we hear besides of God whose attribute is love* (II Cor. xiii. 14). More: we have heard of the love of Christ, perhaps we hear of the love of the Spirit (? Rom. xv. 30); it is when we are being told of the Father, who 'sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world,' that we hear directly that 'God is love' (I John iv. 8 16).

Love does not seem here to be presented simply as an *attribute* of the Father. Love—which is at once transcendent valuing and itself the transcendent value—is *the very nature* of God.

If God be love, then in God alone, in what he essentially is, is the secret of that unblemished infinity of satisfaction for which our capacity to feel must secretly cry out. And when we try to think what love is, how absolute and indescribable

it is in its worth, how its attraction transcends all search into its quality, we may perhaps begin to joy in the very invisibility, the very inscrutability, of the Father. And this inscrutability may seem to have some analogue in the mystery which belongs to our ever-present feeling, eluding as it does all our attempts to bring that heart of it which is really the feeling into observation.

Yet unseen though he be, our study of the implications of feeling has led us to consider that, if God is love, men will find a full luminous satisfaction in their own being only as they are indeed 'sons' of God, with natures identified with his—representative sons of a Father in heaven, who "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and upon the unjust." [1]

[1] We have said that our analogy does not involve any attempt at identifying any of the Trinity with the nature of any phase of mind. But one of the points by which an enquirer into the analogy may be struck in reading the New Testament is that the words εὐδοκέω, εὐδοκία (translated 'well-pleased,' 'good pleasure'), when applied to Divine relations, are characteristically used of the Father: (Matt. iii. 17 and parallels, xi. 26, xii. 18, xvii. 5; Luke x. 21, xii. 32; I Cor. i. 21 (cp. 24), x. 5; Gal. i. 15; Eph. i. 5, 9; Phil. ii. 13 (cp. τέκνα θεοῦ, ii. 15); Col. i. 19; Heb. x. 6). While implying a judgment, they have a *fundamentally affective* meaning; and in our human use they suggest harmonious conditions of feeling.

CHAPTER VI

CRITICAL REVIEW

THE analogy which we have begun to suggest will yet open up in another direction. It will change its appearance, and put forth another force. But perhaps at the end of this first stage of statement, without yet having all the evidence before us, we may do well to consider what would be the strength or weakness of the position if we had no more than this first form of analogy with which to deal.

That there should be three phases of mind, and that there should be a Trinity in the Christian doctrine of God, would hardly of itself amount even to a remarkable coincidence. For 'three' is an interesting number: it is involved in relations specially attractive to the human mind.

Take, for example, the threefold distinction of beginning, midst, and end. This is naturally comprehensive of all the processes and courses of things. Our own human courses are summed up in the impressive distinctions of birth, life, and death.

'Threeness,' again, enters into the very simple form of symmetry in which you have two similar objects balanced on each side of another object, as in a trefoil or a *fleur-de-lys*.

And, once again, three is the simplest and least distracting form of plurality. 'Some' (whatever

it may mean in logic) in ordinary intercourse might be felt rather deceptive if it were applied to two examples only: when there are *three* we begin to use 'some' with a good conscience. This sense of plurality finds a very distinct embodiment both in Classical Greek and in Hebrew, in which languages there are singular, *dual*, and plural forms of expression—it is thus at three that strict plurality begins to break out.

With this various pointedness about the number we may expect to find that the working out of constructions in threes is a prevalent practice. From a wide area one could choose a number of curious pictures for a scrap-book on the subject.

Thus the Græco-Roman world recognized the three Fates, the three dread Sisters, by some esteemed the daughters of Night, the youngest of whom spins the thread of life—with whom therefore it originates—while another mingles with it weal and woe, and the third—whom Milton calls 'the blind Fury with th' abhorrèd shears'—cuts through the thread at the time appointed for death. This seems to be a triad of the 'beginning-midst-and-end type. The groups of the Furies proper and the Graces have also settled down traditionally to threes. In the reputed bribes of that rivalling trio, Juno, Minerva, and Venus, to the shepherd who must judge their several charms a fanciful ingenuity might almost imagine a mirage of psychological tripartism—they were promises respectively of power, wisdom, and a uniquely beautiful partner: (but we do not

quite all believe that æsthetics, the study of beauty, affords a sufficiently generous base for the study of feeling).

From Cæsar's German foes, again, worshipping the three obvious, wealth-giving gods [1] whose reputations were alone current among them—the Sun, Vulcan, god of fire, and the Moon: (a triad a little like the Babylonian triad of the Sun, the Moon, and Venus)—we might go further west, and find three as a sacred number among the Celts. One of the Celtic heroes had hair of three colours, stole three cows, and finished with his duplicity as well as his triplicities in a grave under three flag-stones.

To turn to weightier instances, the Hindu trinity of *Brahma*, *Siva*, and *Vishnu*, standing respectively for Creation, Destruction, and Preservation, might suggest the symmetrical type of triad, with the opposite ideas of Destruction and Preservation balanced on a basis of Creation. And in this region we have *Agni*, again, as the god of fire, taking three forms: the sun in the sky, lightning in the waters of the air, and fire on earth. We may note here that the comparison, akin to this, and familiar to us all, of earth, and sea, and sky is surely all the more pleasing to us because of its comprehensive threeness.[2]

The ancient crystallization (traditional in

[1] *De Bello Gallico*, VI, 21.

[2] Miss Flora Klickmann (*The Lure of the Pen*, pp. 139 ff.), very suggestively defending the 'three-part basis' for stories, notes that most art-products are constructed on such a basis.

theology since the time of St. Augustine), which distinguished in the Trinity the Father who loves, the Son who is the object of the love, and the Spirit who is the link of love between them, may owe something to the capacity of three to define a configuration economically. It forms a compactly appealing triad of the symmetrical type—with the names of the Father and the Son as opposite confronting terms, and that of the Spirit as intermediary and unifying. It has a marked resemblance to the Hegelian construction, on the more purely intellectual plane, in which the Father, as the Absolute, is conceived as pure being or pure thought, the Son after the manner of a necessarily posited object of thought, and the Spirit as reconciling or overcoming the difference involved. How far these may be genuine interpretations we have not now to consider. They are attempts to express the internal relations of the Trinity. Our analogy has been concerned with the relations of the Trinity to man.

The mere fact, then, of a triad appearing in the doctrine of God affords no special coincidence with psychology, because triads are on principle to be expected. But the presence of so intimate a threeness-in-oneness in the doctrine of mind, and the presence of so intimate a threeness-in-oneness in the Christian doctrine of God, where both doctrines, too, are concerned with the nature of living being, *is* remarkable.[1] We have found

[1] The reader may further compare the statement of a psychologist with the statement of a theologian. "In distinguishing

that it appears still more arrestingly remarkable when we compare phase by phase, and see the doctrine of the Trinity corresponding, as no other doctrine of God does, to the three vital and fundamental distinctions of experience.

The question arises whether we can find a

---

the cognitions, feelings and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters; in Nature, they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyse the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination."—Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, Vol. I, pp. 188, 189. "It is true that (the writers of the New Testament) believe in one God the Father, and one Lord the Son, and one Spirit of the Father and the Son, each conceived as Divine and personally distinct. But . . . so close a unity is suggested that each *involves* the others. This impression is conveyed quite without the appearance of conscious intention, but very subtly, both in St. Paul and in St. John. In St. Paul the Holy Spirit possesses the Church and its members: so that the Church is His temple (I Cor. iii. 16, 17 and vi. 19). But the presence of the Holy Spirit, that and nothing else, implies and carries with it the presence of Christ. He treats the Spirit dwelling in us, or our having the Spirit, as equivalent to Christ dwelling in us (Rom. viii. 9, 10). And the Spirit (or Christ) dwelling in us implies or involves God dwelling in us (I Cor. iii. 16, 17). Each involves the others. . . . Though the Three are spoken of as personally distinct, each by his presence and actions involves the presence and actions of all. The Three are one. So in John the coming of the Spirit involves Christ's coming: 'I will come unto you.' . . . And as He abides in the Father, and the Father in Him, so His coming will be the Father's coming: 'We will come unto you' (John xiv. 16–23)." (Gore, *Belief in Christ*, p. 239.)

purely natural explanation of what may surely be described as the intense coincidence.

The relation between the three phases of mind and the declaration of the Trinity does not seem to be one of simple parallel or resemblance: it is rather, so far as we have seen, a relation of *meeting*, a relation of need on the one side and of satisfaction of need from the other. It is as intellectual beings (I do not say as *merely* intellectual) that we *desire means of definite apprehension*; according to the Christian declaration it is in the Son that *the means of definite apprehension are offered to us* in reference to the Godhead. Again, one would not say that the relation between our variable and not necessarily honourable feeling—now pleasure, now its negative and contrary, pain—and the Divine Father is one of simple resemblance. What we found was that the consideration of feeling led us surely on to the recognition of a need in our nature which can never be met and fulfilled except in the identification of our motive of being with love: and "God is Love." And once more, as to our inward striving, "the Spirit helpeth our infirmities."

What, then, if the Christian doctrine of the Trinity latently implies that our nature was created in such a form that needs should so concentrate upon its three sides, or in its three aspects, as to be met by the Divine fulness variously expressed to us in the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Father in heaven? Accepting this, could we describe what has actually hap-

pened in the history of the world by simply saying that *the* reality is our own nature, with its needs, that man conceived a transcendent Divine satisfaction for these needs, and that he thus ' objectified ' a triune God for himself ?

Something like this would be the line taken by Feuerbach, who, I found, had anticipated me in the general matter of the comparison of the three phases of mind with the three persons of the Trinity, while trying different comparisons for the several phases. As his is the only attempt I know of at purely natural reduction of an analogy, or supposed analogy, of this kind, I will deal with him specifically.[1]

In 1841 he brought out *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, which George Eliot's imagination found sufficiently impressive for her to think it worth while to translate it into English as *The Essence of Christianity*.

[1] The approach of Mr. S. A. McDowall to the subject, in his *Evolution and the Trinity* (1918), is too essentially metaphysical to be suitable for discussion here, but at one point he crosses our psychological course. He has a chapter on the " Triunity of Personality " in which he suggests a correlation on lines with which our own psychological comparison does not coincide, while his attitude to correlation contrasts with Feuerbach's: " If," he says, " . . . it can be shown that the idea of Godhead which the Christian theologian formalises in what he calls the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is not merely an unjustified and anthropomorphic projection of what he knows of limited personality into his representation of God, the facts become more than suggestive; they point to the nature of ultimate truth. The Trinity in Unity of the Personal God is then an essential part, at least, of Reality " (p. 86).

In this work, with its curiously self-conscious logic, a philosopher reconciles atheistic limitations with theistic professions in the principle that "God is man, man is God" (p. viii). "Man first of all," he says, "sees his nature as if *out of* himself, before he finds it in himself" (p. 13). His essential nature is "Reason, Will, Affection" (p. 3). But "reason, love, force of will," having their ends in themselves, "are perfections" (pp. 3, 6); they are in their own view not limited, not finite (p. 6); they have their God in themselves (p. 7). And through this type of reasoning we are urged to discern "the divine trinity in man, above the individual man," which "is the unity of reason, love, will" (p. 3). "Man's consciousness of himself in his totality is the consciousness of the Trinity" (p. 64).

Such citation may do something less than justice to the baffling subtlety of the method; but it reflects the opening of the work itself so far as it suggests the prospect of an argument being developed on the definitely stated threefold basis of reason, love, will. The prospect proves as disappointing in the end as the method is baffling throughout. The threefold crystallization of human nature presently seems to melt away amid a perplexing variety of points of view.

Part I, on "The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion," begins with a chapter on "God as a Being of the Understanding" (p. 32). "God as God . . . is only an object of thought" (p. 34). He is "a need of the intelligence, a

necessary thought—the highest degree of the thinking power" (p. 35). This being the view of God the Father, and there being nothing satisfactory to the imagination in trying to correlate the Son with will, what is more natural than that Feuerbach should avail himself of the human appealingness of the incarnation (p. 49) to correlate the Son with affection? "God the Father is *I*, God the Son *Thou*. The *I* is understanding, the *Thou* love" (p. 66).

But there his comparison ends. He gets no further with his at first proposed 'divine *trinity*' in man. With his 'I' and 'Thou' he has become absorbed in treating the relations of Deity, of Father and Son, more nearly on the current philosophical model of transcendent *Subject and Object*; and this has reduced him to a *duality* of the subject-and-object type beyond which there is no advance. He still uses the name of 'trinity' but does not seem to mean a trinity.

For he now explicitly shuts 'the third person' out of the account of persons in the 'Trinity,' as expressing "nothing further than the love of two divine Persons towards each other" (p. 66). Here he falls back upon that traditional formulation to which we have elsewhere referred.[1] The third person "is the unity of the Son and the Father . . . strangely enough regarded in its turn as a special personal being" (p. 66). "We need not," he says, "make the Holy Spirit a separate object of our analysis" (p. 66). "There

[1] P. 75.

are in fact only two Persons in the Trinity" (p. 67).

This statement he had curiously balanced beforehand on the human side by reducing the essentials of human nature, which were three, correspondingly to two: "But Love with understanding and understanding with love, is mind, and mind is the totality of man as such—the total man" (p. 66).

Almost immediately after we find him in difficulty with his remaining two correlations. He has correlated the Father with intellect, the Son with affection. But now, after all, he comes up sharply against the very obvious correlation of the Son with intellect. "The second Person," he continues, ". . . is warmth; the Father is light, *although light was chiefly a predicate of the Son, because in him the Godhead first became clear, comprehensible*" (p. 67—*italics mine*). On realizing occasion for so very broad an admission of the predominant *intellectual* affinities of the Son, a thinker who found himself on another line might conceivably look back to his base to see whether he had made his discriminations soundly at the beginning. But a winged creature of the empyrean, rather than coming back, may prefer to sustain itself still by its own poise; and Feuerbach's argument proceeds with a difficult passage. "But notwithstanding this, light as a superterrestrial element," he says, "may be ascribed to the Father, the representative of the Godhead as such, the cold being of the intelli-

gence ; and warmth, as a terrestrial element, to the Son " (p. 67). This distribution of ideas may be beyond criticism in its consonance with Feuerbach's own abstract system of thought—that does not now detain us. What concerns us more is the difficulty of seeing the effective relevance of his conception of a ' cold being of the intelligence ' to the Christian presentation of ' the Father.'

This whole manner of search for necessary implications of Deity in human nature may have given some hungry satisfaction as a means of dealing with the human desire after God without requiring belief in anything more than man ; but as a piece of continuous psychological comparison Feuerbach's work looks like a house undergoing decay in the builder's very hands. If, however, we pass by the difficulty of mutually reconciling his methods of development, is Feuerbach's theory after all on typically right lines of explanation when he says : " The Son is the satisfaction of the need for mental images . . . Man makes to himself an image of God. . . . But he places this image in God himself, because his want would not be satisfied if he did not regard this image as an objective reality " (p. 74) ? Is *this* the explanation of the possibility of comparison between the triunity of mind and the Divine triunity ?

We have implied that our statement of the analogy is not yet complete. Following the facts closely, we shall turn into an avenue so integrally connected with our first main circuit that we

cannot satisfactorily consider the two apart. We shall find that the analogy, as continuing through this avenue, begins to move in an area of *positively known facts on both sides*, and that the force of an attempted subjective explanation like Feuerbach's for the parallel fades away.

We might almost make our transition along the path of a near anticipation by Richard Hooker; (and I am disposed to receive it as confirmatory of that view of central affinities which we have here been tracing that, more than a century before the psychological doctrine of tripartism became available as suggestor, his conception of the doctrine of the Trinity itself should have led him into such close harmony with us as we shall see). "Dare any man," he has been asking, "unless he be ignorant altogether how inseparable the Persons of the Trinity are, persuade himself that every of them may have their sole and several possessions, or that we being not partakers of all, can have fellowship with any one?" Then we find him taking up the attributes of 'power, wisdom, and goodness' in the Church of England Article "Of Faith in the Trinity."[1] For his particular purposes he reverses their order, and so handles them that we can hardly conceive otherwise than that, if he had had the fundamental distinctions of our more definite psychology before him, and had accepted them, he must in consistency have correlated them as we have (any appearance of *exclusive* attributions must be

[1] Cp. p. 25.

compared with the general tenor of the passage): "The Father *as Goodness*, the Son *as Wisdom*, the Holy Ghost *as Power*[1] do all concur in every particular outwardly issuing from that one only glorious Deity which they all are. For that which moveth God to work is Goodness, and that which ordereth his work is Wisdom, and that which perfecteth his work is Power. All things which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth were eternally and before all times in God, as a work unbegun is in the artificer which afterwards bringeth it unto effect. Therefore whatsoever we do behold now in this present world, it was enwrapped within the bowels of divine Mercy, written in the book of eternal Wisdom, and held in the hands of omnipotent Power, the first foundations of the world being as yet unlaid."

Our own next step will be from the thought of the invisible Trinity to the thought of the manifest creation. And as we mark the plain order of 'whatsoever we do now behold in this present world' it may begin to appear to us that the first foundations of our comparison are much older than any human anticipation of human formulations, and that its principle is objectively rooted where no subjective changes in our thought can affect it.

[1] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. V, ch. lvi, 5 (1597). Italics mine. The affective relation of "Goodness" (cp. p. 25 *supra*) is implied in the substitution, just below, of "Mercy." Cp. Bk. I, ch. xi, 2: "No good is infinite but only God; therefore He our felicity and bliss." (With the dichotomy of xi, 3 cp. p. 24 *supra*.)

CHAPTER VII

INTELLECT AND THE CREATION

THE threefold analogy which presented itself to us in our first study involved us in tracing a parity of relation between the position of intellect in the triune mind and the position of the statement about the Son in the declaration of the Trinity. Now this particular side of the threefold analogy is open to a special development, taking us beyond directly theological considerations into ranges of fact which form the well-known working ground of positive science.

The link, on the theological side, between what we have said of the Son and what we have to say of nature, is that in the New Testament writings the natural creation is viewed as coming into being *through the Son*: "all things came into being through him" (John i. 3); "through whom" God "made the worlds" (Heb. i. 2); "there is one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things" (I Cor. viii. 6); "all has been brought forth through him, and for him, and he is prior to all, and all is systematized in him" (Col. i. 16, 17).

Our analogy might receive confirmation of an at

first almost incredible kind if we found something coming into being, brought forth, through the intellect, seriously comparable to the ordered ranges of the natural creation. This would be a remarkably interlocking confirmation of the comparison we have been led to draw between the position of the intellect in the psychological discovery and the position of the Son in the older threefold declaration. We must be soberly prepared to examine whether the confirming facts exist.

Psychologists by the end of the nineteenth century had worked out a systematic exhibition of what came into existence intellectually. They distinguished 'intellectual products' in orderly array—the products of our perception, imagination and reasoned thought. Of all these it could be said that they were 'brought forth through' the intellect, and existed 'for it'; the intellect was 'prior to them' (it was the condition of their being), and in the intellect they were 'systematized.' The relation of these 'products' to the intellect could be described in the same terms as those used to describe the relation of the natural creation to the Son. That is our starting-point for a detailed examination of the parallel between the forms taken by intellectual products and the forms taken by what we call the products of nature (not that either the word 'intellect' or the word 'nature' *explains* the existence of what we call 'products'). The older psychological exhibition combined with its

accidental defect of being absurdly mechanical a more essential virtue of being peculiarly distinct. We will seek to inherit its virtue. The scheme in some shape may still be dug out from the midst of current conative expositions.

(I) Perceiving, Imagining, Reasoned Thinking

You are near the bottom of the garden, facing the hedge which divides garden from field. Your eyes have been shut, till the sound of heavy breathing, not human, causes you to open them. And above the hedge you unexpectedly catch sight of *a spread of blue, with apparently irregular black lines upon it.* If you shut your eyes at once, that might be about all you would see. But you keep them open; and you discern that what is before you is a blue crumpled sheet of paper, the irregular black lines diversifying it being the forms of letters meandering about the crumplings —a fragment of an old poster, which has evidently been caught and for the moment uplifted above the hedge on the horns of a cow, who surveys you from under this unwonted decoration with a customary though unintentional expression of ignorant disdain. Still looking, you begin to perceive how the sunlit crinkled surface shows different *degrees* of brightness of blue in its ridges and furrows, some of the letters, meanwhile, beginning to stand out distinctly as tagged, others not so; and you might awake to still further strata of details unnoticed at first, but

that the cow has apparently had enough of you, swings the odd weight of its head in a sidelong curve, and is off, poster and all.

The cow carries away a fragment of paper which for all *practical* purposes (if any) is unchanged from what it was when first you saw it. But we have been noticing that meantime *something* has been changing and growing. The blue mass developed for you into a blue mass exhibiting a multitude of detailed shapes in crinkles—shapes distinguishable through the variety in its blue: the irregular black lines on the blue mass stood out at last as the recognizable forms of distinct letters of different cuts of type. It was as if you began with a forked stem of impression—the black and the blue—and finished with a developed bushiness of detail. *What* was it that grew? Not the fragment of poster as it existed, and went on existing, in the world of practice. What grew was something which we must distinguish from the 'practicable object' as *your percept* of the fragment of poster. It was a mental growth that was going on.

This was a *visual* percept. When you distinguished the quality of the sound of the heavy breathing that made you open your eyes, that was an *auditory* percept. We have percepts connected with our various senses. But we need not now work out their inter-relations.

Shut your eyes *at once* as the cow goes. You will still seem to be *almost* seeing the poster, with the sunshine and shadow on its crinkles, and its

array of illegible lettering. In a few moments you will have a difficulty in seeming still to see it *where* you saw it. It will seem to float off out of fixed relation to the space about you, and to have lost substance. This is your mental *image* of the poster. A day or two after, when you are away in London, the image may appear again, but now fainter, and with no assignable relation to the space surrounding you at all. This is a free mental image.

The production, with the sustaining and ordering, of such images is known in psychology as 'imagination.' This work-a-day use of the word must be distinguished from its more ornamental use when we speak of people 'having imagination' in the sense of being able to liberate themselves from the commonplace. If someone is asked, "Did you fill the coal-scuttle?" and in answering "No," pictures the coal-scuttle empty as seen in the kitchen a few minutes ago, imagination, in our sense, would be involved.

So much, for the moment, of percept and image. But, in the third place, you may begin to develop your ideas of the poster in different *aspects*, and (do not be afraid of an abstract expression which will soon clear up) you may *link the special aspects with other conditioning ideas*. Thus you might choose to think of the paper poster in the aspect of its *inflammability*. It would prove inflammable, you might reflect, on *condition* that it was brought into contact with a burning match or its equivalent, and on condition of its *not* having

been previously brought into contact with water or its equivalent; you might further think of it igniting coal, on *condition* that wood intervened. This would be *explicit thinking*. You would be recognizing *reasons why* the paper would, or would not, act in a particular way.

And if you thought like this, it would not be because of what you knew of this particular poster, but because of what you had learned of *paper in general*. And the significance in your thinking would not be confined to any particular match, drops of water, pieces of wood, but would attach to paper, flame, wood, more generally considered. What you thought would apply to whole classes, or general types, of like objects.

Again, if you thought of the poster under another aspect, say of its being *visible*, you could work out different systems of consequences of its being so, according as you connected its visibility with optical, social, or more specially æsthetic conditions. You could think of the optical conditions of its being visible at all, you could think of the social conditions out of which announcement by poster has arisen, or the different social results to which it has led and may lead; you could think of the designing of posters, and their possible influence, for better or worse, upon taste.

It is by the systematic extension of such methods of thinking that the working conditions of the world and the universe have come to

be investigated, and sciences and intellectual disciplines have come to be framed.

The traditional account of thinking was shaped for psychology under a Greek influence with more sympathy for philosophical construction than for scientific practice. It has made, I believe, relatively too little of thought as enquiring into the conditions under which effects happen, and relatively too much of it as classifying objects and dealing with them under general aspects. It has laid stress on the generality of thought, while rather overlooking the shaping effect of its enquiry into the causes of things.

With this proviso, our distinction of percept, image, reasoned thinking corresponds to the three conspicuous forms of organized product recognized one above the other by a systematic psychology of the intellect. What lies below these in the intellectual scale we must consider later.

The analogy between the relations of percept, image and reasoned thought to one another in the intellectual scale, and the relations to one another of the different forms of organized life in the scale of nature was the topic introduced by that article in *Mind* of which I spoke at the outset. Without carrying the comparison lower in the scale (as we shall here), the three *conspicuous and popularly recognized* forms of organized life distinguished upon our planet as one above the other—vegetable, animal, and humanly social—were compared against the three conspicuous forms of intellectual

organization. This was done with an exaggerated evolutionism, and an early approach to what has since become well known as ' pragmatism,' which I have no desire to sustain. Stronger grounds for comparison, as I believe, will be submitted to the reader's judgment.

Before entering into any close analysis we might be struck by the fact that the immediately conspicuous forms of organization are the same in number on the intellectual and on the ' cosmic ' side—the side of the world-order.

And our two portions of scales may begin to look a little interesting when we compare them in respect of what may metaphorically be described as ' *inwardness*.'

Vegetable, animal, and human beings have all an ' outward ' or physical organization ; and with the vegetable the physical organization is our main study : inner life seems but shadowily and ambiguously represented here. What greatly distinguishes the other two forms of cosmic organization—the animal and the human —is that the higher animal and man appear to live a distinct life of *inner experience*—to have an *inward mental life* quite unambiguously. I never distinguished in a vegetable anything corresponding to the signs of inward interest which a strange dog forced upon me even while I was writing thus—looking up with almost dancing attentiveness at my writing-pad, apparently expecting something edible to drop from it.

On the purely intellectual side, again, we have,

for one form of organization, the direct perceptual observation of the '*outward*' object. Here the percept is ambiguous. Having a percept of an umbrella-handle as my umbrella hangs upon my arm, I can consider myself in touch with a physical fact if I regard it from the practical point of view; I am interested in a mental fact if I regard its developing appearance to me after the manner of the development of the poster. Then there are here also, as in the cosmic scale, two higher forms of organization—the image and reasoned thought—which carry us more 'inward': we regard them as more entirely inward to the mind itself.

Thus, though all may be vague to us at present, we may begin to distinguish (i) on both sides a form of organization which is proportionally more 'outward' in interest—*vegetable* cosmically, *perceptive* intellectually; and then (ii, iii) on both sides two other forms of organization higher and higher above the first-named—*animal* and *human* cosmically, *imagination* and *reasoned thinking* intellectually—which develop rooting in 'inwardness': those as 'possessing' inward mental life, these as seeming more absolutely to belong to inward mental life.

But before attempting to pursue the analogy between the two groups, I want to take up a principle of distinction between them.

Nature offers us a vast range of manifestation, extending from the remotest known stars and nebulæ to our very feet, which becomes the

gradually surveyed yet immeasurable *object* of our knowledge. The intellectual manifestations which we have been enumerating are the *modes* of our knowing—we gain knowledge of nature through perceiving, imaging, reasoning.

Now when I perceive a lump of coal, hard of outline, black, yet squarely and brokenly brilliant in seams of light, I *recognize* it for a lump of coal. But how could I do that if I had never seen such a lump before? So far as perception includes recognition like this, memory and perhaps a latent image of what I have perceived at other times seem to be involved in it. Besides, though I am not touching the coal, I have a disposition to *imagine* what it would be like if I touched it, and the imaginative recognition of its hardness seems indistinguishably part of my perceptive grasp of what it is. Once more, ranging a little above imagination, without *distinctly* thinking, I know the coal is useful to burn—which is a latent thought about it. Thus, in the process of knowing an object, imagining and thinking seem to blend themselves into the act of perceiving. I find nothing in the mutual relations of living things in the world about me like this intellectual blending: it belongs to the process of knowing.

So much of perception. But now if for some reason I *image* London Bridge to myself without seeing it, I may straightway find myself visualizing St. Paul's as I have so often seen it rising above

the buildings that line the river-side, remote as if it belonged to a city built in another element, but wonderfully belonging to this city, aerial yet solid, with dark hollows and encircling columns beneath its crowning dome, and its western towers like nothing else I recall except the simpler pair upon the Norman front at Tewkesbury—and perhaps before I know it I shall be picturing the Upper Thames Street route and the Cannon Street route as alternative ways of approach. Thus the presence of one part of a system of imagery may lead to the instatement of more of the system. This has to do specifically with our *knowing*, and again there is nothing, so far as I am aware, analogous to it in the mutual relations of life in nature about us.

Yet again, the lines of *individuality* in intellectual products and in the living beings of nature are different. That you can cut up a plant to start new plants suggests that in the vegetable world individuality may not be very sharply defined. But the indefinite freedom of individualization with which you can take as the unitary object of your perception a Corinthian pillar, or the flourishing capital of the pillar, or one acanthus leaf of the capital, is beyond the scope of analogy.

Once more, a very important relation in knowing is that the percept gives rise to an image which is its *replica*. There is no such relation between living individuals in nature. (And on the other

hand there is nothing in intellectual relations corresponding to the life and death of individuals, and their succession in generations.)

When we have made these distinctions, which have to do with the peculiar nature of knowledge, it may be a surprise to find what a pointed analogy between the intellectual and cosmic scales remains to us.

In following it up there are two points which the reader may do well to bear in mind with some intentness.

One is that this further analogy is the *natural development and extension* of the analogy traced between the position of intellect in the positive triunity of mind, and the position of the Son in the transcendent Divine triunity. Affinity of rooting *there* is to be further borne out by the observable likeness in the directions of the branchings *here*. The *parity of position* which we noticed at the beginning will be found to be accompanied by a striking *parity of content* when we examine further.

The second point is that all explanation of the kind which, like Feuerbach's, depends on an impulse of the mind to procure its own satisfaction through the images it produces for that purpose becomes manifestly out of court as we proceed along these extended, but surely by no means adventitious lines of *cosmic* parallel. The configurations which will now begin to range themselves over against and beyond the facts of mind will very obviously refuse to be treated as

imaginary. And yet this further parallel appears to be the related and clearly warranted extension of *one aspect* of the threefold comparison with which we began. Explanation which proceeds by resolving one side of the threefold comparison into cloud receives at this point a full check.

(II) Lower Degrees of the Scales

We are now, instead of ranging round the three phases of mind, to range up and down within one phase—the intellectual—still comparing the mental content with what is beyond the mind itself. And the parallel range beyond the mind itself now ceases to belong exclusively to a region known only to theology: it continues in due order into the sphere of observation and reflection known to our sciences. Our comparison of the psychological and the theological is to be pursued into a dependent and *corroborating* comparison of the intellectual and the cosmic.

To begin, we might almost say, *before* the actual beginning on the intellectual side, psychologists have to recognize what looks like a dependence of our knowledge on physical and physiological conditions—on physical conditions in the external world of material objects, and on physiological conditions in our own bodies. When I come to see an object it is supposed to be because *something* is happening in the world—something which has been described as a vibration in the ether (though the existence of ether is now subject to question).

This light-vibration sets up an agitation in my optic nerve, and the agitation is 'propagated' to the brain, and then—why, then we come to a chasm in our view of things which no science enables us to bridge, and which no flight of fancy can represent as being bridged. How it should be that upon the occasion of this physical vibration and physiological agitation a change of *sensation* arises in the mind, no one can dream. Various subtle shifts of conception may be framed by philosophers to show that the chasm exists only because we try to look across it; but we do not get rid of the fact that it has been seriously recognized—which is sufficient for the present purpose of our analogy. For we have to point out that on the cosmic side a similar chasm has been recognized as intervening before we can arrive at vital organization in the world about us.

Thus, examining the underpinning of the cosmic scale, we find that all the organized bodies in the world are built up out of inorganic material, which, before it can build them up, undergoes a change we cannot altogether follow. In fact, on this side also, when we seek to pass from inorganic material to the lowest form of living material, we come upon a chasm which has resisted every effort to bridge it. Theorists desire, for the sake of unity, to think that the essentials of life are already present in matter which we call non-living. But neither philosophic theory, nor anything that the chemists may announce to-morrow, will remove the fact that

here a great chasm between the non-living and the living, comparable to that recognized between the non-mental and the mental, *has* been impressively recognized in the history of thought. If both chasms should some day disappear for more comprehensive thought, the analogy of their one-time recognition and subsequent disappearance would remain to be pointed out. At the foot of each scale conditions have been such as to lead us to contemplate a gulf with no evident ford, and yet to witness commerce across it (see the table on p. 116).

Next, as first and lowest of *mental* facts, beyond the chasm, psychologists placed 'sensations.' They tried to show how intellectual structures might be built up out of these, more or less as chemical substances are built up out of atoms. This comparison has been very competently criticized, and we shall not adopt it. The variegated presence of greenness, blueness, whiteness, redness, and the rest which varyingly fill the scope of our seeing at each moment—the differing and commingling assaults of sound which replace each other in our hearing—these and the rest out of which our percepts come to be intellectually organized might surely find a better analogy. All plants and animals are organized out of a certain mysterious living substance known as *protoplasm*: it enters into their constitution in variously differentiated forms. On the other hand, all percepts and images, we shall find, are organized out of sense-data, which enter into their con-

stitution in variously differentiated forms. I think we might aptly call sensation the protoplasm of intellectual organization. But here, as elsewhere, there is something on the intellectual side which has no cosmic analogy. The strongly marked *given differences* of sense-data—the differences between colour, sound, and so on—have to do with the ordered distinctness and richness of our knowledge. One knows of no comparable end to serve in the outer world, and protoplasm is not diversified so deeply as sensation.

Before passing on from protoplasm to conspicuously and variously organized life in the cosmic scale, we must notice those more simple microscopic organisms which are not to be called vegetable or animal, because the special characteristics of plants and animals are hardly to be distinguished in them. Is there, correspondingly, any simple form of intellection not to be distinguished as truly percept or image? The lowest form of intellectual reaction to sensation breaking in upon the mind might perhaps be a simple preparedness to receive its impression more fully—a latent asking what this dawning sensation-signal is going to become? And such a low form of intellectual expectation would be hardly more like a settled percept of an object than like the image which the percept 'calls up' anticipatively—as when, for example, in higher intellection, on seeing a sudden puff of white from a distant engine we anticipate the sound of the whistle which will reach us later.

If this necessarily rather hypothetical analogy of simplest forms does not appeal to us, the analogy of the *conspicuous* features of the scales, which are what chiefly matter, is still left undisturbed. To these we shall now return.

(III) Higher Degrees of the Scales

It is recognized that vegetable and animal organisms alike are built up out of protoplasm—it has even been known for a long time that they are composed of fundamentally the same kind of cellular tissue. On the other hand, the sameness of the sensuous composition of percept and image may become evident to us in the difficulty we have in distinguishing in a dim light between what we perceive and what we imagine.

But now, one of the notable dividing-lines in biology is that animal tissue cannot be built up except out of material which has passed through the form of vegetable tissue. Vegetables, but not animals, have direct nutritive relation to the inorganic world: animals must feed on plants, either directly or through feeding on other animals which have already done so. And intellectually, sense-data cannot enter into the composition of images until they have first entered into the composition of percepts: all our imaging is some modification of what we have once perceived. Perception only, not imagina-

tion, enters into direct primary relation with the world of objects.[1]

There is another striking contrast between vegetable and animal life which is connected in a way we need not now consider with this difference in their modes of nutrition.

One of our first impressions in comparing typical vegetable life with typical animal life is the comparative stolidity of vegetable existence. You may compare, if you will, a massy-rooted immovable oak with a bounding lion—I am not thinking of such oddities as barnacles—or an aspen, astir only where it stands, with a fox visiting and vanishing. You might feel the same sort of contrast between the percept, so steadily and inevitably ' there ' so long as your eyes are in the right direction, and the mental image coming and going as it were at impulse. Apart from very low forms, not typical amid the endless variety of nature, the life of a plant is bound up with a fixed spatial environment, unless some external agency is brought to bear to change its position. And your percept of the chair now opposite to you has its fixed space-relations, except as some force which has nothing to do with your perception of the chair alters them—and it will only move it into other relatively fixed space-relations. On the other hand, the characteristic form of animal

[1] The synthetic production of food-stuffs, if it supplemented, could not alter, the given natural order. It is the purely natural order with which we are concerned.

is mobile, readily changing its relations to its spatial environment. If a tree may be hard to move, an animal may be difficult to confine. And your ' free ' mental image of the piece of furniture is not bound to any one spatial setting—in imagination you can ' try ' the chair in any room, or visualize it in no room.

I am not now asking whether there is any philosophy of all this—whether there is some assignable deep reason why development on both sides should at this point make for mobility and freedom. Our concern is not now to probe the analogy: we have merely to judge of its plainness, with the given facts before us.

The same relation may be viewed more anatomically. The animal frame has an adjustability which the vegetable frame does not exhibit. The woodily supported outspread of a tree cannot be promptly changed by any internal means: the instantly modifiable frame of one of the higher animals can change its pose with a flexibility distributed to each area of its body. And, intellectually, the pattern spread before you in perception cannot be modified in its relation of parts by any act of perception. With a highly developed power of imagination, *imagine* a pattern, and the relations and forms of the imagined parts can undergo change with surpassing flexibility.

Nevertheless, even the vegetable organism is in some respects more sensitively modifiable than we might suspect. Sir J. C. Bose, the famous Indian

biologist, experimenting romantically on the almost nervous traits of plants, has shown with what delicate variation their vital responsiveness can cloud and clear. And the percept, too, can be detected undergoing delicate changes of distinctness or vagueness with the varying of one's observation.

If we return to the subject of the nutrition of living organisms, and consider its physiological balance, we find that in all living organisms two opposite processes are going on—a building up of structure by nutrition (which is called *anabolism*), and a breaking down of structures in the uses of life (which is called *katabolism*). Both processes appear in both plant life and animal life. But roughly speaking (apart from question of exhaustion and decay), with the plant, the steadily growing tree, the stress is on the building up, still up; while the frames of more volatile and excitable animals are continually being built up and wasted and restored. On the intellectual side, if you compare percept and image (apart from question of failure through fatigue), you will find that while you are gazing, say, at the watch you hold in your hand, your percept remains steady, and what you see seems to be solidifying its impression upon your mind. But imagine a watch not before you, and you will find parts of its substance are for ever appearing, fleeting and being restored. Animal and image are thus both comparatively flame-like organizations against the still cinder-glow of vegetable and perceptive life.

So far we pursue physiological comparisons; but a point of special interest here is *the parallel in a challenge offered to materialism*. On both sides we find something *non*-material taking distinct shape.

When plants are in view it might not seem very difficult to regard the living organism as so much organized material. But it is difficult to apply such a conception consistently to a fully typical animal. Let us consider.

You know that though you cut a cabbage or snap the stem of a lily with no more compunction than if you were breaking a biscuit, it would be quite another thing to snap the leg of a mouse or cut off the foot of a . . . well, leave it there. That means that it is not so easy to regard the animal as so much organized material. In fact, upon pain of ourselves becoming what we had better not become, we are constrained to respect, in the animal, the signs of its having what we call *inner experience*.

And the impression we thus sustain *above* the level of vegetable life reacts upon our feeling for vegetable life itself. It is true that we do not detect in the trees themselves, that stand up silent from the lawn and root beneath it, or in the grass and primroses at their feet, any definite evidence of the rounding off, within their secret being, of a life of inner experience with a content of its own. But then they not only share with animals one general form of cellular tissue, they are more or less akin to them in so-called ' sensitiveness.'

And this impels us to regard the tree, distantly related to the animal, as being not *wholly* without an inwardness of life, however blank, and however wanting in the definite traits of anything to be called experience. Animal life seems to present more legibly something which we cannot read in vegetable life alone, but can hardly suppose entirely absent. And thus what becomes definite in the cosmic scale with animals affects our view of what is indefinite below.

And we may notice that when a materialistic biologist is trying to find out how to explain life as nothing more intimate than a physico-chemical process, a biologist of more catholic views may direct his attention to what breaks out in animal life. He may ask him whether he expects to create in his laboratory living chemical substances which are alive with that same life which in its higher manifestations takes luminous shape in animal consciousness? It is animal life which begins to force upon us this problem of a definite *inward vital content* which is something different from any material content.

Within mind, again, it is just as we pass from percepts to mental images that the question of *inwardness* gets thrown into a distinct light. When I look directly at a 'lion' shilling, though I believe, as I have described, that the percept has a growth which does not affect the shilling as practically considered, it is really rather difficult for me to realize that an inward mental fact is involved. I just look at the minted piece of

silver, and the fact that I am looking with my eyes at the 'outward' object, the shilling, overlays everything. Try the experiment: what 'percept' can you distinguish *other than the shilling itself*? But if I image a spade guinea, which is not at present within reach of my senses, the presence of an inward mental fact seems to stand out so obviously as hardly to call for any effort to distinguish it. Here is a mentally sustained object of contemplation which is certainly not the guinea itself. It is a content of the intellect; it is not a content of the practical world where goods are exchangeable for money. I could not sell it as a 'curio.'

And because percept and image are so closely akin, the distinct recognition of the image as an inward mental fact makes it easier to regard the percept as being an inward mental fact too. I look at the shilling again. By comparison with the image I am more easily able to claim the percept as something which, while I am looking at the object, is being mentally sustained.

Thus, as we ascend the cosmic scale, animal life begins, with a voice which can be heard, to call upon us to recognize the inward aspect of all life; as we ascend the intellectual scale, the image begins to assist us in detecting the dependence of all knowledge upon the inward life of the mind.

The *duality* in the life of an animal, which has a physical organization comparable with that of a vegetable, *and* a definite mental organization which transcends the vegetable in distinctness,

belongs to the macrocosm—the great outer world. The distinction of physical and mental is not, when we come to images, repeated *within* the sphere of the mental life, in the intellectual scale. There are limits to analogy. And the limits here may seem quite in accordance with what might be expected.

When we take the next step upward in our scales, to *human social life* on the one side and *reasoned thought* on the other, we may be struck by something to be marked off as *flexibility of specialization* appearing in the members of society on the one hand, and in the intellectual ideas on the other. To make the meaning of 'specialization' clear on the intellectual side, take a simple example of thinking something out—which may serve as a type of thinking not so simple as well.

You have in your room a gas-lamp, worked by two chains labelled respectively 'on' and 'off.' One evening the lamp is not giving so satisfactory a light as it has yielded on other evenings, and you wonder *why* not? That is an approach to thinking—thinking is always in essence, I believe, a framing and attempted answering of such questions as 'Why not?' or 'Why?' or 'How?'[1] First you vaguely imagine something

[1] For a fuller study of the nature of thinking, see an article contributed by the writer to *Mind*, Vol. XV, N.S., No. 60, on "The Constitution of Thought," or, at the University of London, a thesis with the same title approved for the degree of Doctor of Literature.

happening at the gas-works; then you notice that while the end of the ' on ' chain is hooked up, the ' off ' chain is hanging down. Now hitherto your main idea of the chains has been that they are things to be pulled, and conveying the pull to the cock that admits the gas to the burners. But to meet the requirement of your problem of the lowered light you will now legitimately give your idea of the chain a specialized emphasis, and think of the hanging chain specially as a thing *having weight*, and thus exerting a pull. This weight, not being balanced by the weight of the other chain, which has been hooked up, has turned the cock, and lowered the light.

This is sufficient for immediate practical purposes; but you may have curiosity enough to enquire more closely: *Why did not* the unbalanced pull of the chain turn the gas right off? And hitherto your idea of the cock may have been just the idea of something which turns to pass or to cut off the stream of gas in the pipe. Now you *specialize* your idea of it as a thing which sets up friction when it moves, and which has therefore opposed the pull of the weight. This may not be a complete explanation of what has happened—the angle of the direction of the pull to the bar of the cock is a determining factor—but so far as it goes it is reasoned thinking.[1]

To take a more advanced example, the problem

[1] Cp. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 311: "The one *sine qua non* of thought—selective control of ideas in order to solve a problem."

why, though diamond and the graphite of our 'lead' pencils are both pure carbon, the diamond is so hard that it will cut glass, and the graphite so soft that it will rub off on smooth paper, represents a kind of requirement that will arise only under fairly advanced intellectual conditions. It is now understood that to meet it we must specialize our ideas of diamond and graphite in such a shape as to represent the atoms composing the crystals of carbon as disposed in layers which in the graphite are twice as far apart as they are in the diamond, with consequently less cohesion.

It may now be realized that in reasoned thinking ideas can be specialized with a controlled freedom and definiteness unexampled in lower intellection, to meet requirements in the shape of problems which on the lower levels never develop.

On the other hand, it is precisely characteristic of human society that, to meet requirements which at the level of animal life never develop, the members of human society become specialized with a controlled freedom and definiteness unexampled on lower levels of life.

It is the distinction of men to *assume* functions. Human individuals in society can *be* this or that —doctors, teachers, bankers, or performers of the various operations involved in the engineering profession and trades—with a definiteness, distinctiveness, and variety unknown in animal groupings. Now we realize that the specializations involved in reasoned thought open to us new requirements in the shape of problems to be met by

new specializations of ideas. And so in society, as the requirements of society are met by such specializations as we have just described, requirements express themselves in new forms, calling for new specializations. Thus nowadays you get a radium specialist in the West End co-operating with doctors in Harley Street or Devonshire Place, who may be specialized in ways that a generation ago were not thought of. You have engineers specializing in internal combustion engines, and the 'conquest of the air' by and by takes the shape of a requirement rather than a dream; and then you have specialists in aircraftsmanship.

Reasoned thought and human society are thus alike marked by an essential 'progressiveness' (not necessarily *always* valuable in society or valid in thought), which we distinguish from the 'natural growth' of the world or of experience. The specialized developments of society move with their own many-sided and inter-connected strains of forwardness athwart the face of the general movement of nature; the specialized developments of one's reasoned thought move with their own many-sided and inter-connected strains of forwardness athwart the face of the general maturing of one's experience. The more mechanical advance may seem to us variously a doubtful boon, but under existing social conditions the hand-over-hand development of requirement and specialization seems inevitable. The harshness and crudeness of our artificial world, the dreary

lack of any fundamental guiding and controlling significance in it, may leave us wondering what other inventions might have taken the place of those we see, had the race itself been more alive. What other trains of contrivance, more flower-like in beauty, suggestiveness, and subtle effectiveness, might we have seen if the social world had progressed in a more ideal harmony with the Creator of all life, the supreme Originator of fruitfulness and beauty? On the other hand, we may wonder, too, how science might have done something more living than ferreting out facts in an order without meaning, and offering explanations without a glimpse of interpretation. Might not science, more vitally guided, have unfolded the structure and actions both of things living and of things that form the setting of life in such a significant growth as even to do justice to their poetic possibilities, and to make knowledge a ready vehicle, never broken down and halting as now, of Divine disclosure?

Now you specialized your idea of the chain in the direction of weight. Suppose you happen to have such a chain lying detached by you on the table when a draught is inclined to lift your loose papers. Wondering for a moment how to secure them, you might again specially emphasize your idea of the chain in the direction of weight, but *now* to suggest the chain placed upon the paper as a temporary paper-weight. In this instance your specializing emphasis works out to a different ultimate *significance*. If you regard the signific-

ance of the idea of the chain-having-weight as being *determined* through what you know of the cock of the lamp, it can mean the lowering of your light; if you regard the significance of the idea of the chain-having-weight as being determined through what you know of the limit to the raising power of the current of air, it can mean the securing of your papers. This principle of a variously *determinable significance* for our specialized ideas is a grand principle of reasoned thinking. In the higher development of thought it has very intricate application.

A similar principle applies to the specialized functions of the individual in society. The ultimate social significance of the special function of the wood-feller, for instance, is determined in different ways through the cabinet-maker or the boat-builder—and then the fishermen who use the boat, and the people who eat the fish and are so far sustained in carrying out their various functions. There would be other lines of significance determined through the wood-pavior. The more advanced the society, the more complex the application of the principle.

It is difficult to estimate how far the appearance of analogy might be accounted for by the dependence of social development on reasoned thinking itself, or by the degree in which thinking is concerned with assigning causes, while social life itself forms a highly articulated scheme of causation. Whatever account we may try to give of it, the reflective mind may still be struck by the

explicitness of the analogy at this point of the scales.

Beyond the central core of analogy we may follow up considerations perhaps less precise, but still seeming germane.

We may briefly note the importance, for clear and expeditious thinking, of the classifying of objects of thought, so far as they are similar, together under a distinctive name (as 'gases,' 'fluids,' 'Sèvres ware,' 'Dresden ware'); though this importance has, I believe, been made too central in the analysis of the constitution of thought. The ideal of classification would be a ready distinctness and consistency extending through all our thinking of objects, together with a simplified, unobstructed, and intensified suggestiveness. And in society, under local limitations which do not apply to thought, we may observe a tendency for men with similarly specialized functions to group themselves together, and even to form stated associations, as the General Medical Council, or the Association of Booksellers, Unions of Miners or of Bricklayers. The ideal would be that these associations should be designed severally and together to clear the way for the highest forms and directions of social functions.

Classifications, again, may cross one another. Logically, according as the idea of an object can be variously specialized it may be referred to *various* classifications. Take the idea of the snow which at the moment forces itself upon one.

Snow, scientifically considered as one of the states of water, and snow considered as a standard of whiteness beside which a cotton handkerchief becomes almost tawny, would belong to different classes. And a man may be professionally a member of the Law Society, and philanthropically at the same time a member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. The Society of Pewter Collectors, which for anything I know still dines and flourishes, doubtless includes members otherwise specialized to a number of gentlemanly classifications in the way of employment or hobby.

Law, of course, involves a great system of implicit social classifications, treating individuals *in so far* as they are this or that. It carries a far-reaching deductive logic into social life.

But the centre of the constitution of thought I find in the meeting, by means of specially emphasized ideas, of requirements which may be stated in the form 'Why so?—why *so*?—and why *so*?' In my article on "The Constitution of Thought" [1] I was trying to see whether it was possible to reduce 'why?' to an enquiry for *causes*, and nothing else. I do not now think it is. 'Why?' may ask for a *reason* which is not a cause. If we turn to what is perhaps the deepest subject on which we can think, Love is not simply the *cause* of its own self-sustained being; it finds in itself the *reason* for its own self-maintenance—which is a richer thing to say. And what we call

[1] See Note, p. 108.

a 'necessity of thought'—a necessary 'why?'—has, I believe, a deeper root than we can trace by any thinking about causes. If I looked for an analogy to logical necessity in reasoned thinking, I should seek it in the moral principle by which the relations of human social life ought to be governed.

It may be remarked, finally, that as thinking becomes more abstract it depends less for its progress on the support of definite images; and as society becomes more civilized it depends less for its progress on the animal force of its members. Some psychologists speak of 'imageless thinking.' Society has nowhere become so refined as to dispense altogether with its animal base.

The scales on both sides as we have now traced them stand thus:

Cosmic Scale.		Intellectual Scale.	
Conspicuous Forms of Organization	Human Social Life	Intellection as Reasoned Thinking	Conspicuous Forms of Organization
	Animal Life	Intellection as Imagining	
	Vegetable Life	Intellection as Perceiving	
	(Simpler Life)	(Simpler Intellection)	
	The Basal Protoplasm	*The Basal Sensation*	
	Chasma?	Chasma?	
	[Inorganic Material]	[Object World]	

(IV) Transcending the Chasms

One remark upon these scales has yet to be made. In each scale, though we may not be

able to *bridge* the chasm, we can find a ground of continuity on each side of it. This will be a little difficult to explain, but we must make the attempt.

Suppose someone has been talking in crude, bald language about 'the contents of the mind' (in which he includes percepts, as growing up in the mind) and 'the contents of the outer world' (—"like," he says, "the actual sun, moon, and stars, and the rocks of the earth").

Then someone says to him:

"You think the percepts of the mind, and the rocks of the earth, are quite different orders of existence—you call one mental, the other material; and you think the actual rock in the world is the cause of your having a percept of the rock in your mind when you look at it?"

"What else should any reasonable man think about it?" asks the first.

"I have no wish to be an *un*reasonable man," says the other, "but I believe I see how to think differently about the rock and the percept of the rock. How do you know anything about the rock itself at all?"

"Well, I see it. I touch it."

"That means, you perceive it?"

"To be sure."

"Do you know anything about the physical rock itself, even when you think of it as consisting of electrons, except *through* what you perceive, or what others say they perceive, and what you or others argue from what is perceived?"

"Nothing: knowledge of physical things comes through perception."

"And have you not heard that physicists to-day are finding problems in the constitution of the physical world which they cannot answer as physicists, and that some of them are thinking they may have to turn psychologists, and try to solve their problems about physical objects by peering down into the secrets of the ways in which physical objects are *known* to us?"

"I suppose that is a matter of fact."

"But if the study of the *mind* and mental working is going to be a clue to the deeper problems, does it not seem as if mental reality must somehow extend into what thinkers of a generation ago thought they could mark off apart to itself as purely 'physical' reality?"

As he shows symptoms of beginning to talk about 'relativity,' we will leave him, only remarking that he seems to have said something like the truth. The world of physical objects, which we regard from one point of view as giving rise to our sensations and percepts, is from another point of view a world of which we know nothing at all except through our intellectual working. You cannot get a world *altogether* outside the intellectual sphere, after all.

Let us turn to our other scale—the cosmic scale, near the foot of which we found the chasm between inorganic matter and vital organization.

Now we read in that prologue to the Fourth Gospel which contains one of the great declara-

tions of the dependence of the creation on the Son, that "all things came into being through him, and without him nothing came into being which has come into being." That seems to say, in the most quietly emphatic language, that even that unorganized material of the world which you might have considered the most remote from offering Divinely vital manifestation still belongs to the manifestation—it came into being through 'the Word.'

Next we seem to be learning about what is higher in the scale as we hear that in the Word 'was *life*.' Here life is not something simply evolved from matter. It has its origin and its originality [1] in the creative Word, in whom life was present before matter 'came into being through him.'

Then for humanity, higher in the scale than merely living things, life is identified with light: "the life was the light of men." And we may discern in our cosmic scale how life, dark even to apparent unconsciousness on the flatter levels, glimmers into unreflective consciousness in its animal intensity, and in passionately living man gleams into a self-consciousness luminous enough to make darkness at last visible—for man at least *strains* to see what life means. And life will surely become verily luminous precisely as its impulse is realized as one with the impulse of love. We can readily believe that human beings Divinely

[1] The reader of the Greek may note that ζωή, *life*, is at first without article.

perfected in love will need no more to ask to what end they are alive.

Thus in trying to follow this declaration of the relation of the Word to the creation we look down to the foot of the cosmic scale, and are led to look up to the most luminous heights of it. And we are told that "all things came to be through him, and without him nothing came to be which has come to be." In him even that which is lifeless when we try to examine it in itself, and which is even too inorganic to have a self, belongs to the same unity as the highest and most luminous manifestation of life.

Our analogy seems to have remained with us even in these comprehensive subtleties. Near the foot of both scales the facts present us with a chasm—inwardly between the mental and the apparently non-mental and outwardly between the living and the not-living—which we have never been able to bridge by experiment nor to plumb by thinking. But we saw at the beginning of this last section of the chapter that if, on the inward side, we have regard to the intellectually *constitutive* principle which enters into *all* our knowledge of the world, we find ourselves transcending the chasm between the mental and the apparently non-mental. And if, again, on the outward side, we regard the Divinely *creative* principle which enters into *all* the contents of the world, we find ourselves transcending the chasm between the living and what seems in itself the non-living.

With this remarkable and comprehensive agreement in paradox, on both sides outreaching our limited human grasp, we close our present pursuit of that analogy between the natural creation and the intellect into which our comparison of the statements about the Divine Trinity and the human mind led us to enter. Its stabilizing function in the whole argument may appear later.

CHAPTER VIII

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE INCARNATION

HUMAN life is the most highly endowed life which so far has appeared as native to our planet. Scientific imagination has amused itself with speculating about the prospect of a higher form of life coming to be evolved here and replacing the human supremacy.

If man looks at the forms of life which present themselves in the most obvious way to his glance—attending simply to those vital manifestations which are so broadly distinguishable that a child easily recognizes them—he finds what appear like tiers of being, one higher than the other: the quietness of trees and grass, animal life with its varied excitements, and then his own life seeking illumination and developing enterprise of which nothing is known below him. Had there been only two such tiers they would hardly have appeared thus stair-like; even more than three would have been less exactly enough to suggest elevation above elevation. For suggestiveness, the open view of life on our planet might seem arranged as economically as it could be if it were designed, with precise finish, to remind us human beings

continually that we stand at the present summit of a height.

But before we speculate about the possible nature of a further tier, which would leave human life transcended, we might do well to think of the character of man's own outlook, as he stands with the rest at his feet. He is apparently the only one of the denizens of earth capable of appreciating the suggestive presence of various levels of vital existence. And his constitution includes a feature which, familiar as it is, may seem little short of startling when we contrast it with all that we find below him. He has unquestionably the capacity in himself to desire *a higher form of life than he possesses*. And we can surely set no bounds to the suggestiveness of such a feature in his constitution. A capacity to desire beyond what he is suggests a latent capacity to be other than he is. And a realized enlargement of his being might naturally but open to him new and vaster reaches of desire for larger being yet. If the presence of such an endlessly suggestive capacity in the highest of all living creatures in the world is significant as well as suggestive—and would it not be strange if the universe were rational and yet this capacity were *not* significant?—is it in accordance with the facts to overlook the probable existence in *man himself* of the already present and waiting field for the further and higher development of the manifestation of life? Our scientific imagination cannot definitely grasp or limit the possibilities conceivable for a

being who has certainly within himself the pregnant capacity even now to desire to be what he is not. The relatively fixed and bounded forms of lower life about him offer no real comparison to *his* crowning and unclosed if yet undefined vision; and their relations to what is beyond them are no clues to *his* own relation to what is yet beyond. It is almost as if in lower life we saw the movement of a sling, and in human life the movement of the missile detached from the sling.

If we turn to our scales, where human life stands over against reasoned thought, we do not find that the psychology of intellect recognizes any form of intellectual organization which is higher than reasoned thought. What it recognizes is rather *a form of thinking in the midst of our thinking* which penetrates in a new direction. There is *thinking* and *self-conscious* thinking.[1]

It may be prudent to notice at once an ambiguity in the use of this term 'self-conscious.' Capacities valuable and even essential to life are subject to abuse; exaggerative abuses naturally attract

[1] To the more philosophical reader I may say that by 'self-consciousness' I understand an awareness *of* mental change and condition as distinguished from the awareness *involved in* mental change and condition; and I take this awareness to be a psychological datum. Whether the awareness is happily signalized as '*self*-consciousness'; whether in this way we are conscious of a 'self'; whether or in what sense we ever are conscious of a self; how far the self, though we are constrained to believe in it, eludes our consciousness; whether a finite mind actually attains self-consciousness in a strict sense—all these questions do not affect us here. We are using a recognized term in a recognized way, and I define its use without defending the terminology.

attention; and 'self-consciousness' has come to be popularly used for *a morbid misdirection* of the capacity for self-conscious thinking—a misdirection which, as is well and painfully known, results in check to the healthy outgoings of life. This more sensational use of the term should no more be confused with its regular use to mark an essential and distinctive equipment of the human constitution than a normal blood-temperature of 98·6° should be confused with a morbid blood-temperature of 101–105° because both are temperatures, and it is the latter which is colloquially spoken of as 'a temperature.' Without self-conscious thinking in the normal sense there would be no psychology—which means much more than that there would be no science such as we know by that name: without it all literature, poetical, philosophical, moral, exhortatory, which implies man's recognition of his own inner life would be rigidly impossible. We may put the position more sharply: the eradication of our self-consciousness would carry with it the complete eradication of our means of moral vision and moral judgment; without self-consciousness there can be no development of the moral life; and it seems not impossible that a certain weary modern disparagement of self-consciousness arises out of a latent semi-suicidal desire to be rid of moral responsibility. And if the view which we have taken of the ultimate nature of life is true, man's self-consciousness, in a state of the purest and highest vitality, would be a revealing con-

sciousness of himself as a son of God, melting into the consciousness of what God is, and thus becoming identified with a consciousness of the supreme motive for living. Self-consciousness, in the highest conditions, would mean not self-absorption, as it may in morbid conditions, but the inward knowledge of what love is—love supreme and inwardly commanding.

But let us return to the psychological level, and be content for analogical purposes to take self-conscious thinking as the introspective psychologist may recognize it to-day.

Now up to human social life and reasoned thought our scales have proceeded *in parallel point by point.* There is nothing to prevent us asking next—to see what may come of it—what would that further *special* type of human life be like which corresponded to *specially self-conscious thinking* in the scale of intellect? Self-conscious thinking, in the degree in which we arrive at it, is thinking so turned in its direction, so converted, as to become illumined with the knowledge of its own nature as thinking, and knowledge of the mind from which it proceeds. The analogue would seem to be man converted to such an impulse in life as to be realizing what his nature is, and realizing the vital origin from which he proceeds.

But now, we know that when self-conscious thought tries to distinguish what are the ultimate conditions within us of all our intellectual development, and becomes well-informed, it finds at the

root of all, and pervading all, a fundamental *triune* fact—the fact of intellection, conation, feeling involved in the unity of all experience. And if the analogy which has led us on with such curious precision from point to point so far is to hold here, what must the natural expectation be? Surely that if man came to be well-informed about the nature of his own being, and the origin from which it proceeds, he would find at the root of all, and pervading all, some fundamental triune form of Reality—underlying all nature, as the triunity of mind underlies all intellectual organization and development. We reach this result on a purely naturalistic basis by following up the clues.

And then we look round and find that, century on century before the comparison we have now worked out from a modern naturalistic base could have been thought of, such a triune origin and conditioning for man's being and the universe was declared, and it has meantime been proclaimed far and wide. Since a day which marked the historic close of man's earlier attempts at self-realization, the Christian declaration of the Trinity, in striking analogy with the later statement of the three phases of mind, has been familiar throughout an ever-increasing area of the world. And it is to be observed that we have here the *only* close analogue to the three given phases of mind with which a survey of all that is known ever to have belonged to the outlooks of man can supply us. Surely this is a most extraordinary fact.

It will be remembered that on p. 116 the scale, exhibited years ago in *Mind*, of conspicuous developments, intellectual and cosmic, was carried further downwards. It may be useful here to indicate continuation in the opposite direction; though a compact table of such matters may seem less proportionate to its subject than a carving of Mont Blanc in a seed-grain:

Knowledge of	
Triunity of Mind	* * *
↑	↑
Self-Conscious Thinking	*Self-Realizing Human Life*
Reasoned Thinking	Human Life
Imagination	Animal Life
Perception	Vegetable Life
(Simpler Intellection)	(Simpler Life)
The Basal Sensation	*The Basal Protoplasm*
Chasma?	Chasma?
[Object World]	[Inorganic Material]

But now observe a specially individualizing form taken by self-conscious thinking. We speak of 'the mind,' signalizing it by a word. And we so far know what we mean when we so speak that we can say we have *a thought of the mind itself*. We cannot perceive the mind, we cannot imagine it; but we have a thought of it, as appears in our use of a word 'mind' for it in reasoned speech. And we have noticed that, if properly informed, we think of the mind as triune. Is there a special suggestiveness here—in the 'thought of the mind'?

We pointed out[1] that individualization in the mind is less distinct than in the outer world of living things—the individual percept is not so distinctly marked off even as the individual plant, the individual image is not so easily defined as an individual animal, and certainly an individual thought is not so obvious an individuality as an individual man. If then, we have what we call *a thought* of the mind, if our triune mind can be represented in a thought, the analogue might naturally be that *the Divine source of all being should be represented, for the illumination of humanity, in* A MAN—a man with a distinct individuality which a thought does not possess, but may suggest. And that this very thing has already happened in the coming of Jesus Christ—that God, being a triune Being, has even found embodiment in a man distinguishable among men—is again a central position of the Christian faith.

It is distinctly understood, indeed, that it is *the Son*, and not the Father or the Spirit, who became incarnate. And however the analogy may fall short of the reality, it is obvious that the *thought* of the mind is primarily *intellectual* in nature; and it is not only a product of the intellect, but a unique self-expression and direct self-revelation of the intellect. Feeling and will, however, are also, explainably or not, included within the scope of the thought of the mind. And it is said of Christ that "in him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. ii. 9).

[1] P. 95.

An abstract reasoner may hereupon enlarge with his most obvious logic on the paradoxical strain of supposing that the unsearchableness of Deity could be presented under a human embodiment, or on the extravagance of the idea of Divinely incomprehensible verities of being—not one, but more than one—becoming apprehensible through a human manifestation and finding intelligible names in human language. But only try the force of the same sort of self-justifying logic on the psychological difficulties. What is its worth when tested on fact? What can it do with the plain fact of feeling and attention finding intelligible names in our language, with the problem of our knowing or not knowing them, and with the thought of the mind as triune? On the psychological side, the paradox here is, as we have seen,[1] one which psychological acumen like Dr. Ward's accepts as real, but of which even he offers us only a solution which leaves us with two 'unknowables'[2] on our hands, without a definite hint as to how we could have come to distinguish them. There seems no possible doubt that we *have* a thought of the mind as triune. And yet there seems no possible way of understanding *how* we should have it. If we can think intelligently of the mind as knowing-feeling-willing, feeling itself must have become in some aspect intelligible to us. Yet we have said that we are unable to observe it. If so, we are able

[1] Pp. 58, 59.

[2] Cp. *Psychological Principles*, p. 58 end, and p. 59.

to reflect upon it—deeply, even poetically, and most sympathetically, to reflect upon it—without being able to observe it. And we seem to have to accept the fact without finding how to explain it. I see no possibility of insight into this embodiment: on the other hand, I see no use in denying the simplicity with which this 'thought of the mind' presents itself. We seem faced with the apparent *impossibility* of thought presenting what it *does* present.

It seems thus to be in close agreement with the positive scientific position in psychology that, on the other hand, we should be faced with the apparent impossibility of *a human nature* presenting what it does present; and that while we should see no possibility of insight into the incarnation, we should yet have no ground here for rejecting the simplicity with which a Divine manhood offers itself to our view.

We have been noticing that the problem arising out of the psychological fact is so paradoxical as to be left in a hardly intelligible condition by a master of the subject. Ought we then to require that the second problem should either yield its secret on demand to a logic less sympathetically considerate of its material than the psychologist's, or be dismissed as a manifest self-contradiction?

You may, of course, regard both problems, psychological and theological, as unreal. It may then be rather difficult to explain why the two unreal problems should be so circumstantially alike.

I find nothing in thought corresponding to the successive generations of men, their births and deaths, and we cannot carry the parallel into these matters. Analogies in the microcosm cannot be guides to the whole truth worked out in the macrocosm. And yet when we consider the bringing forth of the thought of the mind itself we do find that it requires a quite peculiar direction of attention, different from that in attending to percepts, to images, to 'objects of thought' other than the mind itself. And we might anticipate that if the Divine fount of being appeared under the embodiment of a human form, as the mind appears under the embodiment of a thought, a quite special direction of the preparatory action of the Spirit would be involved. And again this accords with the long-known Christian statement.

But self-conscious thinking has a range extending beyond the individualized thought of the mind itself. Once that thought has been reached, *our thinking generally* may be directed by a fuller knowledge of what the mind, what our own inward nature, is. So, since "the Son of God is come, and has given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true" (1 John v. 20), it becomes possible for the life of men to be carried on in the light of a fuller realization of what God is. Further, in the mental development, attention is of course involved: once the comprehensive thought of the mind itself has appeared there is a newly distinct foundation upon which *attention* may begin to organize our

thinking into clearer inward unity. On the other side we see that, according to the New Testament, the gift of *the Holy Spirit*, quickening and unifying, is conditioned on accepting the manifestation of Jesus Christ.[1]

Now according to the Christian outlook, man, in thus realizing his own nature and origin, already possesses, in germ, his ultimate prospect. He may progress beyond all present conception *in* what he now has, but progress beyond it does not come into question. There is nothing beyond. In knowing God he has now finally come to himself; and through him the creation "liberated from the servitude of decay into the liberty of the glory of the children of God," [2] will also come to itself.

And, if we seek analogy, in self-conscious thinking intellectual development seems to have turned in upon itself—its course is coming full circle as it begins to lay its grasp not simply on objects, but on its own nature, and that of the mind from which it springs. To deny finality here, and to be expecting a new *kind* of advance, would be like trying to touch a still further place in a ring when you had carried your finger all round it. Self-conscious thinking *itself*, indeed, may range much further, with immeasurably greater penetration and clearness than we have ever known in it; and, on the other side, as for freshly and Divinely illumined humanity—"it

[1] On attention and the Spirit, see Chapter IV.

[2] Rom. viii. 21.

doth not yet appear what we shall be" (I John iii. 2), but already "all things are yours, you being Christ's, Christ being God's" (I Cor. iii. 23).

I have dwelt distinctively on the incomprehensibility of feeling and attention, but it would be true, of course, to say that the mind affords us an illustration of incomprehensibility in *three* modes. The difference between intellect and the other phases is that intellect offers a certain aspect to observation, and we do not find any corresponding aspect in the others. But no man can form any full idea of the nature of his own intellect itself, or trace all that *must* have taken place whenever he perceives or thinks. And, in the vaster orbing, though the Son has come within observation, and is in some aspects more intimately familiar to us than any figure in history, and though through him all that we see came into being, yet when we try to consider his nature we are as much lost as though we tried to contemplate the nature of the Father: nor have we the subtlety to fathom the movements and changes evermore taking place before us in the creation which we trace to him.

If our self-knowledge be a figure of the Divine self-knowledge, and God and our own mind be the most intimate presences that we can conceive, yet though God himself be Light, to the finite mind God and itself are alike unfathomable.

The broken look which our own self-conscious experience now presents to us might imply to us,

if we could interpret it, that we can never fully know ourselves except through knowing God. Full self-knowledge is not ours within ourselves. We see the thought of the mind over-reaching itself, as it were, to compass the secret of feeling within, but we know that by no straining of attention in the finite mind can achievement replace the bafflement. There is no suggestion of corresponding limitation in an incarnate Son who can go so far as to say, "All things that the Father has are mine," and who promises that the Spirit "shall take of mine and shall show it to you" (John xvi. 15).

These are personal statements: and while the phases of mind—knowing, feeling, willing—are not themselves personal, but only *aspects* of personality, it should now be possible to see clearly that to bring these aspects into analogical comparison with what we learn of Father, Son, and Spirit by no means suggests that these names of 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Spirit' themselves also apply only to *aspects* of Divine personality. If thoughts, which have not personality, be the analogues of personal beings—of human beings in society, who are personal, or have the capacity to be persons, even if they abuse it—the intellect itself, though but a phase of personality, may well be the analogue of transcendently personal being; and so with each of the phases. In a word, the analogy with the phases of mind in no way suggests that 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Spirit' are the names of phases, and not of transcendently

personal beings; for it is one result of the parallel between the scales that we find that which is *not* itself personal coming into place as the analogue of that which *is* personal.

And here I am reminded that there is danger wherever there is life. There is, as theologians repeatedly warn us, a danger lest in using the word 'persons' in its developed modern sense we should latently pass over from distinction to division, and thus violate the conception of unity in the Godhead. It would seem that we might illustrate this form of theological heresy by a psychological fallacy. For I notice that a writer with a rare gift of popular exposition, who incidentally uses the triad of mind in the purely general way to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity, claims 'thought, feeling, and will' as 'three consciousnesses,' and speaks of them each as 'a separate living consciousness.' The truth is, surely, that we do not know of any consciousness except that *constituted* by the organic synthesis of the three; so that they can hardly, when analytically viewed, be regarded as *each* a separate 'consciousness.' That would be a sort of 'trimentalism'—comparable with the overblown heresy described as 'Tri-theism,' in which the three members of the Trinity are regarded, not as three personalities in one God, but more after the pagan manner as three distinct 'gods.'

CHAPTER IX

ESTIMATES

THE parallel, in the full extent to which we have now uncovered it, can be seen to involve something on the theological side for which Feuerbach did not allow when he attempted to explain all that stood on that theological side by reference to *human productive wish*. You have now, on the theological side, the triune Creator *and his creation* (stated to be through the Son), with all its various recognized tiers of unalterable fact spread out in the world: just as you have, on the psychological side, the triune mind, with its various orders of intellectual products spread out higher and lower in the scale.

The conditions of explaining the possibility of the parallel as a whole become quite different from what they appeared on Feuerbach's inspection. For we can hardly credit humanly productive wish with bringing into existence before us the physical, vegetable, and animal ranges of being in the world. *Their* objective presence can hardly be explained by Feuerbach's theory of the tendency of the human mind to project an image of itself.

In this part of the parallel, then, where the

intellect and *the world* are concerned, the mental projection theory breaks down. No consciousness, clear or dim, which the early Christian believers had about their own mental constitution could have made *the actually present facts* of intellectual formation and of cosmic formation lie in solid parallel as he who observes may find them lying to-day. *What you have over against the intellectual constitution just here is* (not merely a human belief, theological or other, but) *stubbornly substantial fact*—the physical universe, plants, animal life, and human society: the range of the world.

It may be observed, first, that these well-known tiers, long existent in the world, seem to offer quite as close a parallel to the known tiers of intellectual formation as the statements about the nature of triune Deity offer to the known characteristics of the triune mind. And in the second place it may be observed that, on the given premisses, the two comparisons—triune God and triune mind, the creation and the intellectual formation—fall into one connected system: since the creation is said to be through the Son, with whom, according to the first comparison, the intellect stands parallel. What right should we have to cut apart the two continuous parallels—(*a*) the parallel of the doctrine of the triune God with the doctrine of the triune mind, and (*b*) the parallel of the tiers of the creation with the tiers of intellectual products—and consider them out of relation with each other? Our problem is that

we *start* (more or less like Feuerbach) with a parallel between the doctrine of mind and the doctrine of the Trinity; but *then* we find that this parallel, when pursued, uncovers a *contained* parallel of unalterable facts as old as the constitution of the world, and already firmly established when no human wishes about it can be supposed to have existed.

This contained parallel, it will be seen, involves a principle of actuality on which the solvent of an imagination-theory obviously takes no effect. It is this stubbornly substantial parallel of enduring fact which puts the system of correspondences, when we try to view it as a whole, beyond the reach of any explanation by dream like Feuerbach's.

The relation with which we have to deal might be looked at as one of deduction and verification. We have first a relation of three phases of mind with the doctrine of the Trinity. Next, we have the certain fact that the three phases of mind are organically connected with the intellectual scale. From this we may deduce a tentative probability that if the doctrine of the Trinity tells us of what is *actual*, there may be *a scale of facts discoverable in actually present nature* corresponding to *the scale of intellectual features*. We examine the contents of nature, and find that there is just such an array of facts in nature as was suggested. We have now clearly before us, as the result of our comparison of the psychological discovery about mind with the doctrine of the Trinity, two

parallel scales—psychological and cosmic—of facts actually existing within the range of observation and within the scrutiny of science. The inference is that what was conveyed by the statement about the Trinity was itself actual; for apparently it has an actual bearing on the contents of the world. By means of it we have been able to bring to light a previously unperceived relation between the contents of the world and the similarly actual intellectual contents of the mind.

And this is not simply an argument from analogy. If it had happened that the matters of fact involved in the scales had been set in order in the days of Socrates, four centuries before the coming of Christ, and the three phases of mind had then been definitely distinguished as underlying all intellectual development, and an inference had been drawn to the probable existence of a corresponding triune Reality underlying all nature, this *would* have been an argument from analogy. And it would have had the weakness of such an argument, because it would merely have supposed a parallel which did continue where both sides could be examined to continue still where only one side—the psychological—could be examined. But in actual history the declaration of the Trinity in the form of a revelation came *first;* and now afterwards natural facts are seen in a complex way to corroborate it, even by parallels extending on both sides into nature itself. The argument is not simply one of constructive analogy, but of the confirmation of old-standing

definite statement through a network of afterwards recognized facts.

Look at the relation of facts in another light. You are proceeding up the scales, with a remarkably precise and definite answer of the facts of the known world to the richly varied features of intellectual developments and conditions. Amid the changeful windings of the lines the parallel faithfully abides, and gains force through the tests of the windings. Then the psychological side, which has so far been answered with such distinctness by the known facts of the world of nature, shoots up without break into an all-comprehensive triunity. This advance on the psychological side leaves a position unfilled on the other side, but *shaped out very definitely by the existing facts* both of mind and nature.[1] Then we find that this vacant position defined by the natural facts would be filled with a fully characteristic precision by the long-known Christian doctrine of the Trinity —and not by any other known statement among all the doctrines of God that have been produced in the world by all philosophies and all religions, nor by any other known statement about anything beyond us. Nature and mind together are so shaped as to hold a niche uniquely for the doctrine of the Trinity. That revelation alone completes in continuous character the continuous scientific revelation of the parallel shapings of the intellect and the world.

But now suppose a very drastic attempt to be

[1] Cf. table, p. 128.

made to escape from the unforeseen objectivity of the position. There are groups of philosophers known as Idealists, who tell us that the mind has far more to do with the shapes in which objects appear to us than we are apt to suppose. Carry this view to an extreme, and the shapes of the facts about plants, animals, and the rest, on which we have relied, would all be attributed to the working of the mind according to its own constitution. It is because of what the mind is, it might be said, not simply because of what any facts in themselves are, that we see even cabbages and tigers in the shapes they always take for us. On this view it would have to be said, not that the peculiarly Christian doctrine of the Trinity fell into appropriate place in a scheme of facts independent of mental shaping, but rather that it fell into appropriate place in a scheme of appearances due to the working of the mind according to its own constitution. But even on this abstract view, it would remain that to reject the doctrine of the Trinity would be to reject part of a logically connected scheme which in its other parts was due to the constitution of the mind. There would therefore still be a risk, in the rejection, of acting contrary to the lines of one's mental constitution—a procedure so likely to have disastrous consequences that even Idealism might be felt to offer no perfect relief from the logical pressure of the parallels. And the realism of Christianity would not be satisfied by Idealism.

Again, considered from the point of view of

the totality of science, this answering of triunity by a Triunity transcending us surely breaks upon us with the impressiveness of dawn from beyond our horizon. For this fact of triunity is a last bounding fact, and even in one aspect an already transcending fact, of our science. All science is the product of human intellect. In psychology, science goes beneath science to study the working of the intellect which produces science, and to trace out the vital principles of the growth of science. In reaching the intellect we are reaching our last scientific fact, and are come to our ultimate scientific way of viewing all the facts with which the intellect is concerned. But this extreme fact of ours proves to be threefold, for this same intellect is a factor in the triunity of intellect, feeling, and will. And we are now getting beyond science; for though we may scientifically recognize the threefoldness, and give it a distinct place in psychology, feeling and willing are something more than intellect, something *with* it, something compelling us by difference of nature to look beyond purely scientific interests. Scientifically we are left at last contemplating a threefold fact lying upon our extreme scientific horizon and beyond it. So our science ends. Then it is this self-same threefold fact which proves to have been met and answered before it was recognized, by the declaration of a loftier Threefold Reality, which is absolutely supreme, and beyond which is no horizon, for we have reached Divine finality. To see all this as factitious, or as accident,

would surely require quite the wrong kind of imagination.

It might, of course, be conventionally suggested that the psychological emphasis on the three phases of mind, and on the intellectual scale, is after all more in the spirit of nineteenth-century than of twentieth-century psychology. I have hinted that a time may still be anticipated when some nineteenth-century aspects of psychology will appear less out of date than now—and it may then be time for some of our present psychology to be very much out of date indeed. It may prove that our advance of the moment has been over-specialized and hasty, and that we have forgotten and left behind much that is real, because of the admittedly extraordinary suddenness of our transition to new ideas and new absorptions. But let us be content for the moment to take simply the unquestioned fact that the psychological principles of the nineteenth century were *supposed* by leading formative thinkers of that not very distant time to be quite scientifically valid. If they were not scientifically valid, these thinkers, not perhaps manifestly less powerful and balanced than their successors of the present day, were under a persistent illusion. How then is it to be accounted for that parallel illusions should arise first in the theological sphere of the beginning of the Christian era, and then long after in the quite distinct, and theologically uninfluenced, psychological sphere of the nineteenth century? And how comes it that these same two illusions should

have such affinity with what is actual as to draw the known facts of cosmic existence into one system with their mutually remote selves? Is any instance of an illusion mistaken for science, and thus paralleled in another quite different region, known to have arisen in the history of the world? If not, how are we justified in supposing such an unexampled duplication of illusion, affecting competent minds, to have arisen here?

But suppose the objective pressures of the parallel have to be admitted. How might they bear upon the thought of our day? The prospect is so momentous that one almost draws back from formulating it upon the present grounds. But let us put it provisionally.

A man, let us say, is anticipating the as yet undefined new religion which humanity in this age of mechanical advance, mathematical advance, psychologically manipulative advance, and critical advance is expected to prove competent to evolve for its own greater advantage. This religion is to be the expression of the chastened aspirations of the race, and will gather itself about a doctrine of God which it has much simplified for itself—freeing it, he conceives, from accretions and complexities. No doubt simplification is biologically associated with degeneration, and even with loss of life and decay. But this religion, he anticipates, will be not the least remarkable of the constructions of a supremely constructive (if not supremely fruitful) period. His eye is not much on the past: conscious to-day of being a typically

modern man, he has perhaps never looked back to see whether the typically modern man has not been typically the same in other periods of history. The time, in his view, has fully come for the supersession of religious embodiments whose great praise it is that they were intensely modern centuries ago. Exactly what form the supersession will take, and how it should be brought about, he may not know; but he is sure it will be brought about in the progress of the race. Meantime he may indulge himself in the pleasurable half-sleep of a superior vagueness amid the destined decay of all more organized religious belief.

Then imagine there comes before him, and before men less interested in religion than he, a strangely stubborn logical and scientific puzzle, bound up with the facts of nature, and having its rootings in old time, its developments in new. Indeed, its very first rootings seem to go back even to the formative times of the world; and it comes to light through that same late-born (or late re-born) science, psychology, which he thinks almost holds the future of humanity in its hands. Perhaps if he gets over his first impatience at an arrest, he finds the points of coincidence are so many and so systematic, so prominent and so typical, the areas so central and comprehensive, the persistence of agreement in plan on both sides so remarkable, that it becomes increasingly difficult to put it aside. It is so inwrought with fact that to suppose its purely mental origin would involve us in philosophic idealism, and

even then it would appear to be on lines implied in the very constitution of the mind, and the Christian revelation would come in to work out the *only* conceivable completion of the lines. What might at first seem logical ways of exit from it prove no exit; and on looking back into history it may be seen under what rare conditions of impressiveness the materials for the analogy have entered into the world. Is it so certain that we have really done with the historical element in religion? Is there no such thing as revelation with a distinct form of its own, and a vital complexity entitled to intellectual respect? Are not the comparative facts such as to raise again questions which may have been dismissed in too much haste—whether in despair, or in undue willingness for easy intellectual and moral relief?

The final answer to these questions will not be found by any study of the parallels themselves. What the fair examination of them should rightly do, so far as I can estimate, is to urge a thinker anew not to be satisfied with the conventional dismissal of what his particular group of associates has dismissed in the name of modernity. Analogy may be extremely effective in exposing the one-sidedness of unconsciously biassed objections. And when receptiveness is not crossed by a blank wall of mental habit, prospects may open up. If the doctrine of the Trinity is true, God himself is not inaccessible. There is a living way to approach him, and that way may be learned.

There is a Holy Spirit to enlighten man, and to quicken and guide. We need not be left to the dumbfounded study of parallels if the teaching about God is true; for the living truth will be found, not in the parallels, but in knowing him.

And I should wish to make it quite clear—if necessary with redoubled emphasis—that while I cannot but be concerned that the body of coincidences should be considered fairly for what it is, and allowed that operation which is its right, I am *not* interested in inducing men to base what they may take for religious convictions simply upon coincidences—coincidences of this kind or of any kind.[1] Whether coincidences have any real light to throw upon life cannot be tested by any examination merely of the coincidences in themselves. I believe that except as we can interpret or judge of them under a higher principle of guidance they remain spiritually worthless to us. A barren intellectualism is a very breeding-ground for superstition. And a religious conviction based upon coincidence, even coincidence beyond natural explanation, is at the mercy of other unexplained coincidences, even though the other coincidences should have in them no possibility of spiritual light, and though their leading should be to spiritual degradation.

But here we have a comprehensive and deeply entrenched coincidence related to a region of well-tested and triumphant spiritual experiment. And

[1] For an estimate of another type of coincidences, see p. 256 of my book *The Evening of the Last Supper*.

I think that the plainly detailed and outstanding parallel, with its extraordinary history, might very reasonably lead a man to enquire about it, until he was constrained to wish for some Divine guidance about it, even though the thought of Divine guidance had not been familiar in his life; and that just there might be the beginning of the very best that it could do for him.

Supposing the office of analogy to be to arrest and stimulate rather than to guide, it may be a working advantage that it should not in itself be too perfect and profound. And indeed a competent scrutinizer of this analogy may notice that it seems to rest much in the forms of things, without entering far into their laws. Principles which are of vital importance apparently lie without its scope, while yet within its limits it is strikingly distinct. If the comparisons are clear in substance, they dissolve into divergence in their borders. Study of them would not make anyone expert in psychological causation, and I certainly should not think it safe to appeal to them for settlement of any problem in theology. And this might seem exactly to the purpose of such an analogy, as helping to keep it in its place. For if it points to revelation, it would be strange if it could be used instead of revelation. And without being easy to set aside, it does not seem to invite any undue confidence in its own content alone. To say this is not to disparage it. You do not cease to regard a picture as an effectively intended analogy to life because if you scratch the flesh it

does not bleed. And the value of our present analogy may prove like that of a prescription, which is in itself a mere leaf of paper, significantly inscribed, with no curative power, but capable of being interpreted, and when interpreted and acted upon becoming the means of bringing us into touch with apt medicinal potencies. No one who did not believe in magic would attribute potency to the sight of the prescription.

If I were to try to speak more directly of the convincing appeal of the doctrine of the Trinity as I see it, I think I should refer to another way in which it makes a powerful intellectual impression—an impression which merges into something more than intellectual: I am struck by its *balanced ultimacy*, every way. Let me explain.

Life and death are to us ultimate ideas—they are extremes with nothing beyond them in their own direction. And if, under the guidance of Christian teaching, you frame the idea of the God of all life giving his own Son, in whom God is comprehended for us, to die, you will have framed an idea beyond which you cannot go—unless you will think of the very Godhead dying, and all being which is dependent upon God (which means absolutely all being) coming to utter and hopeless annihilation.

When, again, you have framed the idea of God himself by his Spirit absolutely quickening us to the life by which we live, and becoming himself the secret of the life, character, and action which is most profoundly ours, you have framed a thought

beyond which you cannot go—unless you will lose the idea of your own individual being in absorption into other personal or impersonal being.

In both examples the thought is carried as far as it can be without involving the thought of destruction either for God or man.

But yet once again, in the dying of the Son and the indwelling of the Spirit, here is God involved in relations with human beings which extend to ultimate possibilities—the ultimate possibilities in positive directions; and can a God who so intimately meets us be God in his own transcendent Deity any longer? Yet in the revelation of God the Father, so unapproachable in mystery and moral majesty, unapproachable save through the Son and in the Spirit, the transcendence is maintained with an emphasis beside which, surely, all simpler emphasis on Divine transcendence shades off as comparatively indistinct. Where else in all the religions of the world is the transcendence so remotely solemn and the awe of it so near? Has there been opened before us anywhere such a vista of Deity as in the Christian revelation?

When I see how far the thoughts about God are carried towards ultimacy, seeming to stay just at that point where fulness, if carried further, would begin to decline into relative blankness, I am so struck by their unsurpassable force and exquisite balance that I cannot conceive them springing up as the accidents of theological

vagary; and I feel that if these which I find in the Christian revelation are not Divine thoughts about God, I shall never see any.

But having gone so far, I am perhaps obliged to go further. Is not the intimacy and fulness of the Divine giving to man which is implied in the Christian revelation out of all proportion to man's position in the universe? Within recent times there was no intellectual action, I suppose, much easier to our materialism than to take this kind of proportional argument for something blankly obvious: staggering and silencing. But even from the material point of view the times are changing.

Recent modification of the astronomical interpretation of the universe seems likely to give a new direction to our sense of proportion from the physical side.[1] But even apart from that, there is something considerable, perhaps, to be said about proportion from the human side. While we may learn from mathematicians many things which would once have been incredible, I do not think it will be by pure or applied mathematics that we shall be enabled to take the final measurement of our spiritual destiny. We conceive man as a creature averaging between five and six feet high, in his present most prominent representatives, on a planet of eight thousand miles diameter in the midst of immensity. If that is to be our essential estimate of what man is, the astronomical

[1] See note on Jeans, Eddington, and Lodge, p. 156, *infra*.

and mathematical argument about comparative importance might, no doubt, on the views of the solar system and the universe which were till very lately regarded as established, appear to be overwhelming in force. It is clear to a quite elementary intelligence that the whole race of men put together must be less in size than the one star Betelgeux (pretty well instanced of late), which could afford room for the earth and Mars to revolve at their present distances from our sun inside it. But is it really so easily possible to make any valuable and settled estimate, on these lines, of the relation of our humanity to the physical universe?

We have referred to that suggestive characteristic in man, that he is able to desire to be a greater being than he is. There seems no reason to suppose that Betelgeux can. And is there any reason to suppose that if man did become greater in the scope of his inward being, he would not still be able to look out and desire to become greater yet? And where do we set any decided limits to this, so as to settle the compass of man, and begin to compare it with the compass of the vastnesses of the universe? Where do we get our fixed terms for comparison, if we are going to speculate on man's relations to the greatness about him? When did we discover it to be impossible that man should advance, with a real continuity of being, to a greater condition which as far transcends his present condition as the hugest body in the universe transcends the earth,

his present dwelling? If this is speculative, of course the whole comparison is speculative. And to turn to what is not speculative, we know, at any rate, that man, within a few secret months, followed by no great multiplicity of open years, grows from a microscopic cell, without senses or other comparable range, into the creature who, in some of his developments, is capable of taking in hand to measure the universe by multiplying in staggering figures the distance through which light, moving one hundred and eighty-six thousand miles a second, would travel in years and centuries and vaster intervals of time. He ranges past the bounds of the earth, past the bounds of the solar system, past the bounds of the local cluster of stars, past the bounds of our whole Galactic universe, and comes into touch with universes beyond. This transcendence of man's preliminary state by man's manifest state we know for a fact, though we know it almost without being able to believe it, so incredible is the disproportion. Would it not be rather absurd hereupon to assume once for all that this being who so incredibly changes his proportions (blinding our imagination, though we know of it) is thereafter a fixed quantity, so that he will certainly be incredible in development no more, and that we have therefore a settled basis for arguing overwhelmingly upon his ascertained proportion to the rest of the universe?

If, indeed, we knew that the universe, as well

as the earth, was already peopled with beings who were like ourselves, and in essentially the same conditions as ours, without having lived upon the earth, we should have a more manageable basis for working out proportions. This would mean working at last with really comparable terms on the two sides—human beings here, human beings yonder. There might be some distinct sense in this, which it is not easy to discover in any vaguely confident attempt to work out sums with the spiritual being of man on one side, and the physical extent of the universe, expressible in miles, on the other—as if we could ascertain the effect with which a thousand tons would weigh against Sunday morning. But was there really any reason for our peopling the universe with beings like ourselves, except that we could not think what else to do with it, now that we had begun to try to measure it? Our knowledge of things outside this planet can hardly be said to rise anywhere definitely above the physico-chemical level (though there may be facts which carry conjecture higher about our neighbour Mars—which is not going very far).[1] And now it appears with sudden distinctness that we do not

[1] This is a recent remark which bears authority: "There is no definite evidence of life, and certainly no evidence of conscious life, on Mars—or indeed anywhere else in the universe."—Sir J. H. Jeans, *The Universe Around Us*, p. 334 (*vide infra*). It is significantly observed that, if there were, "we should then at least know that life had occurred more than once in the history of the universe" (*Ibid.*).

even know to what degree suns with planets round them like ours are exceptional.[1] It was on such

[1] See Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*: "The researches of Sir J. H. Jeans lead to the conclusion that rotational break-up produces a double star, and never a system of planets. The solar system is not the typical product of the development of a star; it is not even a common variety of development; it is a freak" (p. 176). The production of "a configuration resembling the solar system" depends on a mutual approach of stars under variously determinate conditions. On the admittedly vague data, Eddington would "judge that perhaps not one in a hundred million of stars can have undergone this experience in the right stage and conditions to result in the formation of a system of planets" (p. 176).

I am able to note on my proofs the appearing of Sir J. H. Jeans's *The Universe Around Us*. He says that "apart from the certain knowledge that life exists on earth, we have no definite knowledge whatever except that, at the best, life must be limited to a tiny fraction of the universe. . . . We can still only guess as to the meaning of this life which, to all appearances, is so rare" (p. 335). Two large and complex problems make their appearance in these two sentences: "All this suggests that only an infinitesimally small corner of the universe can be in the least suited to form an abode of life. . . . Finally, after all these conditions are satisfied, will life come or will it not?" (p. 333).

This reads very differently from the assumption of Sir Oliver Lodge, in his *Substance of Faith*, published less than a quarter of a century ago: "So, given [hypothetically] the existence of some thousand million solar systems or families of worlds, within our ken, and knowing what we do about the exuberant impulse towards vital development wherever it is possible, we must conclude that those worlds contain life; and if so, it is against all reasonable probability that the only world of which we happen to know the details contains the creature highest in the entire scale." (Clause X).

Obvious physically-based conclusions about our relative spiritual insignificance were all the time liable, it seems, to be upset by a closer examination of what it means for matter to spin.

physico-chemical information and lack of information that we had fallen into the habit of basing a spiritual conclusion—a conclusion, that is, about our own relative spiritual standing.

But given the surprise of the probable extreme rarity of solar systems, and the overwhelming depth and complexity of the conditions naturally needing to be fulfilled before life would appear even where there was a solar system, what should we say of a generally lifeless universe? And what are we to say of a religion that, proclaiming the doctrine of a Trinity, proclaims also the self-committal of the Trinity,[1] concentrated locally in a cross infinitesimal upon the earth's surface, and in an earth infinitesimal in the universe?

It is to be remembered that if Christianity is what it is believed to be it is even to this day growing in the earth and amid the universe in a way that is preliminary and germinal. And germinations, the germinations of living things, are characteristically, in their first appearings, disproportionate to their ultimate destinies, their final growths. What, then, would you expect to see? Germinations can, so to say, afford to be disproportionate: for they hold in them a potency to which time is servant. The seed which a man can flick from between his mere finger and thumb has in it, as a living, germinating thing, a potency in time to subdue its lifeless surroundings amazingly to itself—to constrain the contents of soil and air and clouds about it to be assimilated

[1] That is, in its characteristically self-manifesting personality.

to its own nature in the at last imposingly disproportionate form of a far-reaching living tree—a living system one bough out of whose many boughs would be enough to tax and crush the strength, not of that man's fingers, but of his whole frame. This is but the history of an every-day green tree: starting with a germ, it has, almost to a miracle, vitally transformed some part of its lifeless surroundings into the material of the triumph of life; and a tree is not very high in the scale of vitality.

But it happened once in the earth and in the universe that a Jewish peasant, in no position to give effect to his word by massy legions marching under weight of metal on distantly extending roads, manifestly possessed, even to miracle, such a kind of assimilative control as no Cæsar could emulate, and possessed it within a strikingly narrow scope. That means, of course, that there was wide temporary disproportion between the material embodiments of surrounding material might and the material embodiment of the vital germination centring in Christ. We have seen the developments in the earth since that day. And, in sight of them, is it anything conclusive if, to us astronomical earth-dwellers, looking out at our moment amid the vast ages of adjustments in the universe, the disproportion between the stellar embodiments of material force and the present earthly embodiment of spiritual religion should appear altogether past imagination? May not the situation be correspondingly temporary? Re-

turn to the early history of Christianity. By and by even the limited strength of hands that had laboured in carpentry was cancelled by solid nails firmly driven into heavy wood; and from that situation has gone forth power that is still building character, while the palaces of the authority which made the possessor of those hands an outcast criminal are still being turned into dust. Is it disproportion? Then there can be a moral thrill in disproportion that makes it worth while. And to go back to the very beginning of the appearances, the one who was destined to exert a sway beside which the sway of imperial Rome was but a swollen and soon self-destructive parochialism was not born even at the minor Jewish capital known as Jerusalem! It may be admitted that it would not be in accordance with that materialistic idea of proportion which has seemed to be trying to subdue the idea of spiritual proportion to its own terms that the greatest of all the sons of our humanity should be the more conspicuously great in his appearing in a mean lodging at Bethlehem. And correspondingly it may not be in accordance with that same materialistic idea of proportion that it should be in a world like ours that the Son of God gave himself most profoundly to showing the spiritual universe that God is love. But are we not glad to think that he was not thus metropolitan, and very glad to think that he was not imperial? And does it really matter, or may it not be really better—more spiritually significant—that the planet in which dawn came to Bethlehem, and not

to Jerusalem or Rome, should itself be a planet not of metropolitan proportions, not the largest mite even among the planets of a sun that boasts no imperial majesty amid the material outspreadings of God's heaven?

> "Lord, when I stand and gaze
> On the night heavens, Thy ways
> Confound my thoughts, they are too great for me;
> But wonders, these are none,
> Thou hast them so outdone
> In the great ways of Thy humility." [1]

Love is self-transcendence. And where Love Divine is, all our first thoughts of proportion are transcended, and their far-reaching lines obliterated. And in their transcending we face the vastness of the universe as but children who have been brokenly handling the immense symbols of an Intelligence beyond our own.

[1] Jean Ingelow.

CHAPTER X

EXPOSITORY APPLICATIONS

I SUPPOSE a large book would still leave much unsaid. But it may be desirable to take another glance—a quick glance—at the data: not now simply in search of confirmation, but in pursuit of difficulty.

The expository field open to us for the illustration or testing of the analogy is, of course, a wide one. But extended exposition undertaken for the specific purposes of illustration may not be the most generally profitable exposition. Curiosity is apt to become the rival, not the servant, of deeper realization. I do not find that the direct study of analogy provides the right atmosphere for every kind of exposition. Under present limiting conditions I will take up just two conspicuously 'Trinitarian' passages, the first of which specially calls for examination because it might immediately seem to be opposed to our distribution of comparisons.

We have a concentrated reference to the Trinity in the threefold attribution of I Cor. xii. 4–6:

"There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit;

"And there are varieties of ministries, and the same Lord;
"And there are varieties of effectings, but the same God who effects all things in all."

Here, it might be said, the most conative characterization of the three—the 'producing of effects,' the 'operatings'—is related, not to the Spirit, but apparently to the Father, in the Trinity.

But on comparing more closely it may be observed that *all* the terms—'gifts,' 'ministries,' 'effectings'—have a marked conative aspect. And the whole passage, before and after these words, is concerned especially with the *Spirit*. Spirit, Son, Father are all viewed in their relation to what finally expresses itself in 'the body of Christ' (ver. 27) as a 'manifestation of the Spirit' (ver. 7).

And in analogy with this, in psychology, you may view conation, intellection, and feeling all in their special relation to *conative* expression. In modern work there is a tendency to do this so constantly that conation becomes the *permanent* centre of psychology; though this, I suspect, is over-pressing a legitimate possibility.

But now will our analogy help us to get at the heart of what is being said, and to grasp its at first elusive variety of aspects in any clear unity?

The analogy will not help us, so far as I know, if we are determined to think of the Divine work as if it were something mechanical, with a bald

efficiency as its end. But surely when the very colours of the flowers seem to constrain us dimly to conceive an unfathomable depth of passion behind their creation, we are not likely to be right in thinking of the Divine work upon the living Church as anything less kindling than the work of a creative artist, making a canvas, with all its finely conceived distinctions, live in one glow.

Raise your analogy to this level, and what do you find required, conatively, intellectually, affectively?

The artist must have at his command, first, the varied particular *skills* of his craftsmanship. These skills are *conative* dispositions—the combined results in him of his natural gifts and his continued practice.

But his *intellect*, framing the plan of the picture, and holding its organized *scheme* together in all its parts, must govern these various skills, and employ them each in their due order and combination.

So far, what should we have in the picture?

Competence, ingenuity; not yet that whole of art by which art becomes great and thrills the beholder, subdues and uplifts him. Firing all the skills, and turning their accomplishments to instant daring and mysterious magic, melting all the intellectual conceptions of the plan into one large effect that strikes us with pleasing awe, and that eludes us with hints of something infinite while we trace its lines, there must be the artist's impulse as informed by *passion*. Unless that

governs every element in all the picture, there is some part of the picture which, after all, is dead.

Now in this way of looking at the subject we are comparing the skills, the *conative* dispositions, of the man, with the gifts lying immanent in the different individuals through *the Spirit.*

Next, if you look toward the end of the chapter (28 ff.), you will see how the various ' ministries ' are ranged in the *general scheme* of the life of the Church. There are the several orders of apostles, prophets, teachers, and so on, entering into the organized scheme of the ' body of Christ.' We may therefore think of the ' ministries ' as combined schematically under the government of the ' same Lord ' : and this makes the term ' Lord ' at once obviously appropriate here. He holds the services in a combining command [1]—as the intellect of the artist orders the varied skills into its service under the requirement of the organized scheme of his high product.

Then, as the supreme impassioned impulse of an artist ' effectuates ' in every movement and combination of skill, and *makes* the picture the picture, there is an all-pervasive impulse in the Church, felt, if we might say so, like the very heart-beat of the invisible God.

It may be distinguished that, associated with the Spirit and with the Lord, there are the special embodiments and organizations of the ' gifts ' and the ' ministries ' ; associated with the Father there is no new embodiment or organization—

[1] Note the uniting change of conjunction—not δέ, *but.*

only the 'effectuations' themselves, which are directly identified with that all-pervading effectuation which is personally his own. Thus it would seem to be tacitly implied, here again, that the Father manifests his secret of life through the means provided in humanity by the Spirit and the Son.

Lay the analogy with its narrowness aside. Simply read the words through again after following it. Do they seem to have a unity you did not find in them at first? Do they collect themselves for you with a continuous, on-bearing significance? I am not pressing anything upon you—do not let me do that: form your own judgment:

"There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit;
"And there are varieties of ministries, and the same Lord;
"And there are varieties of effectuations (ἐνεργημάτων), but the same God who effectuates (ὁ ἐνεργῶν) all things in all."

Conceive that the churches had in them less of artificial pressures to keep them up, less of emergency work and of compromise, less of attempt to attract people upon an unchanged level of gratification. Conceive that they had more of this individual and united Divine glow of being. If they had, would they be more powerful in their witness to things of which the world has not yet learned, and more compelling in their demonstrations of vitality beyond its living?

Would the church of which you are yourself a member have anything to learn in hope, in method, and perhaps first of all in humiliation amid its enterprises, from the vividly 'Trinitarian' conception of the life of the Church as we have been thus led to picture it?

Take up now the familiar words of the threefold Benediction (II Cor. xiii. 14):

"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ,
"And the love of God,
"And the fellowship of the Holy Spirit,
"Be with you all."

Grace, attributed to the Son, is not a specially intellectual attribute; communion, associated with the Spirit, is not easily viewed as specially conative. We implied from the outset that much of rich quality must remain outside the scope of such an analogy as ours. And yet it is remarkable to observe with what unifying effect the suggestiveness of the three phases can be applied to the three thoughts of the Benediction.

Think of a very typical succession of mental situations, in which intellection, affection, and conation may be successively prominent, though none of the phases is absent from any of the developments.

An object is presented to you; you observe it, take notice of it, receive it into your mind. The attitude (involving attention, and no doubt attended by feeling) is characteristically intellectual. You 'take it in.'

Its being thus taken in is the condition of developing between mind and object, if all be well, a deeper mystery of living harmony. A hidden fount is touched, and feeling has scope.

A natural sequent of this intimate relation in feeling may be the arising of a conative impulse to take full possession of the object for your very own. And if your possession is not merely of the lifeless kind which may consist in little more than locking things up in a box, or 'acquiring titles' to them, the object becomes a feature in your life (minor or otherwise). And possession means a permanent conative relation—because the object is under your control.

I am here, as on occasion elsewhere, taking up broader lines for comparison than those of our main analogy, which restricts conation to attention.[1] Its force of suggestiveness is not confined to its central core. The structure of a cell extends beyond its nucleation.

With this common psychological sequence before you, begin by thinking of what 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ' means in the New Testament for the relation of God to man. It is through this grace that God brings men within the scope of his reception. In this grace we have God's going forth, in the more literal sense, to *apprehend* man: to take him up into the beginning of relation to God himself.

To the grace of Christ in its reconciling and transforming power we shall not, indeed, find any

[1] Cp. p. 50.

sufficient analogy in our own intellectual receptiveness. The point on which our analogy might direct our thoughts in some orderly way is that the grace of Christ is the condition of a profound harmony with the hidden being of God—a harmony not represented as unfelt by God or by those whom he receives into it. We are come to the furthest mystery of intimacy between man and God viewed Godwards: we are thinking directly of God's own love—directly and inwardly of the Father.

And, finally, love finds expression in intense inward *possession*. God so possesses those he thus loves as to indwell them by his very Spirit, and man is God's indeed. And, led to this point, in order, by our analogy, we pass beyond the analogy to reflect that those so possessed in oneness with God, through the Spirit of God, as to be not their own, are melted into unity one with another. There is a fellowship—fellowship Divine with man, and therefore among men a unifying fellowship—of the Holy Spirit.[1]

Take this interpretation by broad psychological comparison, and see whether there appears to be one movement throughout the Benediction: one movement towards intense and completed fulness of possession. See whether the 'grace' (so 'lordly' a bestowal in its admissive freedom) and the 'communion' seem fitly to stand on either side of the 'love' as the initial and final forms of its expression. See whether all appears

[1] Cp. pp. 45–47.

like the continuously renewed, developed, and abiding manifestation of a Divine relation to humanity—free in tender life, open as heaven without cloud, rapturous in sacredness:

"THE GRACE OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST, AND THE LOVE OF GOD, AND THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, BE WITH YOU ALL." [1]

[1] On another threefold passage—Ephesians iv. 4–6—see Expository Note, p. 206.

CHAPTER XI

THE LIKENESS OF LOVE IN THE UNIVERSE

We have been considering man as inevitably bearing in his natural constitution the image of a transcendent Triunity. The image seems to be adumbrated below the human level; for we find evidence of the presence of the threefold aspect in animal life; but in human life it seems to come to accomplishment, and is bound up with an aptitude and a need for fellowship with the Divine. We have now to take up man's need and prospect of moral participation in the likeness of God as Love. We have to show how all the ranges of nature seem to point to such a participation as their climax.

We have said that love must delight in love,[1] and that to us love is the one satisfying motive for living. If there be One who *is* Love, he must

[1] I have mentioned (p. 68, *note*) that St. Augustine thought so; and it is interesting to see how, with this thought before him, he reflects on nature, inanimate, vegetable, and animal, on human nature, and on the footprints (*vestigia*) of the Creator, found here more, there less, distinctly impressed as we pass in review the lower creation (see *De Civ.*, XI, xxvii, xxviii). It might almost be supposed that here was the prompting of the present comparison; but I did not know of it until after my own thoughts had taken shape.

surely find within himself the most luminously satisfying and self-justifying impulse to the continuance of his own fulness of being. He may reasonably be conceived as having the very motive of his being in the moral glory of his own nature. If he is Love, unlimited by conditions beyond himself, and self-sustaining with the noblest of reasons—the self-justifying reason hid in love's own nature—he might surely speak to us with purest light ready to shine through the first blankness of the utterance if he said to us, "I *am* because *I* am."[1] (Why we should specify that phrase may appear later.)

Think of the life of Love in this aspect, and turn first to the universe in its vast physical range. To some eyes it has looked so self-sufficient as to render all thought of God in relation to it superfluous. Endlessly unfolding, necessarily without showing a glimpse of any agency beyond it, it has seemed to bear within itself at one moment the whole cause of what it will be at some other moment. This appearance of a self-sustaining universe which gives no reason for itself—is this our ultimate revelation of reality? Apparently not. We shall find it suggestive that there should have been such a universal appearance of self-contained physical causation: it is still more suggestive that the appearance should to-day seem to be breaking up amid the liberating view of causality opening upon us even through the advance of physical research.

[1] On the italics, see note, p. 187.

Shall we as we proceed be logically constrained to regard this aspect of self-sustaining in the universe as just the mirror of deeper Being—Being that to those who realize its nature does offer profoundest moral reason for its own self-sustaining? The apparent self-sustaining of the physical universe is surely without imaginable reason of its own: is it the veiled self-hinting of One who can say, "I *am*, because *I* am," with a glory of self-justifying reasonableness not wholly beyond the grasp of our quickened sympathies? The question could hardly be decided upon purely physical data; but we do not conceive that we are confined to purely physical data. What if the physical universe be a mirror purposely inadequate to what it reflects, that we may look yet for more mirroring—what if it be even purposely dull, that we may pass on, by intensity increasing to intensity, towards more luminous mirroring, and still realize how all comes short of that ultimate brightness which is ever the more richly involved in what we see, the higher we look, and still beyond conceiving?

For in this world are things that live—the simplest of them too small for the naked eye to see them. If we examine one of them it may seem as if here in the world were something supporting itself in the world—supporting a 'self' with a distinctness not found in the sweeping general movements of the world as merely physical. Teachers of elementary biology introduce their fascinated students to a microscopic organism,

comparable to a particle of living jelly. They name it *amœba*, from the Greek word meaning 'change'; and very curious is the study in self-sustaining which it offers through its changes. They show it extending its indefinitely shaped substance to flow over and surround the speck of matter that will be food for it and help to support its vital activity and structure. It is seen engulfing the captured speck in its own substance; and then the minute living system of the amœba intimately transforms the mite of matter to suit its own upbuilding, and ejects from itself material which is of no further vital use to it. In this exhibition of the vital course it looks (and we are concerned with looks) as if the most evidently active cause for the continuing existence of the organism of the amœba were the organism of the amœba itself. The contrast of the amœba's self-sustaining—which, taken in itself, seems to have no reason why it should be—to the lofty utterance "I *am*, because *I* am," may seem vaster than the very universe; but is not the affinity to be felt across the ineffable reach?

The complex plant, again, springs up, we say, 'of itself.' We might be ready, with some sense of meaning, to adopt the phrase that it *is*, because *it* is. From the seed onward it has been making itself; and now, with its searching root, its methods of inwardly storing nutriment, its defensive provisions, it seems continuously and elaborately occupied in cherishing its own life. The wide outspread of relatively blank life upon

the level where the plants grow in stillness seems philosophically valuable just because it *stimulates* in us thought which it fails to *support*—thought which finds itself, after all, in vacancy with purely vegetable life alone. There is here a degree in the manifestation of life perhaps specially calculated to develop our sensitiveness to the idea of there being life in living things on earth which is complete only beyond the things themselves. For, first, the plant seems—almost inevitably seems to us—to be striving to live and to become more, striving to come to its fullest possible self-expression; growing, contriving, evading, persisting to this end; but then, again, what experience of life can it have that it should so sedulously do this? One may muse in the garden again and again through the years, and still wonder, fascinated yet blinded, unless one may look beyond the plant for the solution of the problem in the plant. It acts precisely as if life were a good to be cherished, though we do not see how to the plant itself life can be a good. One does not know how to find any substance in which to rest from the sense of something manifestly actual, yet at bottom elusive, unless one dares to think of the plant as carrying within itself the image, fainter than faint, of a more luminous passion for life than its own. We say that we can conceive one whose very life is love saying, with fulness of meaning, with fully luminous passion for life, "I *am*, because *I* am." And if we could conceive that it is just such a thought

of being that the plant is *echoing*, without being able to utter it, its semblance of sharing in a pervading eagerness, without evidence of inner kindling of its own, might cease to seem self-contradictory, and begin to seem suggestive. It may not be wholly philosophical, and yet it may sometimes become almost inevitable, to think that even the intense glow of inexhaustible colour, set there amid the sweet calms of its foliage, suggests a vital passion, perfectly blended with the life of a flower, which yet cannot be in the flower.

When we pass from plant life to animal life we find that the life of the animal is maintained through processes which go on in the animal organism, much as in the vegetable organism, without the creature being aware of them. But distinctively in the animal they are kept going through initial actions—such as watching, hunting, eating—which would cease if the animal became unconscious, or if it lost all interest in perceptible objects. The evidence has been differently analyzed by different psychologists and philosophers, but the natural impression is—and we are interested in natural impressions—that the animal's life has to be maintained by a circuit of processes involving its *interests* (instinctively prescribed). Thus *the animal itself*, we feel, is constitutionally engaged in the maintaining of its life in a deeper sense than any in which we can speak of 'the plant itself,' and still more in a deeper sense than any in which we can speak of 'the physical world itself.' For we regard the

animal as conscious. Now we have taken the expression "I *am*, because *I* am" as our standard of fulness of self-sustaining life. And if in still plant-life the reflection seems pale as the cold moonlight, in interested animal life the reflection seems to be accompanied in a focal area by something more like incandescence and warmth.

But we felt that if we had to regard the plant simply in itself, its apparent striving for fuller vital self-expression would remain provocative to our thought, yet emptily so. And even the animal, we have reason to believe, can form no judgment as to whether fulness of life is a good or not, or whether life is worth while; and yet it seems to be guided to live and grow through interests that are made to be intimately its own. If we try to regard such a form of life thoroughly and simply in itself, our sense of inability to take it up in a consistent conception may be only sharper than with vegetable life. But if we believe that there is a goodness of life which, in the deepest secret of its rooting, remains self-concealed beyond all creature thought and valuation, it may seem significant indeed that the lowly creature, incapable of *illumination* about the inner quality of life, should be caused to *taste* of life in such a way that its own experience should become an incentive to its living. Suppose the universe not an accident, but purposed. If then life were not good at the core, and yet the creature were purposely so fashioned by its Maker as to seek the sustaining of life *through its own interests*,

would not that seem almost like a deception in the universe?

With man we pass to a being to whom it would be shame to be involved in a circle of eating to live and living to eat. The body matters now for the distinctive kind of living which it supports. And it surely now becomes a question of the weightiest import for the estimation of the manhood of a man: How far can his living really—heartily and conscientiously—sustain itself? He may be kept going by interests; and they may be of such a kind that he partly knows and partly conceals from himself the truth that they keep him going all the more effectively because he never honestly held up before him any clear and penetrating estimate of their ultimate worth. But has he ever been made such a living man that he can be kept going amid and through his varied interests—more deeply than simply *by* them—upheld by the latent sense of what it is to be alive as *he* is alive? A genuine answer to that question would determine how far his is a derelict life—part of the drifts of the world, his movement being identified with them still in all the variations of its phases—or how far it is the life of a personal being, making his own distinct vital assertion in the world. And it will be seen that the question is really a putting of the question: How far can he echo, or more than echo, that expression of the fulness of self-sustaining life, "I *am*, because *I* am"?

It is One who is Love, we repeat once more,

who can be conceived to say with the fullest moral reason, "I *am*, because *I* am." And we can never enter into the unselfish self-satisfaction of such a Being except as love dwells in us; and not knowing love we shall never be satisfied with our own motive in life—and to be dissatisfied with it is not fully and personally to live. If the dwelling of love in us is impossible to us in any satisfying measure, our constitution fundamentally demands what it cannot have, and is therefore not thoroughly and manifestly reasonable.

Now we have looked into the different ranges of life that are spread out before us on their several levels in the world; we contemplated the physical manifestation of being that is more widely extended to our view through the universe; and no being appears to contain within itself the principle that would harmonize its aspects, and make it reasonable. With each type of being that we examined we found that any really explanatory reason for its moving and living as it does must lie beyond it and be working through it. And do not our greatest spiritual seers tell us that it is just the same with the truest life of man? Do they offer us any prospect of human life becoming finally interpretable while it is regarded apart as merely itself, or of its becoming fully harmonized with itself while it is lived as of itself?

That there should be no prospect of thorough interpretation or full harmonization for human life apart from fellowship with its Creator falls as penetratively into line with what we find in

nature as we could well imagine it to fall if all were designed to lead up to this. That jewelling apple-blossom, unfolding amid the yet crinkled leaves in the May sunshine, breaks forth upon a tree that seems without motive in itself from root to the forking of its stems into boughs and branches. What the tree is doing under the blue sky can be interpreted in accordance with its apparent nature only by conceiving a motive which is not of it, but in it from beyond. Those red beasts at rest in the lit-up green meadow, after food, prosper through their own contentment; but that, in the order of vital processes, they should prosper through contentment is no plan of their own. Any motive for their coming to benefit through enjoyment must be beyond them, yet it is working within them. And all the while each of these, tree and beast, is made to *be*, we have seen, in a measure because *it* is. And the highest of beings on earth, a man who has found the Way—and it is true even of the supreme Son of Man—finds that the true motive of his doing and his aiming is within him from beyond him. He finds this to be so at last in the light that is unknown to the lower creation. And while the utterance even of the spiritual man's life cannot be "I *am*, because *I* am" (for he *is* because *God* is, and lives in harmony with that truth), yet he has in him the illumined will to live, and lays hold on life as no other creature on earth can; for he knows God who is Love, and who, because he is Love, is Light—as having within himself the fully

satisfying and self-justifying reason of being. He thus realizes in his human life at last, amid the dim though variously illumined creation, the unfathomed secret which makes life reasonable, and he lives in the impulse and the joy of it.

There is that basal region of being where the blind mass, once moving, moves, apparently because it moves—I am here content with the appearances presented to us (and formulated in Newton's First Law of Motion),[1] whatever further mathematical analysis may show to underlie them. There is that spread, and even carpeting, of refreshing green—endless to the horizon and the unseen coast, and resumed beyond other shores—passive beneath our feet, yet springing *as if* life were good, and so far alive that we may feel it sleeps. There are those rough and unpolished rudiments of mind and continually urging motive, low and narrow, yet akin to our own, in the horses, and kine, and lambs with their mothers in the field. *And at this level we have at least so much of far-off likeness to* LOVE *as gleams in* LIKINGS. Above, there is our own animality, and our aspiration, not to be dissevered from it. *And still the likeness to* LOVE *develops : there are now our* CONSCIOUS AFFECTIONS. And do not all from their depth beneath the Highest—depth which yet includes such measureless height of one above another—point our eyes upward to height indeed —beyond scaling, beyond vision, beyond estimate ;

[1] We have no occasion to insist, in face of modern views of curvature, on Newton's ' straight line.'

height revealing its quality with increasing plainness from mirror to mirror higher and still higher—mirrors yet all too low until Love, dwelling from above in man, transforms its mirror into its own image?

What has really happened in the structure of this world?

Form after form of being passes before us; each calls out our thought; none is in itself reasonable. At last we realize that we ourselves, to be harmonized in ourselves and satisfied in ourselves, must be made to transcend ourselves and to live beyond ourselves—beyond ourselves in the height of our motive and beyond ourselves in the beneficence of our aim. It is Love that will thus harmonize us, and make our being profoundly and openly worth while and therefore reasonable.

And does it not look as if indwelling Love were preparing its way throughout? Is it not like Love, superior and yet brooding Love, like Love beforehand in the will to reveal itself, to be already flashing its life and the likeness of its onward-bearing and hope-inspiring energy through being that can no more grasp and understand it than the woody plants; is it not like eager, sympathetic Love to kindle the utterly uninterpreted yet significant glow in the animal mind? Is it not like inviting, anticipative Love to spread all this open, yet hidden, marvel before us, as if to hint at something as yet utterly uninterpretable to us—as if to hint at Love's secret, not to be known except

in coming to know Love itself? We have heard of love—the word is on our lips, and the beginnings of realization are in our consciousness. And the existence of a hidden Love supreme seems just what is shown us, through the reflection in nature and in ourselves, as required to make all reasonable and significant in harmony with the constitution of things.

And can this principle of possible reasonableness be last-born in the world, and be no more than it would be if it were so? If it were no more than that, how then should the thought of it, when once reached, come to breathe the promise of reasonableness so intimately through the constitution of things that came into being before it? Must not Love, which we must seek, and which every order in the creation requires for reasonableness, have been in the very origin of things? Are we not watching, not an aimless unfolding, nor a production that first simply is, and only afterwards is thought of, but a revelation preparing its way in the heart of all the known varied ranks of being?

Let us venture further into the region of abstractions.

If we become assured that the creative principle itself is one of Love, then the first problem of the creation—namely, why there should be a creation at all—ceases to be a sheer barrier to thought, and becomes vitally provocative. From the intellectual point of view, indeed, we might despair of finding any adequate *reason why* the world, the universe, should first come to be. But when we

reflect on the unfathomed gratuity of love's activities, though this lends us no hope of finding any limited, definite reason for the creation, it leaves us contemplating an abyss that is no mere intellectual blank, but which is luminous with suggestion substantial and living, though we can never reach the fundamental depths of this abyss of new-found reasonableness.

Again, from the abstract intellectual point of view it remains an insoluble problem why Being that contains all fulness and perfection within itself should find place for the creation of beings less perfect in fulness—beings the very existence of which might seem, from that point of view, to take from a pre-existent, all-pervading fulness of being, rather than adding anything to it. But now we reflect that the boundlessness of Love appears in its self-transcendence—the thought may clear as we dwell upon it for a while. And it may begin to appear reasonable that God should transcend the greatest fulness of his being that we can conceive—as it were making little of it—to go beyond it in the expression of his nature as Love. The letting go, the not insisting on retaining, some given fulness of which it might hold possession is what love, in its higher energies, is constantly doing: another name for it is 'self-sacrifice.' It becomes credible that there should be a gratuitous creation which is less than God, that God may condescend to it in expression of himself as Love.

That there should be an Incarnation begins to

look also harmoniously significant upon the same lines. Here, surely, the fulness of *self-transcending* Love appears not the less, but the more, *because* what the calculating mind might see as fulness has been laid aside. The being of God *as Love* is not less full for this. We may be prepared to see it as only the more proportionate to such an act of self-transcendence as we discern in the Incarnation if creative Love should seem to disregard the material proportions of its own creation, and act as if their vastness, in one aspect the expression of its own boundlessness, were all transcended and cast into oblivion for the purposes of this supreme self-expression as Love. How can proportion in the actions of Love be estimated by any law other than love's own ?

There is another problem that may be raised in the discussion of creation from the intellectual point of view. Everything that we observe in the universe seems to be caused by something beyond it; but a primal creative energy cannot be caused by anything beyond it, or it would not be itself the primal cause. It has been suggested that we should look back to a cause which is moved by itself. We should then begin with the *self-caused*.[1] From the purely intellectual point of view this is perhaps rather the blank form of an idea than an idea: how can we give substance to such an abstraction, or get any profit of it ? But

[1] Spinoza begins the first part of his *Ethic* ("Of God") by defining '*causa sui*'—that which is cause of itself. We are there, however, in the region of high metaphysic.

we can speak with meaning when we say that love must delight in love, and must by its very nature be self-cherishing, and that if Love be before all, and be limited by no condition beyond it, it must, by the very virtue of its own pure passion and noble self-delight, be self-caused: forever spontaneously willing its own being as an unfailing source of beneficence. When we think thus we have no longer before us merely the formal idea of self-causation: we have now a principle of self-causation which is become profoundly reasonable, because it is intensely self-justifying; unfathomable in its spontaneity, but attracting us by a depth of pure rightness which extends to the last reach of our reasoning and does not seem to end there.

All this can be said of Love as a first creative principle. And in the actual world we have seen the apparent reflection of its self-sustaining in the kind of blank form provided by the physical universe, apparently self-moving; the form, still blank, but more provocatively suggestive lovewards, of unconsciously self-maintaining vitality; the form, less blank, but not filled, of life maintained through *likings*; the human form, more conscious in its blankness, in which the satisfaction of mere likings manifestly cannot be satisfying—till we come to the promise of Love to dwell in those who truly seek fulness of life. The highest causing-to-be on earth is that of the heavenly Fatherhood. Love supreme must be the cause in us of life that is life indeed.

And if we think of the whole system of causation throughout the universe as also an expression of the nature of self-causing, all-originative Love, we find that the principle of causation involves that no objects can fully develop their own latent possibilities while they remain each apart to itself: they require the effect upon them of other objects. This means on the one hand that oxygen has it *in* it to become a constituent of water, but it cannot without hydrogen; and it goes, on the other hand, to make the world a home for love, or a place where the lack of it may be felt. Without the principle of causation how could love—love in us—express itself? If I could never be a cause of anything in my brother's life my love would be like an impulse in a paralyzed body. It is the delight of beneficent love, as the passion for life, to take effect on other lives, and be a real cause of their self-realization. Without causation there could be no self-sacrifice of one for another. The problem, the marvel and stumbling-block, of the atonement of Christ is one of causation.

In tracing those relatively blank forms of existence that seemed each to call for more filling, and with each filling to come nearer in likeness to the fulness of life that is in Love—energetic, living, capable of enjoying, self-transcending—I have availed myself of an expression which may itself appear like a blank form: "I am, because I am." It has seemed to me of uniquely directive value for bringing out the vital, and even more

than vital, vestiges of the likeness of Love in the obscurer parts of the known creation. I derive it from a Hebrew declaration of the Divine nature,[1] much older even than the declaration that "God is Love." Amid the shifting lights of present knowledge and present ignorance any translation is perhaps likely to be challenged; but I should lay stress upon the energetic force of the Hebrew verb 'to be' (and 'to become'), and upon what I suppose to be the peculiar *supporting* sense of the Hebrew relative—"*I-am-being*, as to which, *I-am-being*." The language is more familiarly translated "I am that I am," but the translation which I have been using appears in the R.V. margin. To my own mind, that the words, if they are thus to be rendered, would imply self-sustaining, and would thus be so like an anticipation in blank form of something involved in the later full declaration that "God is Love," and that they at the same time assist one in correlating the relatively blank forms, physical and vital, of the universe and the world with the finally and transcendently reasonable principle of Love, would be a corroboration of the rendering; though to other minds this correspondence might raise difficulty. For it suggests a depth of origin for the utterance, and a mystery

[1] אהיה אשר אהיה, Exodus iii. 14. The italics which I have applied to the words elsewhere to assist the English reader's immediate grasp of the supposed relation of dependence (*vide infra*) are *exegetical*. In *translating* (as above in this paragraph) I preserve an even balance.

in its early appearing, answering to that which has already impressed us in the dawning of the declaration of the Trinity.

In the context, a request has been offered for the 'name' of God—as if for some declaration of his character from which the nature and quality of his purposes in a coming enterprise might be anticipatively inferred. The answer, on our view, is a blank form, which implies on the face of it—*by* its form—that it can never be interpreted except through insight into the very motive of the Divine being. God cannot be known through any comparisons, nor can his purpose with man, arising as it does from himself and out of his own profound origination, be grasped through any descriptions. Confidence in God's ways cannot rest in anything short of God himself—otherwise our thought of the ways will be baffled in their depth, our expectation from them will be ready to perish in the greatness of their circuit, long before they have carried us to the goal. We can be anticipatively prepared for the scope of God's originative and unexampled working in the world, according to his own character, only by trust in his inward motive; we can be sustained in the fulness of patience and boundlessness of hope required for his enterprises only where there is some knowledge of himself and a prospect of knowing him more intimately and clearly. And God himself must be his own revealer. You cannot interpret the utterance about himself, or the promise in it, till he unfolds it. When,

with the vision of the Son before us to prevent the narrowing of our hopes of interpretation, and the Spirit with us to bring us to the realization of more than our hopes, we are entrusted at last with the fuller, more substantial declaration, "God is Love," it exactly fits, as we have been seeing, into the relatively blank form of the earlier declaration of self-sustaining personal being; which thus, we find, seems as mysterious in its early breaking forth as the revelation of the Trinity taking shape in advance of our psychology some centuries later.[1]

But now I am again in the position of having gone so far that I must perhaps go further, and make renewed sacrifice of compact coherence to the desire, if it may be, to be helpful.

I could not direct our thoughts on these lines without realizing that some would be asking: *Does* the world so universally reflect the characteristics of love? What of the evil that we and our fellow-beings so constantly and so poignantly suffer? There may be those who will even ask why evil should appear so intimately inwrought with the very framing of the world. And though

[1] The reader will by now be prepared to learn that I should not accept the too obvious principle that the form of all utterances about God and the appointments of God in the world is to be explained simply through attempts to reconstruct the human history of their appearance. Some of the other evidence to the contrary is highly complex, but I tried unsparingly to render a section of it plain, for sufficiently deliberate attention, in my recent *The Evening of the Last Supper*.

I do not profess in a few words to track out all the possible phases of a problem that has perplexed powerful intellects through the centuries, I will offer some thoughts which have brought what I accept for clearance to my own mind, and which have seemed to be welcome and relieving when I have passed them on to others.

I am not disposed to minimize the force of evil in the world. To-day we are trying to facilitate our progress variously by ignoring some of its aspects (there are, indeed, an increasing number of people who confusedly seek to ignore it in all—a social development the importance of which it is not very easy to estimate). On the other hand, if some sober, well-informed thinker were to forecast that to-morrow, or perhaps the day after to-morrow, accumulating circumstances would move us to turn and regard evil as being not so entirely negative, nor even so entirely blind, as we now tend to conceive it to be, his warning would not be altogether unfamiliar to my own thoughts about experience.

It is a fearsome thing, and very wounding to life, to see, in a world in which good appears so majestic a reality, and so clearly in the right of it, evil so prevalently, intimately, and triumphantly present. Its manifestations are multiform. We count them most direct, and feel we ought to count them most grievous to us, when they come most directly out of a corrupt will. But wherever we find confusion, collision, decay, there I believe it is a true vision which sees evil casting its

characteristic shadow and obscuring the fair light of order in the world.

Now it does not appear that the presence of the shadow of evil upon this planet can originate from any known form of perverse moral will among the inhabitants of this planet. I do not say that man has not sealed the conditions of evil upon the world where he should have sought to break them down, or that he has not admitted evil to his own demesne from which it should have been kept out. But we cannot attribute the creation of tooth and claw to anything that man has done; and yet, if no conflict were in contemplation in the creation of the world, what would be the use of these finely developed and beautifully polished weapons of offence as we see them in the carnivorous animals,[1] or where would be the need for defence? And can we really conceive conflict in a world of good unmixed with evil?

To point to the good qualities that may be developed through conflict is only to show that good can come of facing conditions when they *have* to be faced. It is not to show that the conditions themselves are wholly good, or that

[1] Our human constitution, while partly like that of the animals, does not include the necessity of accepting it simply as the animals accept theirs. It may at first sound rather amusing to say that we might, on reflection, regard the fact of human teeth as a badge of our call to sacrificial living. But is life sustained through the surrendered life of other things cosmically defensible, unless it be, in its use of its energies, itself a more profoundly surrendered life?

they could exist where there was no evil. Is there not a tendency to-day to accept relief in an enterprising, bustling kind of thought about this subject that rather dispenses with the attempt to penetrate? Between conditions which will always remain fundamentally opposite, after the last word of palliation about some of them has been said, we ought surely to distinguish unsparingly. When I look into the necessary arrangements of organized life, I can hardly believe other than that this world was made to be a scene of conflict; and while I do not question that good can come out of conflict—under conditions calling for conflict—I do not see how, without a stultifying twist in one's thought, one could suppose conflict to have been necessary if there were nothing but unbroken good existing to necessitate it.[1]

Now if this world was made so fundamentally fair—" and behold it was very good "—and yet it was designed to be a scene of conflict, it seems a

[1] To say that moral qualities *require* conflict for their development implies, I think, a confusion between what happens as a matter of fact under present conditions and what is morally necessary. Moral qualities are developed by *striving*, and it may be admitted that we cannot strive except as against limitations. But may we not strive towards our destined larger growth against temporary limitations which we might recognize (if we knew their nature) as being in their season salutary and friendly—friendly in their very provocation of striving? Such striving may surely exist apart from that particular species of striving—conflict properly so called—which arises from disorderly collision, and which is to-day superposed upon our striving.

natural inference that one purpose in it was an exposure, some exposure against a contrasting light, of the nature of evil.

But this leaves behind it a question why, if Love be the origin of all, any evil should exist, and there should be any such nature expressing itself in the universe to be exposed.

It may be argued that because God is Love, and is the one Reality, evil cannot really exist, and the idea of its existence must be our own self-injuring illusion. The logic is obvious enough on its own terms for those who care to surrender and confine themselves to it. That its simplicity is equal to coping with the actual richness amid which the forces of life daily move is not so obvious. Is it really so obvious, either, to the bottom, first of all, that Love, being self-transcendent, would greatly care to be in every sense the one reality? Let us distinguish ways that differ.

If, indeed, assuming the supremacy and all-sufficiency of purely *intellectual* Being, you set out to grasp the world, the whole universe, in thought, you may try to unify all being under an idea as perfectly as you can by holding to a comprehensive conception of one 'sole Reality.' That, if you could make it work, would clear the ground for you—though the difficulty is that, in clearing it, it melts it away, and logically the world and yourself and everything else but the unchanging 'sole Reality' should disappear. If, on the other hand, you are trying to see

whether the world would look as you know it day by day if Love were the origin of all—surely a legitimate experiment in thought—you must be careful to make sure that you are actually starting your thought from the basis you have now chosen for experiment. You must, on pain of fundamental confusion between two profoundly different points of view, *drop* the attempt to guide yourself by the conditions which belong only to another experiment in thinking: you must not be latently retaining your assumption that a sole Reality answering to your *more abstractly intellectual* conception must be at the bottom of all. Otherwise you do not found yourself clearly on the actual qualities of Love, and cannot give your whole mind to the required testing realization. You try to go two ways at once without knowing it: the first result is a fallacy; and if you trust the leadings of these imperfectly recognized and latently conflicting half-thoughts, the further result is likely to be blind self-contradiction in the beliefs you try to carry through in the world. If by corresponding suppressions in your own constitution you manage to make them workable for yourself, and modify your views of the world accordingly, centring all in a neutral sort of abstract Divine Entity which is not like God who is Love, you may not perceive that the last state, whatever it be in point of ease, in point of truth is worse than the first.

Trying to start firmly from what we know of love in the necessities of *its own being*, we may

begin to draw the less abstractly simple, but by no means therefore the less actually living conclusion, that evil exists even *because* God is Love, and that it is as unjustifiable and hateworthy as it is for that very reason. Let us try to see how this is.

What we have just said may *sound* very like saying that Love is *the cause* of evil—as though God who is Love were the originator of evil. But let it be remembered that statements which are built up out of elements very like for the ear may be as different as glory and shame for inner discernment. Take a human case for interpretation. A wise trainer may, just at the fit time, entrust his charges with working tools in the use of which they may develop their individual capacity; and through heedlessness some of the tools may be broken. If anyone then pointed to broken tools and spoilt work as evidences of that stimulative trainer's *want* of wisdom, the superficiality of the remark, and the lack of judgment in it, might be suitably and more deeply rebuked by warmly opposing to it the downright paradox that it was *because* of his wisdom (as a daring evoker of individuality) that the tools lay broken and the work subject to vanity. But to say that if this were so, then his wisdom *was the cause* of the breaking, and try to bring blame home that way, would only be to avail oneself of an ambiguity. It would be pointing to continuous *circumstantial links* of causation and treating them as if they were a *moral unity* of cause. We should distinguish

those two very different spheres of agency—the circumstantial and the moral. It might be correct enough to say that the violent energy of every crippling assault that has ever been delivered on this planet is traceable, circumstantially, to the sustaining activity of the sun; but the statement would not be morally elucidative, or even morally pertinent. I am not, it may be added, here comparing the sun's impersonal activity with Divine action, or with that of our imaginary trainer. I am only trying to exhibit the clear distinction of two types of consequence—circumstantial and moral. Unconscious agents are involved only in the circumstantial; personal agents are involved in both circumstantial and moral, but the two must not for that reason be confused.

Let us now try to see how evil might arise out of Love's way of working, and *because* of it, though Love can never be *the cause* of evil in any moral sense other than that in which a hurtless object can be a cause of hate profoundly alien to its own nature.

Thinkers on this subject have felt, with reason, that the problem must turn on spontaneity in the creation, on the freedom of the created. Let us immerse ourselves for a while in the thought of love and its love of spontaneity. We pictured our imaginary trainer seeking to evoke individuality in his charges, and that aspect of his school was not sketched without an eye to the nature of our special problem. But this is not enough.

Love seeks, not merely individuality in a worker, but individual spontaneity in a lover.

One truth of solid splendour that we know about love among ourselves is that love desires to be met with realities. If deep love winningly induces answer to itself, the answer must yet be so induced as to be profoundly spontaneous in the one who answers: else it is naught to love. We recognize that. Knowing love, and the love of love, we may recognize it with such a passionate contempt for all on earth about us that is not thus real as would either transform the shallow puppetries and diversions that ape love into something truer if it might, or banish and burn the whole growth of their lies out of the earth they dishonour. But if, knowing in ourselves this passion for living reality, for reality in life, for reality in answer to our own love, and in our love in answer to the love given us, we accept this as being in some degree in the image of Love supreme, of creative Love, how, next, can we carry our realization forward into our thought of the creation? Do we not find ourselves conceiving that Love must so have sought reality as to have taken what our helplessly one-sided human language might speak of as the unspeakably glorious *risk* of creating beings whose answer to Love could be free enough to be spontaneous, and so far real?

But our previous enquiry after a reasonable view of living organisms might suggest that the ideal of spontaneity in a created thing is not

altogether a simple one—not perhaps so simple as some unbridled impulses of to-day assume. All life shows forth something of the nature of spontaneity; but we did not anywhere find the constitutional activity of the living thing to be a quite simple movement 'of itself': the significance of what the living thing is doing has seemed to us always to depend on the realization through its life of a larger and more luminous ideal than any that could be purely its own. This ideal, as we ascended through the ranges of the world, took on more and more distinctly the likeness of the purpose of Love—self-cherishing being, cool below, began actually to glow in animal life, and in human life was attended by a need to find itself actually worth while. And we can conceive that Love will not be satisfied with a passive, colourless and incompletely real reflection of its ideal. That might seem to be expressed to us in the plainly visible ranges of being which leave other ranges looking comparatively passive and colourless below them. Must not love, knowing its own glory, desire a response to its ideal which comes of *appreciation*, desire a response to its ideal which is unforced and not as in the dark? And does not this involve a type of creature to which the self-justifying nature of Love can be revealed, and which yet, however influenced by the persuasion of the revelation, is not so overwhelmed and carried away by its unshaded manifestation as to lose its own power of self-determination? And yet again, surely, on the other

hand, if anywhere in the amplitude and ranks of the creation, and amid the delicately rich and tender possibilities of life, the spontaneous, self-determined creature chooses that even its *self-determination* shall be *purely* its own, it will be destroying its own finest significance of being. For unless its self-determination be its own *only as Love, to which it is surrendered with a will, enables it to determine itself*, the largest possible ideal of life will be missed. A lower way of living will be set up. And if evil never existed before, nothing more will be required for the beginning of evil. There will be a principle that develops a purpose opposed for mere self's sake to Love's fulness. There will be a self-determination separated from the central Love in which all beings rest and move in harmony, with one will in all their wealth of wills.

If such a thing has happened, when and where are we to conceive it to have happened?

We are being constrained, it may be observed, not to take a narrowly parochial view of the problem of evil. Collision and conflict appear to have been present in our own planet, in its physical, vegetable, and animal conditions, before it could set up an internal moral economy of its own with the advent of man. And if all forms of evil have a moral root, the moral root of these early manifestations in conflict would have to be sought in other moral agency than that of an earth-born humanity which had not yet appeared. Our planet is not its own universe: it does not

carry all its conditions in itself. The history of this world appears to form but a lately beginning chapter in the far-reaching history of the creation. And if we look around us in space instead of behind us in time, we find no sufficient reason for construing those conditions of collision in which we have been reading the significant manifestations of evil as being peculiar to the planet immediately about us. When, indeed, we naïvely look up to the heavens in their overspreading generality, and follow the steady movement of their clear illumination, and admire their lofty appearance of incontaminable purity, their distance may cause them to sift out for us a true imaging of that ideal order which is deeper in the thought of the universe than the deepest disorder; and the vision may at once refresh and inspire us and rebuke us; but when we take a closer view through peering instruments and intimate calculation we no longer conceive the wider universe to be exempt from violence.

The problem of evil, then, looks like being a problem of the universe, rather than a problem simply of the earth; though we may have the deepest grounds for believing that the earth has become a very special focus of the problem. In searching for the origin of evil we may seem to be looking down a vista of unknown extent beyond the planting of our local earthly growths—and we do not even know that the vista can be measured in space or time or any blending of these two conceptions alone. But without fixing the

position of the pivot of events, our previous course of thought led us to associate it with self-determination. We conceived the self-determination which might have fulfilled Love's intense inward purposes being self-diverted to set up new growth, which, though in Love's moral universe, is not truly of its wholeness. And, if we expand the view before our mind's eye, a condition which is now partly one of rivalry, based on self, and therefore prolific of division between selves, begins to take the place of one of universal harmony.

And conceive the creation to be a system of governments, superior and subordinate. That is a principle of structure which may be variously illustrated from the constitution of things. Within our own vital system are nervous centres governing in certain areas, and in turn governed by higher centres. Our world is part of a moving system centring in the sun, which again, with all its attendant planets, is thought to form part of a more comprehensive system with its centre in a star-cluster remotely veiled from us. Physically, we think we look out at night, beyond the Milky Way, into a dimly discerned universe of universes. Mentally, scientific explanation progresses by bringing facts under principles, and principles under principles of wider and still wider scope. The reader of the words of Jesus in the Gospels will find hints of more than one form which point to the conception of subordinate governments in the spiritual sphere.

You have but to suppose that we are living in a department of the creation which has been affected in the heart of its special government by a principle of rivalry distinguished from all-harmonizing Love, and you will have conceived an apt cause for those very features in the history and life of the world which we so continually, and to-day perhaps more consciously than ever, deplore. It is a world which seems characteristically at variance with the very ideal which its framing and possibilities are ever suggesting. It is a world in which simple *self* has seemed the first natural object of living; and in which serious direct thinkers could immovably imagine that pleasure must be the ultimate end, even though pleasure alone, thoroughly contemplated, ceases to please. In ideal, we can see, our mutual profiting would be in vital co-operation (and this modified the application of the pleasure-theory to practice); in fact, we make a self-stultifying progress by deadly competition. The history of our nations is a history of rivalry in which war is latent, and has been continually in open flame: we now believe that with the advance of our power over the resources of nature the loss by it must incalculably, as well as tragically, outweigh any possible gain from it; yet never was the dread of it more oppressive; and we do not know which people might be urged by that very dread into seeking the terrible unreal advantage of the first devastating blow. There is not a living thing whose frame does not speak of the necessity of

order as a condition of life; yet nature about us is in perpetual collisions and storms (which again to the scientific eye display only order convulsed); and living things are constrained by their constitution to break into the order of other living things, and reduce their organization to pulped mouthfuls in order that they themselves may live.

All this is happening about us; and yet our world is so beautiful: it may shock us, we may feel that if we were more sensitive it would wring our hearts, to turn from these things to its beauty. I am writing in May. I have wondered whether —as England, so small in the world, without great mountains or Mediterranean shores, has yet been deemed to be the loveliest country in the world—so this world to which Jesus came, small in the universe, is yet the loveliest in its kind, with its sweet, homely greens, its fair prospects, its shining rivers and its sea sparkling into lightsomeness out of solemn power, its single peerless moon. The garish cigarette-covers abandoned on the pure grass by people who take the air in the evening over it as it stretches to the slowly darkening woods against the sunset sky—these, after all, only complete the picture of what the world is like. Against the beauty, how ugly shows the desolate confusion, how dreary are the dank decays of nature itself! And if within our own systems painful conditions stab us bodily, or desire disappointed in dryness afflicts us, while the eye surveys the rich possibilities of delight

unable to enjoy them, how the bitterness of the loss of the conditions of inward harmony is brought home to us! How more horrible than all is the sin that is done under the blue skies! Is evil let into the world, and allowed intimately to affect its constitution, and still to go on to new wrongs, for a profound purpose? Is this kind of inwrought and still working contrast part of the very meaning of the world? Is evil being closely, sharply exposed through being associated with the things which God saw, "and behold, they were very good"—exposed through its essential capacity for reckless ill-working; naturally and inevitably exposed, without haste that would mar the exposure; exposed without faltering? Will something come of it?

But why such a slow, often excruciating, way? If Love really has all under control, why did it not long ago, even at once, crush out the movement contrary to itself that brings such confusion and destruction, pain and shame, in its lasting? People were asking, you remember, in the second decade of this century: Why should Love let the conflict and the suffering go on?—and they have not forgotten how they were pressed into asking it.

But before we are in a position to put critical questions about the ways of Love and their evidence, we may need to put a question about ourselves. One may ask: How much, proportionally, do I care for ease, and how much about having the very truth of things made

manifest? And which is the nobler desire? Which would a perfect Love, that loves *me* perfectly, itself desire me to desire first? It seems to me that God, not interposing the prerogative of force, and letting the narrowed rivalry to self-transcendent Love work its own violent consequences out in some sufficient degree, may give us at last a universe much the more luminous with Love's own unanswerable self-justification. And when the pressure has seemed hard to bear, when life's better hungers (yet not the very best), have seemed so long in vain that the delay has almost seemed vain also and unmeaning, and I have been ready to complain, I have found strength in the dawning thought that God is willing to bear the cost of what is going on, for the sake of his ultimate and inexhaustible manifestation of limpid truth, that will make the whole universe morally refreshing to the soul; and that the Heavenly Father is asking his children to be willing to bear some part of the cost with him, that we may be prepared for some appreciatively personal share in the glory of his issues. I cannot bring the vision of Love's open self-justification in the universe before my eyes. It must infinitely transcend imagination. But I can feel in my heart a thrill with clearness in it, and a sense of truth, and believe that if we could see the vision as it is prepared for in him through whom evil was defeated here in its very victory against him, and who said in deadly agony, "Thy will, not mine, be done," we should count Love's

perfected working out of reality through the ages transcendently worth the cost, and should discover the exhilarating lightness, by contrast with the glory of the prospect, in that cost which we ourselves may daily be called, with God's support, to bear.[1]

EXPOSITORY NOTE ON ANOTHER TRINITARIAN PASSAGE

We have reached what seems the most suitable point for referring to one great 'Trinitarian' passage which is difficult to expound because of the high combination of intimacy with indefiniteness in its close (Eph. iv. 4–6).

"*There is one body, and one Spirit, even as you were called in one hope of your calling.*" This opening is strikingly suggestive of a body as an organ of purposive expression. There is the body, and there is the animation through which alone it can be such an organ; there is the summons to an aim, together with the anticipative outlook towards its accomplishment. We are in the conative sphere.

Next we look not so much to what is to be reached as to what is established before us—we contemplate a settled *régime.* "*There is . . . one Lord, one faith, one baptism.*" The note is one of order and prescribed expression. Here we have before us not so much conative prospects as *definite presentations* for our acceptance and adoption. Not by any means the intellect alone is concerned, but we distinguish that relative definition of form which appeals to the intellect.[2] We have the coherence which is the condition of growth.

Then, last, we come to an utterance less distinctly shaped than either of those that went before, turning much on prepositions, and hardly to be interpreted unless we enter into an atmosphere and yield ourselves to a mood. "*There is . . . one God and*

---

[1] Cf. II Cor. iv. 17.

[2] On the relation of intellect to the principle of 'form,' see Chapter XII.

Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all." The writer assumes the conditions of relation to the Spirit and to the Lord to have been fulfilled: the full perfection of the relation to God comes into sight. We may recall how, in our first Corinthian passage, when we came to the thought of the Father, there were no special organizations like the gifts and the ministries;[1] and there are here no objective considerations, as of calling and hope, faith and baptism: there is just an intimate Divine presence, suggested as if it might be more realized than discerned, while yet it is specially suggested as intimate to 'all.' This repeated consilience with what is so characteristic of feeling—its remoteness from formulation and its peculiar intimacy to personality—may be taken note of for consideration with other points. If we now take up the pronouns they may recall what we have just been thinking about life. The Father is 'over' all—and the word (ἐπί) seems to express a presence in contact with us, and yet extending we cannot tell how far above us: it is God transcendent. He is 'through' all—as if finding expression through us, we cannot measure to what end. He is 'in' all—for when the Father, to whom we have access through his Son by one Spirit, has found us, his own being, which is the ultimate secret of the life that transcends us, and goes out beyond our individual living, becomes the secret of our very own life. Our life is finally harmonized with itself in him.

[1] Pp. 164, 165.

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It will help to clear up the relations of the various lines of thought that we have followed if we distinguish the three principles of Form, Force, and Value—using the second term without regard to mathematical refinement, or to the distinction between force and energy.[1]

The thinker will readily recognize that intellect is characteristically concerned with *form*—with the shapes and relations of things, with their structures and systems. Its peculiar satisfaction lies very much in reducing the materials of our contemplation into definite figurations.

The special affinity of conation is with *force*. In our striving we regard ourselves as 'exerting energy'—though the connection between our experience of conation in ourselves and our conceptions of force acting in the universe may require tracing.

In the third place, most people will readily allow that appreciation of *values* is quite different from our intellectual comparison of forms, and

[1] For our purpose, there will, I think, be no confusion involved in using whichever word better enables the imagination to serve the understanding at the moment.

quite different from our exerting of force. It would seem to be impossible to attribute worth to things, to find a value in our experience of life that induces us to cherish it, if we were absolutely cold in the way of feeling—if we did not feel. We need hardly to have penetrated into the subtleties of the relation between delight and value to be sure of their special affinity.

These special affinities are not to be conceived in closed compartments. We can be *intellectually* interested in *forces* and *values*, while still seeking with more or less success to reduce the thoughts of them to definite forms: the affinity between intellect and *form* may be described as central rather than exclusive. Again, we may recognize that the exertion of energy without reference to form would be typically aimless—a very extreme of "ado about nothing"; and we may realize also that exertion without reference to values is more than difficult to justify—it would be a spending for nought. Thus while we may realize that conation, vital striving, is more centrally related to force than either intellect or feeling is, this again does not mean that it is related to the principle of force exclusively.

When we come to the affinity between feeling and value we get the more convincing statement not by beginning from the mental or subjective side, with *feeling*, but by beginning from the objective side, with *value* itself.

Here it will be evident to us that the highest human value we know could not disclose itself

to us if there were nothing in us but passive and unintelligent feeling for it to meet. Such feeling, if it existed, could be no organ for the appreciation of moral quality, and we can hardly conceive the highest human value as without moral quality. We have to widen our psychological base. We find it impossible to think of a noble human worth existing where there is no ideal before the mind; nor can we imagine ourselves hailing the noblest development of human worth in one who has been a stranger to all striving, who has put forth no energy, who is wholly untested. But the presence of an ideal before the mind necessarily involves the contemplation of some more or less distinct *idea* of what should be, the cherishing of some *more or less definite form of thought.* And we are ourselves no judges of human worth unless we both have an ideal, and realize what striving means. Thus while appreciation of value so necessarily implies delighting that it seems centrally to involve feeling as its animation, the relation of value to feeling is anything but exclusive of relation to the intelligence and to conation.[1]

[1] The reader who is interested in abstract psychological and ethical analysis may notice that while it appears that intellect is not related exclusively to *Form*, or conation to *Force*—or *Value* to feeling—it is not so apparent that Form is not related exclusively to *intellect*, of the three phases, and Force to *conation* —or that *feeling* is not related exclusively to Value. If you think of intellect and Form, or conation and Force, the subjective phase seems wider in scope than the objective principle; if you think of Value and feeling the objective principle seems wider in scope than the subjective phase. Feeling, of the three,

In sum, I believe we have here a genuine distinction of abstract principles—form, force, value; and that intellect, conation, and feeling are united with them severally and centrally, but not in altogether exclusive relation.

With these organic distinctions brought into relief we may more plainly interpret the bearings of our second, third, and fourth chapters—in which intellect is correlated with the manifestation of the Son, conation with the operation of the Spirit, and feeling with the Love that is declared as the very nature of the Father.

What we had distinctly here was not so much resemblance, perhaps not so much even extensive and continuous analogy, between the three phases and the three persons of the Trinity, as another kind of relation which we can now signalize directly as *an affinity in principle*. In the Son the manifestation of God takes form, and intellect is concerned with form: we find a certain affinity in principle between human intellectual apprehension and the apprehensibility of God in the Son. We find an affinity in principle, again, between conation and what we learn of the Spirit: in conation we believe that we vitally exert energy, and we believe that the Spirit vitally energizes. We find an affinity in principle, once more, between our nature as

has the faintest natural hold on objectivity. In the perversion of our nature it most tempts us to live within ourselves; in the wholeness of life it most poignantly of all makes us realize that we can never be complete in ourselves.

feeling, but not satisfied in itself as feeling, and what we learn of the Father as Love—who, as Love, must surely have in his nature the supreme ground of self-delight. There is, we may say, in each instance a meeting in the sphere of a principle: the Son meeting the intellect in the sphere of definite, apprehensible form; the Spirit meeting our conation in the sphere of determinate vital tendency; the Father, as ultimate Love, being profoundly related to us in the sphere of value, in which alone our feeling can find a home.

But now again, as we saw that the relations of the three phases to the three principles, or spheres, of form, energy, and value are not to be read in exclusive abstraction, so it should be added that the relations of the principles with the Divine Trinity are not to be read in exclusive abstraction. The Son, for example, is not in himself a principle of form without impulse or attracting value; although if you think of form in relation to the Trinity you will surely think first of the Son. Analysis into compartments, which falsifies the organic vitality of the mind, is untrue also to the character of the Christian declaration of the Trinity.

A difficulty that may possibly have haunted the mind of the foreseeing reader, and that perhaps could not have been dealt with simply at the outset, may now be easily cleared up. We thought of the Son as related to the intellect, and of feeling in special relation to the Father. *We*

also contemplated the Son as revealing the Father; but—here is the difficulty—in what sense could we then go on to contemplate our 'intellect' as revealing our 'feeling'? It may now be seen that distinctness and consistency in our comparison do not require us to raise any such question here. The meeting of the Son and the intellect *in the sphere of form*, as occupied by both, or the relation of feeling and the Father *in the sphere of value*, is independent of any question whether our own feeling and intellect are *directly* related to one another exactly as Father and Son are related. The relation which you establish between positions on the right and left banks of a river are quite unaffected by your finding a bridge up-stream such as you are unable to discover anywhere down-stream: or again, a concave shield has two sides, inner and outer; a straight bar may connect two points on the inner side as no straight bar can connect two points on the outer side; but no one will thereupon question that the outer and inner sides are parallel one to the other.

Now these affinities in principle, these relations within the spheres of principles, might be acknowledged to be convincingly distinct, special, and consistent, and yet it might not be felt certain that there was here anything more than a purely *human* religious significance. The *suggestion*, so far, is that we are living 'subjects' so constituted as to have a triune Deity for their supremely fitting Object; but that would not of itself

demonstrate the existence of any such Object. In the absence of any Object the history of the suggestion would certainly be very remarkable. It would, of course, be a very strange fact if, under an impulse originating with a Jewish peasant teacher, a select body of men had created, near the beginning of this wonderful era, a conception of God for themselves which latently construed their own threefold natures as apt subjects to a Divine Object, although the Divine Object did not exist, and their threefold constitution had never been distinguished. It would be still stranger if this had happened (in accordance with the view which some hold of the development of belief in a Divine Trinity) as the result of a combination of influences working through the Jewish would-be spiritual liberator, and through the heritage of Greek thought. It would be so strange as to require looking into; and to the serious naturalistic enquirer the result might be perplexing. But, so far as we had gone, it would remain *possible*, *under difficulty*, to put forward the suggestion that the triple coincidence in principle might be due to a latent human creation of a thought of God in man's own image rather than to the foregone Divine creation of the very nature of man in God's own image.

But in considering this problem of *creation* we are thrown upon a fresh branch of comparison. There is very plainly open to our view a world of various and ordered structures—physical,

vegetable, animal, social—which we assuredly believe *not* to owe its creation to human imagination, however it did come to be. We found also an inner cosmos of the intellect, with various and ordered structures, equally unalterable in essence by human will, which corresponded step by step in salient respects to the features of the outwardly manifest world of nature. Here, in given *facts*, is a complex and inherently *progressive* base of analogy, quite apart, on both sides, from any creation by human imagination. Pursue the line of progress on the inner intellectual side—still keeping to facts—and you find that there is nothing known or suggested in the world which enables you to pursue it correspondingly on the other side *without bringing in the Christian revelation of a higher order of life and a triune Source for all things that are*. The situation has a significant look.

This comparison of facts harmonizes readily enough with the belief that a supreme Creator both shaped the whole mind in such a way that it would be a reflection of his own nature, and designed the intellect in such a way that it produces developments in parallel forms with his natural creation. On the other hand, if the comparison is valid, it is very difficult indeed, on a theory of human imaginative construction, to account for the *objective* agreement of these structures with those structures, where neither series was produced, or is alterable, by human will. It is easy to *de*duce an arrangement of

substances from a shadow; it is not so easy to *e*duce an arrangement of substances from the shadow.

But we have now had comparison between the triune nature of mind and the triune nature of Deity from two points of view: one from which the human mind appears as *subject* to its supreme Divine Object; one from which the human mind and its developments appear rather as *an objective reflection* of the nature of the Creator and his creation. The points of view being different, the reader will do well, in testing the comparisons, to remember the difference of angle: otherwise there may be interference between his fields of vision.

From the point of view of the first 'subjective' comparison, for example, Jesus was regarded as a *presentation* to the human mind: we thought of him as perceptible. From the point of view of the second, more 'objective' comparison, we compare his manifestation directly, not with perceptible presentation, but with the thought of the mind itself. The two lines of comparison may be mutually suggestive and mutually sustaining: they must not be pursued as if they could be identified one with the other. Each has its own approach; and the philosophically critical reader who remembers the inability of philosophers to reconcile to each other's satisfaction the different points of view from which the mind is regarded as a subject

of experience and an object of observation may think it not unnatural that we should be precluded from wholly exhibiting our two lines of comparison in mutually transparent unity.

Now in comparing the developments of nature with the products of intellect we started from the base of natural science, and we were confined throughout to an *abstract* view of nature and of what takes place in nature. The abstract view extended to what we saw, from this standpoint, even of the manifestations of Christ in the world. We dealt with forms, not values. Moral and spiritual realities did not come within our scope: only their embodiments. But in a closing study we considered nature less abstractly.

We found the marked tiers of nature rising as if towards a level at which a transcendent Love should be manifested in the very life of those that live in the world. The tiers rose, not as if successively complete in themselves, but as if, in their thus rising one beyond another, they repeatedly brought into fuller view the arc of some vast circle—the circle of life's suggested, but still only suggested, reasonableness. We found this arc, in comparison, but shallowly discernible in the apparent seekings of plant-life, and still manifest only as a broadly open segment in the more apparent seekings of animal life; and yet there seemed to be a rounding, from manifestation to manifestation, into more and more tense approach to the invisible figure—to

the circle of the fuller manifestation of that Love in which is the only conceivable ground of life's reasonableness.

It was very difficult to think that the ultimate self-completing circle was merely a matter of after-thought—not existing even in idea while the brokenly visible circlings of life were actually growing more and more provocative in their incompleteness apart from it. It would surely be straining paradox to try to conceive that the full-orbing Love, which seems at last, in its rising, to interpret all the mysterious changing of the growing gleams into one continuous dawn, had no existence before its own appearing to us. The capacity of the thought of Love to evoke the prospect of reasonableness from all the ranges of being in the world, from the lowest levels upwards, is not itself interpreted by supposing love's own reality first to have sprung into being among an order of creatures late born into the world.

But our conception of Love as an interpretative reality, widely dawning in the world, involved this: that the very life of an individual creature includes an impulse towards an end beyond its own individual grasp. Bound up with the very nature of individual life is an aim which the individual could appreciate and make its own only if it could have fellowship with the supreme creative Love. But as truly as a fellowship which melted individuality down to nothing would destroy the base of fellowship, so truly an appreciation forced

upon the individual would not be the individual's own appreciation. And here we may find a use for the long-permitted spectacle of the world's present disorders. Does it not tend to produce in us, by reaction, some latent approach towards a spontaneous appreciation of Love's own ways? We are at least wearied over and over again by the barren and dire results of the assertion of individuality apart from love. Would not our conscious weariness, if it were true to realities, mean a longing, a spontaneous longing of our own, for the principle of transcendent Love to be governingly re-asserted in the world's life? What else will serve? What radical hope have we, unless the reassertion is made?

But is self-harmonization with transcendent Love conceivably within the power of life that is disharmonized by its very detachment from Love? If the very secret of universal harmony for individual life lies in dependence upon a central and transcendent Love, it is surely fitting to conceive that any effective movement for re-harmonization will come from that centre—from the sustaining centre rather than from any situation of derangement more towards the circumference of the moral system. And it is reasonable to suppose that in our outlying and subordinate position we should not be able fully to grasp the conditions of re-harmonization, nor to fathom the working that would meet the conditions. Our thoughts are soon exhausted. If the intuition that Love must love love appeals to us as true, when we try

to deduce Love's necessary relations to what is opposed to love we may find that we have lost our way past finding it again. There does not seem to be any possibility of following these relations, unless Love, calling us into fellowship, should itself reveal them, or should manifest something of them to us in its very way of working.

But suppose the conditions of re-harmonization to have been provided, beyond any hope we could conceive, by transcendent Love itself. This can hardly be in every sense all that is required. Surely if Love is cherishing the spontaneous individualities that (*ex hypothesi*) it cares to harmonize with itself, it will require some attitude on the individual side. For, indeed, except as the individual appreciates Love, how can he have the most vital harmony with it, and have its inward motive as the ground and substance of his own inward motive? Appreciation is surely the necessary condition of the most profound and living dependence upon Love, and must therefore enter into a fully restored dependence.

On the other hand, we have seen individual self-dependence as the very condition of the loss of the highest significance of life, and of the breaking-out of disharmonies. It would appear that any ground of self-dependence must be shut out.

Now what attitude, what condition of mind, can include appreciation of the action of Love and at the same time exclude self-dependence—which, as self-assumption, is apt to enter even

into our appreciation? The one and only attitude, so far as I can find, which can conceivably fulfil these conditions is that of belief fixed in simplicity upon its object. That position, familiar as it is, seems to arise with much directness out of our survey of the conditions of life in its various ranks in the world: the deduction is continuous. Should anyone wish to regard this last conclusion as factitious, can he really, on thorough test, suggest any other attitude that would fulfil the vital conditions?

Belief is dependence awake to its Object—and Love would have us thus to be awake. And in such concerns we may naturally look to see belief finding its object centring in one in whom, as we said at the outset, God is made manifest. We do look that way, and we see in him a reassertion which seems exactly to answer to the fundamental needs of the world. We feel it being made by him in living spontaneity, and at his own unspeakable cost, as he says, "Thy will, not mine, be done," and steadfastly holds that principle even to realization in a death we cannot fathom. We distinguish him in the midst of the currents of the world, under the very conditions of individual life, and with a capacity of individual purposing, using that same capacity, to the utmost of sacrifice, to reassert the Divine purpose; thus, in human individual life, reasserting the Divine purpose against such a merely individual purposing as has filled the world with wrong still breeding wrongs.

Upon the diagnosis which we were led to frame of the world's evil, if we see this reassertion being made with individual force, and in oneness with the Divine purpose, and if the principle can be made effective in us, we have a living counteraction precisely answering to the world's condition—we have a principle touching the root of its disorder with a potency extending to all the branchings from the root. And if we are right in deducing from the conditions of evil that the way out for our individual life must be through belief—dependence awake to its Object —what answering centre of belief do we find, even in offer, in the whole world's history, if we exclude the cross of Christ? In this respect, that "there is no other name under heaven given among men" [1] remains literally true.

One mode of thought that is making way among us to-day leaves for individuality no ultimate and positive hope. No way of reconciliation is seen for the individual life with the one abiding principle of Being except in its very ceasing to be particular and individual. This mode of thought may be a true rendering of the self's vision in its solitude, cut off from realization of the central Love; but if the actual conditions of life point us, as we have found, to Love, then to these actual conditions it is not true. But even while this mode of thinking may offer some opiate both to one's painfully keen sense of the reality of the world's weary evil, and to one's

[1] Acts iv. 12.

moral consciousness of individual responsibility, the moral consciousness itself may, in half-stifled expression, be speaking through it. The soul, from its standpoint in the vast apparent Solitude, may be contemplating the one side that it can see of a more organic reality—namely, that only through some form of death can an individuality that has become what ours is enter into full reconciliation with the one transcendent principle of Love. And if there was one who, now manifestly possessing influence incomparable in the world, did, by an appointment emanating from the centre of the moral universe—that is, from God—die for us, die for us as a matter of moral necessity for our harmonization; if there is one who is presented for the belief of our deepest heart and very conscience as having done this; then the harmonization is offered to our belief in such a way as to constrain us to look towards the Divine centre of moral reality, and to realize the awful, reverend, and unalterable depths of that reality—deep, dare we say, as Love's love, by its very nature, of love?

Can we with full assurance deny that we have here, as at a turning-point of the world's history, a crisis holding on the one side the prospect of our harmonization with transcendent Love, and on the other side a prospect of a latently continuing self-identification with the separative principle of evil—a principle which already, within the present limited sphere of our experience, shows itself so capable of returning upon its dwelling-

places in forms of loathsomeness, of disaster, and of that anguish which, when it comes upon us, is so terribly separative and lonely in the bearing?

And what is the consequence of letting Christ and his re-assertion of the Divine principle be real to us? A countless host of those who have exemplified life in the world, in times far off and present, and with an immeasurably wide variety of temperament and intellectual capacity, have acknowledged (not necessarily in philosophical phrase) that through his great re-assertion, full even to death, their own constitution has been set upon a new foundation, their old individuality has been transcended, and all the fruits of it have become a dead letter: they have been clear that the way is henceforth open to them to live in restored harmony with the central Divine principle of life.

To find a depth answering to the depth of their consciousness of the conditions of life that is really life we must find the Personal centre of their belief. I have been approaching this great subject from the cosmic point of view, and trying by means of abstract and inadequate terms of a philosophical type to isolate and bring into relief an aspect of its reasonableness. But I should wish to make it unmistakably plain to anyone who may have been impressed by this way of approaching it that it is only a way of approach; and to warn him with the utmost gravity against supposing that the thoughts which it has offered him are anything more than outlines to be trans-

figured through the possession of the vision they seek to subserve. For the spiritual consciousness truth is personal before it can be full cosmic truth. And in the course of our survey the problems of moral personality have not so far appeared in their own directness; the significance of the cross of Christ has but been hinted through attempts, as it were, at slant-wise parallaxes. But to say where we may come face to face with it in its spiritual depth is not difficult. If there is an all-transcendent Love, and we are what we know we are, a revelation from that Love is no anomaly, but only a pursuit of transcendent order. And it is to the pages of the New Testament, in their commanding urgency and unexhausted spiritual novelty, that I would now refer the reader. What he finds there, as contrasted with our reasonings, should be all the more convincing because its appearing is so spontaneous: its world is more actual than that of philosophical conformities. And here, though he will find the utterance "God is love" in its original fount, he will not find the abstract word 'Love' used in place of the personal name 'God,' as I have used it. That use has served, I hope, its occasional and temporary purpose of simplification; but I am far from commending it except for consciously limited and special purposes—for, indeed, I even suspect that the habitual use of abstract terms for personal names in speaking of God sustains a tendency to religious self-hypnotization (one of the signs of which

may be the substitution of a kind of lubricated impassiveness for edge and outrightness in the expression of one's own personal life). To the New Testament, then, without reading the limitations of our present kind of argument into the freshness with which it discovers the foundations of the soul's peace with God.

Belief can issue in fellowship only where there is revelation. Faith in Christ involves letting him manifest himself constrainingly to us for what he is in content, force and value. And just there is the distinction, which must NEVER be overlooked—which must be insisted upon, and insisted upon, until it can no more be overlooked—between the practice of deliberate auto-suggestion and the Christian principle of faith. Auto-suggestion may work by first *feigning things* for ourselves that they may come into being for us: faith in Christ seeks frankly to realise *what he verily is* in potency for us. The resemblance, of which we have heard too much, is superficial: the contrast of attitudes involved is fundamental. The situations differ both intellectually and morally. Auto-suggestion depends essentially upon one's own openness to conviction, and works independently of interpretation: faith in Christ depends essentially upon the convincing qualities of Christ himself, and develops through interpretation. And it is in his assurance of the *conscience* that, with warrant not to be set aside without violating conscience itself, I find him convincing. I find the height and the purity of

one's conception of God to be staked upon the intermediate conviction that the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins.

Such reality will never dawn upon one merely as a result of following a course of speculative thought. I have been constrained, indeed, by the facts which I have observed, and by the haunting sense of responsibility that has resulted from the comparison of them, to set out a path of psychological and other speculation that may help to lead the attention of some in a direction from which other attractions were dissuading them. And I will confess that I was at one time ready to triumph in the anticipation that we had in the comparison of triunity the germ of an argument for Christianity so scientific and so cogent as to be unanswerable. Within a few months of my beginning in *Mind* the public announcement of it, I was to learn, under direct pressure of experience that seemed to leave no hope of ever living in hope again, that an argument may be unanswerable, and yet be totally unable to sustain a spiritual conviction, or to contribute the faintest assurance of relief to life's intensest need. I am not likely to forget as long as I live what the vision of the cross of Christ, going down in its depth beneath my sin, meant to me in that day. I have come to understand that the attempt at deduction about the deepest interests of life is like a function without an object, unless we can base it upon a *realization*; and that realization, to be fully trustworthy, must come to us with the con-

GEN. THEOL. SEM.
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

straining force of moral justification in its claim upon us. All the rest, however suggestive it may be, and however it may be related to substance, lacks substance in itself. And I know no pathway to substantial realization except as faith and prayer mutually open one another's way. What we may deduce from the tiers of nature may be known more assuredly through the crisis of the spirit—that life, not Divinely interpreted, remains uninterpretable.

THE END

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

NEW WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY

THE FAITH OF A MORALIST. *Gifford Lectures* 1926—28. *By* A. E. TAYLOR, D.LITT., LL.D., *Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.* 2 *vols.* 8*vo.*

Series I. The Theological Implications of Morality.

Series II. Natural Theology and the Positive Religions.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. *By* G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., *Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, St. Andrews University.* 8*vo.*

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. *Translated by* NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.PHIL., LL.D., F.B.A., *Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.* 8*vo.* 25*s. net.*

SYSTEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY: PROLEGOMENA. *By* EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. *Crown* 8*vo.* 10*s.* 6*d. net.*

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Editor-in-Chief: EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, LL.D. Associate Editor: ALVIN S. JOHNSON, PH.D. *In* 15 *vols. Imperial* 8*vo.* 31*s.* 6*d. net each.*

Vol. I. AARONSON–ALLEGIANCE. *With preliminary matter including Lists of Editorial Consultants and Contributors, Preface, Introduction I.* The Development of Social Thought and Institutions, *and Introduction II.* The Social Sciences as Disciplines.

Macmillan & Co., Ltd. :: London

NEW WORKS ON RELIGION

THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. *Studied with special reference to the Origins of the Christian Ministry.* *By* CANON BURNETT H. STREETER, *Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford.* 8*vo.* 8*s.* 6*d. net.*

THE PAPACY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. *By the late* PROFESSOR J. B. BURY. *Edited, with a Memoir, by* DR. R. H. MURRAY. 8*vo.*

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. *By* OSCAR A. MARTI, PH.D., *Professor of History in the Central Missouri State Teachers' College.* *Crown* 8*vo.* 10*s.* 6*d. net.*

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE. *The Greek text, with Commentary by* CANON J. M. CREED, M.A., B.D., *Ely Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.* 8*vo.*

THE FULLNESS OF SACRIFICE. *By the* RIGHT REV. F. C. N. HICKS, D.D., *Bishop of Gibraltar.* 8*vo.*

RABBINIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF GOSPEL TEACHING. *By* C. G. MONTEFIORE, HON. D.D. (MANCHESTER). 8*vo.*

Macmillan & Co., Ltd. :: London

89296
233 d
F 811
Foston, H.M.
Man and the image of God.
233 d
F 811
89296

C0-BUX-858